Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was a police officer with the New York City Police Department when she was injured while loading wooden police barriers onto a police flatbed truck. Plaintiff sued the City of New York and the New York City Police Department seeking damages, asserting, among other claims, a cause of action under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law (GML) 205-e for failure to comply with N.Y. Labor Law 27-a, otherwise known as the Public Employee Safety and Health Act (PESHA). Plaintiff based her claims, in part, on the alleged unsafe and dangerous condition of the truck. Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the general duty clause of Labor Law section 27-a(3)(a)(1) could not serve as a statutory predicate to Plaintiff’s GML 205-e cause of action. Supreme Court denied the motion in part, concluding that Labor Law 27-a(3)(a)(1) may serve as a predicate for a violation of GML 205-e. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that PESHA’s general duty clause serves as a predicate to Plaintiff’s GML 205-e cause of action for damages. View "Gammons v. City of New York" on Justia Law

After School District notified Petitioner, a tenured school social worker, that she was to be suspended without pay for misconduct, Petitioner made a written request for a hearing on the specifications pursuant to N.Y. Educ. Law 3020-a. In response, Respondent told Petitioner that she could only challenge the disciplinary determination against her by means of the procedures set forth in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the School District and a teachers association. Petitioner grieved the matter under the process specified in the CBA, without success. Petitioner then commenced this N.Y. CPLR 78 proceeding to annul the disciplinary determination, asserting that she had been disciplined without being afforded the process to which she was entitled under the Education Law. The Appellate Court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because section 3020-a plainly provides that, in any CBA taking effect on or after September 1, 1994, tenured employees must be permitted to elect the discipline procedures set forth in section 3020-a, and because the governing renegotiated CBA became effective in 2006, Petitioner was not foreclosed from invoking the statutory procedure. View "Matter of Kilduff v. Rochester City Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) adopted Medical Treatment Guidelines, which include a list of pre-authorized medical procedures and set forth limitations on the scope and duration of each procedure. The Guidelines also set forth a variance procedure, under which the medical treatment provider requesting a variance must demonstrate that the requested treatment is medically necessary. In 2009, Claimant received authorization from the Special Fund for Reopened Cases (“the carrier”) for acupuncture for chronic neck and back pain that she suffered as a result of work-related injuries. In 2010, a doctor recommended that Claimant receive additional acupuncture treatment and requested two variances under the newly-created Guidelines. The carrier denied the variance requests. A Workers’ Compensation Law Judge determined that Claimant’s medical provider failed to show that the additional acupuncture treatments were medically necessary, and the Board affirmed. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating the regulations; (2) the variance procedure does not improperly shift the burden to the claimant’s treating physician to prove medical necessity; and (3) the Guidelines do not deny injured workers due process. View "Matter of Kigin v. State Workers' Comp. Bd." on Justia Law

At issue in this lawsuit was whether workers engaged in testing and inspection of fire protection equipment are covered by New York’s prevailing wage statute. The New York State Department of Labor issued an opinion letter stating that the workers were covered but that the opinion shall be applied prospectively. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified to the Court of Appeals a question regarding what deference a court should pay to an agency’s decision, made for its own enforcement purposes, to construe a statute prospectively only. In its amicus brief in the Court of Appeals, the Department asserted that no deference was due to it by the courts deciding the litigation. The Court of Appeals answered (1) courts should give an agency no more deference than it claims for itself; and (2) a party’s commitment to pay prevailing wages pursuant to the prevailing wage statute binds the party to comply with the statute as correctly interpreted, whether or not the correct interpretation was known to the parties at the time of contracting. View "Ramos v. SimplexGrinnell LP" on Justia Law

New York City police officers and firefighters appointed on or after July 1, 2009 are tier three members of the New York City Police Pension Fund and the New York City Fire Department Pension Fund. Petitioners filed a complaint alleging that the City of New York unlawfully deducted three percent from the gross annual wages of its tier three police officers and firefighters as mandatory employee pension contributions. At issue in this case was whether N.Y. Retire. & Sox. Sec. Law 480(b) obligates a public employer to pay any portion of a tier three public employee’s statutorily required pension contribution. The Appellate Division answered that question in the positive. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 480(b) only encompasses temporary programs in place as of 1974 for tier one and two members of a public employee retirement system. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law

After the Town of Islip discontinued the practice of permanently assigning Town-owned vehicles, or “take home” vehicles, to certain employees, the union representing the employees declared that employee use of a Town-owned vehicle for personal purposes was a mandatory subject of bargaining and filed an improper practice charge with the New York State Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB determined that the Town violated N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 209-a(1)(d) by canceling “take home” vehicle assignments without negotiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that PERB reasonably determined that the Town engaged in an improper practice when it unilaterally discontinued the permanent assignment of “take home” vehicles to employees. View "Town of Islip v. State Pub. Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was terminated from her position as chief operating officer for Communication Action for Human Services, Inc., Plaintiff filed suit against Community Action and its chief executive officer (collectively, Defendants), alleging that she had been terminated in violation of N.Y. Labor Law 740(2), the whistleblower statute, for registering complaints with public agencies concerning policies and practices of Community Action. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, asserting that the complaint was deficient because it failed to identify the particular “law, rule or regulation” Defendants were claimed to have violated. Supreme Court left Plaintiff’s section 740 claim intact, but the Appellate Division dismissed the section 740 claim because of Plaintiff’s failure to “identify a specific law, rule or regulation that Defendants purportedly violated.” The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) in order to recover under a Labor Law 740 theory, a plaintiff’s complaint need not specify the actual law, rule or regulation violated; and (2) Plaintiff’s complaint in this case was sufficient to state a cause of action under section 740. View "Webb-Weber v. Cmty. Action for Human Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) from the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System and the Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New York (“retirement systems”) of the names of the retirement systems’ members. After the retirement systems refused to provide the names, Petitioner brought N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceedings to compel disclosure. Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that N.Y. Pub. Off. Law 89(7) exempts from disclosure under FOIL only the home addresses, not the names, of retirees who receive benefits from public employees’ retirement systems. View "Empire Ctr. for N.Y. State Policy v. N.Y. State Teachers' Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

This case arose out of dispute over the administration of a workers’ compensation self-insurance plan (“Plan”) administered by Herkimer County. Dozens of municipalities participated in the Plan, including the Village of Herkimer. In 2005, the County passed a resolution to terminate the plan. To ensure funding for outstanding workers’ compensation claims, the County created an Abandonment Plan that allowed municipalities to withdraw from the plan and pay a lump sum withdrawal fee. Several of the participating municipalities, including the Village, filed an action challenging the Plan and Abandonment Plan based on alleged mismanagement by the County. The County counterclaimed for breach of contract, seeking to recover the withdrawal liability. The County prevailed on summary judgment as to the liability on its counterclaim for breach of contract against the Village. After a trial on damages, the jury awarded the full amount of damages sought by the County against the Village. The Appellate Division affirmed the damages award. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that the fee for the Village’s withdrawal from the Plan reflected benefits to be paid in the future and therefore should have been discounted to its current value as of the date it was due. View "Village of Ilion v. County of Herkimer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment when he was struck by a sheet of plywood that fell from a building under construction. Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits for his injuries and then filed this personal injury action. Thereafter, the insurance carrier for Plaintiff's employer filed a motion to discontinue Plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits. An administrative law judge found Plaintiff had no further causally-related disability and that he had no further need for treatment. The Workers' Compensation Board Panel (Board) affirmed. Subsequently, in this negligence action, Defendants moved for an order estopping Plaintiff from relitigating the issue of causally-related disability. Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the determination of the Board was one of ultimate fact and thus did not preclude Plaintiff from litigating the issue of his ongoing disability. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants failed to establish that the issue decided in the workers' compensation proceeding was identical to that presented in this negligence action. View "Auqui v. Seven Thirty One Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law