Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cammeby's Funding LLC (Cam Funding) and Fundamental Long Term Care Holdings LLC (Fundamental) entered into an option agreement entitling Cam Funding to acquire one-third of Fundamental's membership units for a strike price of $1,000. Cam Funding subsequently notified Fundamental that it was exercising the option and sent Fundamental a check for $1,000. Fundamental respondent that, pursuant to its operating agreement, no membership units in Fundamental would be issued until Cam Funding provided a required capital contribution of 33.33 percent. Fundamental then sought a declaration that Cam Funding was bound by the membership requirements in the operating agreement. Cam Funding filed a counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Supreme Court ruled that the option agreement unambiguously granted Cam Funding the right to acquire a one-third interest in Fundamental upon payment of $1,000 and that enforcement of the operating agreement would interfere with Cam Funding's rights under the terms of the option agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mere reference in the option agreement to the operating agreement was not enough to evidence clear intent for the two separate contracts to be read as one. View "Fund. Long Term Care Holdings, LLC v. Cammeby's Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant and three codefendants - Eric Young, Marvin Howard and Nathaniel Williams - were jointly indicted on a theory of accomplice liability for second-degree murder and second-degree weapon possession. Young and Howard waived their right to a jury, and Defendant and Williams were tried jointly. Howard testified during the trial. Defendant and Williams were convicted of both crimes, and the judge acquitted Howard. Defendant appealed on the ground that the judge's refusal to direct Howard to testify outside the jury's presence deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The appellate division agreed and reversed the judgment of conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was prejudiced by the judge's decision to allow the jury to hear Howard's defense. View "People v. Warren" on Justia Law

Under the Sex Offender and Registration Act (SORA), offenders are assessed fifteen points if they have a history of drug or alcohol abuse or if they were abusing drugs or alcohol at the time of their sex offense. At issue in these two appeals was the extent of proof necessary to constitute clear and convincing evidence of drug or alcohol abuse under the SORA guidelines. At a SORA hearing for Defendant Michael Palmer, Supreme Court assessed Palmer fifteen points for drug or alcohol abuse based upon his admission that he was using alcohol at the time of his sexual offense. At Defendant Cornell Long's SORA hearing, Long was assessed fifteen points under the history of alcohol abuse risk factor because he admitted to drinking alcohol 1 1/2 hours prior to committing his sexual offense. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted both cases, holding that the extent of proof in these cases failed to meet the statutory standard of clear and convincing evidence of drug or alcohol abuse under the SORA guidelines. View "People v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Defendant pleaded guilty to all three counts. At the time of the guilty plea, Defendant had a prior undischarged state sentence stemming from a felony drug conviction and also faced a federal violation of supervised release in connection with two prior federal felonies. Defendant was later sentenced to a determinate prison term of twelve years. The sentencing court stated that the sentence would be concurrent to the federal sentence. In addition, as a second felony drug offender, N.Y. Penal Law 70.25(2-a) required Defendant's twelve-year prison term to run consecutively to his prior undischarged state sentence. Defendant appealed, asserting that his guilty plea was involuntary because the trial court did not advise him of the consequence of his plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the failure of the trial court to address the impact of section 70.25(2-a) during the plea colloquy did not require vacatur of the plea. View "People v. Belliard" on Justia Law

An insurance company (USF&G), having settled asbestos claims for nearly a billion dollars, sought to recover a share of its settlement payment from its reinsurers. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to USF&G. The Appellate Division affirmed, with one justice dissenting on the ground that there was a genuine triable issue of fact as to whether a portion of the settlement was for bad faith claims. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division's order to deny summary judgment on two issues and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) there was an issue of fact as to whether USF&G, in allocating the settlement amount, reasonably attributed nothing to the so-called "bad faith" claims made against it; and (2) there was a genuine issue of triable fact as to whether certain claims were given unreasonable values for settlement purposes. View "U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Am. Re-Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Following a verbal exchange between Defendant and a police officer in which Defendant swore at the officer and accused the officer of harassing him, Defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct. In a search incident to arrest, the police discovered Defendant was in possession of twenty-five bags of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress the drugs found on his person, contending that the arrest for disorderly conduct was illegal, rendering the contraband fruit of the poisonous tree. After the motion was denied, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance third degree and assault second degree. The Court of Appeals reversed, vacated Defendant's guilty plea, and granted Defendant's motion to suppress, holding (1) Defendant's arrest for disorderly conduct was not supported by probable cause due to insufficient proof on the public harm element; and (2) because the arrest was unlawful, the cocaine seized during the search incident to that arrest should have been suppressed. View "People v. Baker" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff's father (Decedent) collapsed and at a health club owned and operated by Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York, Inc. (Bally). Ambulance personnel administered shocks to Decedent with an automatic external defibrillator (AED), but he never revived. Plaintiff, as executor of Decedent's estate, brought a wrongful death suit against Bally, alleging that Bally employees negligently failed to use an available AED, or failed to use it within sufficient time, to save Decedent's life. Bally primarily argued that it was immune from liability under the State's Good Samaritan Law. Supreme Court denied Bally's motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding (1) N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 627-a imposes an affirmative duty of care upon health clubs so as to give rise to a cognizable cause of action in negligence for failure to operate an available AED; and (2) the complaint stated a cause of action based upon common law negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) section 627-a does not create an affirmative duty for health clubs to use the AEDs they are required to have available; but (2) Plaintiff pleaded a viable cause of action at common law. View "Miglino v. Bally Total Fitness of Greater N.Y., Inc." on Justia Law

After falling on the street and injuring her leg, Plaintiff commenced this negligence action against Communications Specialists, Inc. (CSI) for creating a hazardous condition in the road by failing to properly pave over a trench CSI cut to install high-speed fiber-optic cable underneath the street. To rebut Plaintiff's testimony that a dip in the trench caused her to fall, CSI subpoenaed a physician who treated Plaintiff shortly after the accident and declared that Plaintiff "tripped over a dog." CSI paid the doctor $10,000 for appearing at trial. Plaintiff's counsel asked the court to charge the jury that, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8001, the doctor was entitled to a witness fee of $15 per day. The court gave the jury a general bias charge but made no specific reference to the payment the doctor received for appearing at trial. The jury found that CSI was negligent but that such negligence was not a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court should have issued a bias charge specifically tailored to address the payment CSI made to the doctor; but (2) the court's failure to issue such an instruction in this case was harmless. View "Caldwell v. Cablevision Sys. Corp." on Justia Law

Three police officers pulled over Defendant's vehicle because of a defective rear brake light. While the vehicle was stopped, one of the officers asked the vehicle's occupants if they possessed any weapons. The offices subsequently discovered weapons in the vehicle. An ensuing misdemeanor information charged Defendant with two counts of misdemeanor possession of an air pistol or rifle. Supreme Court granted Defendant's motion to suppress the air rifles recovered from his vehicle, holding that the officer's inquiry into the presence of weapons required suspicion of criminality and that mere nervousness on the part of occupants did not give rise to such suspicion. Upon reargument, Supreme Court reversed its prior order, finding that the officer's inquiry was permissible even though the officer lacked a foundation of criminality. The Appellate Division reversed, granted Defendant's suppression motion, and dismissed the information. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the appellate division did not err in suppressing the air guns; but (2) the case should be remitted for consideration of the People's alternative claim that officers would have inevitably discovered the disputed physical evidence. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant Inepar S.A. Industria e Construc es (IIC) was a Brazilian power company that held a sixty percent stake in Defendant Inepar Investments, S.A., a corporation organized under the laws of Uruguay. Plaintiff IRB-Brasi Resseguros S.A. (IRB), a fifty percent state-owned corporation organized under the laws of Brazil, purchased $14 million of Inepar's global notes. After the interest payments ceased, and IRB never received the payment of the principal, Plaintiff sued IIC and Inepar seeking payment of the global note principal and the unpaid accrued interest. Inepar defaulted in this action. IIC moved for summary judgment, arguing that the guarantee IIC provided to guarantee the punctual payment of principal and interest under the terms of the global notes was void under Brazilian law and that New York's choice-of-law principals should apply, resulting in the application of Brazilian substantive law. Supreme Court ruled the express choice of New York law in the parties' contract should be given mandatory effect and ruled in favor of IIC. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a conflict-of-laws analysis need not be undertaken when there is an express choice of New York law in the parties' agreement. View "IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar Invs., S.A." on Justia Law