Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a national satellite television provider, purchased equipment used to deliver programming to its customers. Between March 2000 an February 2004, Petitioner did not pay sales or use taxes on its equipment purchases from manufacturers, and instead, collected sales taxes from its customers at the time the equipment was leased to them. Following an audit in 2005, the Department of Taxation and Finance issued a notice of determination assessing Petitioner an additional $1.8 million in use taxes in use taxes for the same period on the basis that Petitioner owed taxes at the time it purchased the equipment from manufacturers. The Tax Appeals Tribunal upheld the notice of determination. The Appellate Division confirmed the Tribunal's determination. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner's purchases of equipment used to deliver programming to its customers were exempt from sales and use taxes under New York's Tax Law. View "EchoStar Satellite Corp. v. State Tax Appeals Tribunal" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, among other charges. At his initial trial, the jury deadlocked on that charge but rendered a partial verdict convicting Defendant of the lesser included offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. Prior to the second trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss the count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, arguing that reprosecution for that offense would violate double jeopardy. The court denied the motion and proceeded to trial, convicting Defendant of third degree criminal possession. The appellate division reversed and dismissed the count of the indictment charging Defendant with third degree criminal possession, finding that Defendant's conviction of the lesser included offense of seventh degree criminal possession was deemed an acquittal of third degree possession and that double jeopardy barred Defendant's retrial for the greater offense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that by opting for a mistrial and a retrial on the remaining counts, Defendant could not now claim his retrial was barred. View "People v. McFadden" on Justia Law

Each of these consolidated appeals involved a police officer who responded to provide assistance at the World Trade Center following the September 11, 2001 attacks. Two officers sought accidental disability retirement benefits (Bitchatchi and Macri), and the surviving spouse of another officer made a claim for line-of-duty death benefits (Maldonado). The primary issue was whether the pension fund Respondents produced competent evidence to rebut the statutory World Trade Center (WTC) presumption accorded to Petitioners' claims. The WTC presumption states that an officer's disability or death as a result of a qualifying condition is presumed to be caused by his or her exposure at the WTC site for purposes of benefit upgrades. The Supreme Court held that Respondents in these cases did not meet their burden of disproving that the officers' disabilities or death were causally related to their work at the WTC and related sites, thus affirming in Bitchatchi and Macri and reversing in Maldonado. View "Bitchatchi v. N.Y. City Police Dep't Pension Fund Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

Supreme Court convicted Defendant of three crimes of terrorism under N.Y. Penal Law 490.25 premised on first-degree manslaughter, attempted second-degree murder and second-degree weapon possession, as well as second-degree conspiracy for agreeing to commit first-degree gang assault as a crime of terrorism. The Appellate Division modified by reducing the terrorism convictions to the three primary offenses, holding that the People established that Defendant only engaged in gang-related street crimes, not terrorist acts. Both parties appealed. On the People's appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence in this case was insufficient to establish Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under Penal Law 490.25, as Defendant's criminal acts as a member of a gang were not acts of terrorism under the statute. On Defendant's cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial on the underlying offenses specified in the terrorism counts because the theory of terrorism should not have been charged, and the People were therefore permitted to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence that unduly prejudiced the jury's ability to fairly adjudicate Defendant's guilt or innocence. View "People v. Morales" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were owners of real property in the Town of Chester (Town), New York. Plaintiffs then lived in New Jersey, and their address there appeared on the deed. Plaintiffs subsequently moved without informing the Town taxing authorities of their new address. After Plaintiffs failed to pay taxes on their New York property for three years, Plaintiffs defaulted in a foreclosure proceeding brought by the County on their New York property. The property was later sold. Plaintiffs subsequently sued the County, asserting that the attempts to give them notice of the foreclosure were constitutionally inadequate and seeking a declaration that they still owned the property. Supreme Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) when notice mail to Plaintiffs at their last known address proved undeliverable, the tax collector was not constitutionally required to find some means of making personal service on them, or to address a notice to "occupant" at the former address, or to search New Jersey public records for a new address; and (2) therefore, Plaintiffs were not deprived of their property without due process of law. View "Naughton v. Warren County" on Justia Law

Defendants were two owners of an apartment in a condominium (the Tomchinskys) and a company the Tomchinskys hired to renovate their unit (Company). Additional defendants were the condominium, its board of managers, and the Trump Corporation (collectively, the condominium defendants). Plaintiff, an employee of Company, was allegedly injured while working in the Tomchinskys' apartment. Plaintiff sued Defendants, claiming common-law negligence and violations of N.Y. Labor Law. Several parties moved for summary judgment, including Plaintiff, who cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on his cause of action alleging a violation of N.Y. Labor Law 241 (6). Supreme Court denied the motions and cross motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed in part, granting the condominium defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims asserted against them. Plaintiff appealed the denial of his cross motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division did not err in affirming Supreme Court's denial of Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability under the Labor Law. View "Guryev v. Tomchinsky" on Justia Law

Defendant took an undercover police officer to meet a drug dealer, handled the cocaine transaction for the officer, and then gave him the drugs. For these acts, Defendant was charged with selling cocaine, facilitating the sale, and possessing narcotics. At trial, Defendant claimed he was not guilty of the sale or facilitation counts because he was acting as the agent of the buyer. The trial court acquitted Defendant of the sale under an agency theory but convicted him of facilitation and possession. At issue on appeal was whether a claim of agency may be interposed as a defense to the crime of facilitating a drug sale. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) based on the plain language of the facilitation statutes and the historic rationale underlying the agency doctrine, agency may not be interposed as a defense to a charge of criminal facilitation; and (2) therefore, Defendant was properly convicted of that offense. View "People v. Watson" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of driving while intoxicated and operating a vehicle with a backseat passenger under sixteen years of age without a seatbelt. Defendant moved to suppress her statements made prior to her arrest. The justice court found the evidence before the arresting officers was insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest Defendant and accordingly dismissed the charges. The appellate term affirmed the dismissal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) both the justice court and the appellate term applied the correct standard of proof in deciding the question of probable cause for arrest; and (2) further review on the issue of probable cause for arrest was precluded. View "People v. Vandover" on Justia Law

Twenty passengers of the Ethan Allen, a public vessel operating as a tour boat, were killed and several others were injured when the boat capsized and sank. Claimants, individuals who were injured and the personal representatives of those who died due to the accident, commenced this action against the State alleging that it had been negligent in certifying an unsafe passenger capacity and in failing to require a new stability assessment after the vessel had been modified. The Court of Claims denied Claimants' motion to dismiss the State's affirmative defense of immunity and denied the State's cross-motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed as modified, finding that the inspections were a governmental function but that the State had failed to demonstrate its inspectors had in fact exercised any discretion in certifying the vessel's passenger capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding (1) the inspections at issue here were consistent with those deemed governmental functions; (2) statutory obligations did not create a special duty of care owed by the State to Claimants; and (3) because the State owed no special duty to Claimants, the claim that the State's inspectors failed to certify safe passenger capacity on the vessel must be dismissed. View "Metz v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the judge of the county court (Respondent) exceeded his authority when he disqualified the county district attorney (Petitioner) and his staff from prosecuting a case against Defendants and appointed a special attorney to pursue the case. The underlying case stemmed from an investigation initiated by Petitioner and other agencies relating to the illegal sale of steroids and other prescription drugs over the internet. After Defendants were indicted, they commenced a civil action against Petitioner and his staff, alleging that their federal constitutional rights had been violated during the prosecution of the criminal case. Respondent subsequently disqualified Petitioner from further prosecution of the matter, reasoning that the pending civil law suit against Petitioner and his staff created a conflict of interest sufficient to warrant dismissal of the indictment. Thereafter, Petitioner commenced a proceeding pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 seeking to prohibit enforcement of Respondent's orders. The appellate division granted the petition and vacated the orders. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Respondent exceeded his statutory authority by disqualifying Petitioner from the underlying matter and that the appellate division's decision to exercise its discretion in issuing the writ of prohibition was appropriate. View "Soares v. County Count (Herrick)" on Justia Law