Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of murder, attempted murder, assault, and weapons offenses. The theory of the defense at trial was that the real killer was not Defendant, but the leader of Defendant's gang, Simeon Nelson. Defense counsel attempted to interview Nelson before trial, and the prosecutor tried to use that effort to the People's advantage during the People's summation. The appellate division affirmed. Twelve years later, Defendant moved to set aside his conviction, arguing that the prosecutor had accused defense counsel of trying to fabricate a defense, with the result that Defendant was deprived of his right to conflict-free counsel. The county court denied the motion. Defendant then began the present coram nobis proceeding, arguing that appellate counsel was at fault for failing to argue, on appeal, that the conduct of the prosecutor at trial subjected Defendant's trial lawyers to ethical conflicts and thereby deprived Defendant of the effective assistance of trial counsel. The appellate division denied coram nobis relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate that his appellate counsel was ineffective. View "People v. Townsley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendant formed and managed a limited liability company for the purpose of entering into a long-term lease on a building in Manhattan. Later, Defendant took sole possession of the property and bought Plaintiffs' membership interests in the LLC. Defendant subsequently assigned the lease to a subsidiary of a development company. Believing that Defendant surreptitiously negotiated the sale with the development company before he bought their interests in the LLC, Plaintiffs commenced this action against Defendant, claiming that, by failing to disclose the negotiations with the development company, Defendant breached his fiduciary duty to them. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. A divided Appellate Division modified Supreme Court's order, allowing four of Plaintiffs' claims to proceed - breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, unjust enrichment, and fraud and misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals reversed ad dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety, relying on its recent decision in Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.A.B. de C.V. View "Pappas v. Tzolis" on Justia Law

A town and county squabbled in and out of court for five years over whether the county's department of human resources was required to provide the town with documentation of an employee's fitness to resume work before the town reinstated him to his position under N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 71. On the employee's second visit to the appellate division, the court concluded that section 71 did not require the department to provide the town with medical certification or an underlying medical report. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when a civil service commission or department directs a municipal employer to reinstate an employee pursuant to a medical officer's determination of fitness under section 71, the municipal employer must immediately reinstate the employee, and a challenge to such a determination must take the form of a N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding. View "Lazzari v. Town of Eastchester" on Justia Law

Respondent was convicted of attempted rape in the first degree. A trial was later held pursuant to N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law, article 10, after which a jury found that Respondent was a detained sex offender who suffered from a mental abnormality within the meaning of that statute. At a later hearing, Supreme Court, acting without a jury, concluded that clear and convincing evidence in the record established that Respondent was a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement, and committed him to a secure facility. Respondent appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the State did not violate Respondent's rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal and State Constitutions; and (2) Respondent was not denied his state constitutional right to trial by jury. View "State v. Myron P." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree. In a statement given shortly after the homicide, and at trial, Defendant admitted fatally stabbing her estranged boyfriend but claimed she had done so while attempting to defend herself. The trial evidence showed that Defendant had been a frequent victim of sexual and other physical abuse since her early childhood. After a social worker testified that Defendant had stabbed another man in the thigh and that Defendant was "very angry toward men" for all the abuse she had suffered, the prosecutor argued that the fatal stabbing had been motivated by anger and not by a reasonably perceived need to resort to deadly force for self-protection. Defendant's principal appellate contention was that the social worker's testimony should not have been received. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the evidence was not demonstrably relevant to the specific state of mind at issue in this case and was more prejudicial than probative. View "People v. Bradley" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with endangering the welfare of a child. During the court of Defendant's bench trial, the trial court restrained Defendant without articulating a specific justification for doing so. Defendant was convicted of the charge. The Appellate Court upheld the conviction, rejecting Defendant's claim that the trial court erred in ordering that he remain handcuffed during the proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the rule governing visible restraints in jury trials applies with equal force to non-jury trials, and the district court erred in failing to state a basis on the record for keeping Defendant handcuffed throughout these proceedings; but (2) based upon the Court's recent holding in People v. Clyde, the constitutional error committed here was harmless. View "People v. Best" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were several dozen national and international citizens who resided in Israel and were injured in rocket attacks allegedly launched by Hizballah during the Second Lebanon War. Plaintiffs brought suit against the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB), a defunct bank headquartered in Beirut, claiming that LCB assisted Hizballah in committing the illegal attacks. The lawsuit was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs asserted personal jurisdiction over LCB under New York's long-arm statute. The district court granted LCB's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals accepted questions of law from the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals and answered (1) a foreign bank's maintenance of a correspondent bank account at a financial institution in New York and use of that account to effect dozens of wire transfers on behalf of a foreign client constitutes a "transaction" of business in New York within the meaning of the long-arm statute; and (2) Plaintiffs' claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Alien Tort Statute, or for negligence or breach of statutory duty in violation of Israeli law arose from LCB's transaction of business in New York within the meaning of the long-arm statute. View "Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL" on Justia Law

Having decided to arrest Defendant for driving with a revoked license, a police officer also decided to impound the car he was driving. The officer did not inquire whether Defendant's passenger, who was not the registered owner of the car, was licensed and authorized to drive it. Defendant pled guilty for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the officer acted unreasonably when he decided to impound and search the car without inquiring whether the passenger was licensed and authorized to drive it. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) no such inquiry was constitutionally required; and (2) the officer's search of the car after he decided to impound it was a valid inventory search. View "People v. Walker" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the parties' contract language specifying that Seller's "sole remedy" was liquidated damages and Seller had "no further rights" against the defaulting purchaser (Buyer), trumped language in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5001(a) directing that statutory interest be awarded in a contract dispute. Buyer commenced this action to recover its down payment. Supreme Court rendered a judgment awarding Buyer the down payment plus statutory interest. The Appellate Division modified to vacate the award of statutory interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the contract language controlled in this instance; and (2) therefore, Buyer was not entitled to statutory pre-judgment interest. View "J. D'Addario & Co. v. Embassy Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

East Midtown Plaza Housing Company, a limited-profit housing company organized under the Mitchell-Lama Law, sought to withdraw from the Mitchell-Lama program and become a private cooperative apartment complex. A vote was taken on a revised privatization plan, and the proposal would have been approved if the votes were tallied using a one-vote-per-share rule, but not if counted under a one-vote-per-household formula as directed by the certificate of incorporation and City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD). Following the vote, East Midtown filed a proposed second amendment stating that the plan had been adopted by the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the outstanding shares of East Midtown. The Attorney General refused to accept the amendment. East Midtown responded by commencing this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding seeking to compel the Attorney General to accept the second amendment declaring the plan effective and to direct HPD to recognize that the plan achieved the necessary two-thirds shareholder vote. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the courts below correctly held that the vote should be calculated using the one-vote-per-apartment formula, and therefore, the necessary two-thirds approval was not met. View "E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co. v. Cuomo " on Justia Law