Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants in these three consolidated appeals were convicted of depraved indifference murder for driving in an outrageously reckless manner while intoxicated by alcohol or drugs and causing the death of at least one other person. Defendants challenged their convictions, contending that the evidence was not legally sufficient to support their convictions. Specifically, Defendants asserted that there was insufficient proof they had the requisite mental state of depraved indifference. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that there was sufficient evidence in each case that Defendants were aware of and appreciated the risks caused by their behavior. View "People v. Heidgen" on Justia Law

In 2011, Petitioner was convicted several crimes. In 2012, Petitioner was convicted of additional crimes. In all, Petitioner was sentenced to five definite one-year terms of imprisonment, four of which were imposed to run consecutively. Respondents calculated Petitioner's consecutive definite sentences by awarding Petitioner jail time credit for time served prior to the commencement of his 2011 sentences as well as good time credit. Respondents then applied these credits against Petitioner's court-imposed aggregate term of imprisonment, reducing it to 868 days. Because this term was longer than two years imprisonment, Respondents adjusted Petitioner's discharge date to exactly two years from the date his sentences commenced. Petitioner filed a petition seeking to compel Respondents to recalculate his sentence by applying his jail time and good time credits against the two-year term imposed under N.Y. Penal Law 70.30(2)(b). The Appellate Division ordered Petitioner's immediate release from county jail. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, when Penal Law 70.30(2)(b) limits consecutive definite sentences to an aggregate term of two years imprisonment, jail time credit and good time credit should be deducted from that two-year aggregate term rather than the aggregate term imposed by the sentencing court. View "People ex rel. Ryan v. Cheverko" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here were a group of travel companies that enable customers to make online travel arrangements, including hotel reservations. Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of Local Law 43, a hotel room occupancy tax applicable to online travel companies. Alternatively, Plaintiffs contended that the law did not apply to them because their service fees were not "rent" within the meaning of the state enabling legislation. Supreme Court held (1) the law was constitutional, and (2) the plain language of the state statute authorized the City's tax. The Appellate Division reversed, holding (1) the enabling legislation did not provide the City with broad taxation powers to tax Plaintiffs' fees, and (2) the City's tax was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the City had the authority to enact the tax and that the Appellate Division erred when it declared the tax unconstitutional. View "Expedia, Inc. v. City of New York Dep't of Fin." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in these cases were judgment debtors whose bank accounts were frozen by judgment creditors in anticipation of enforcement of a money judgment pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 52. Plaintiffs brought putative class actions in federal court seeking injunctive relief and money damages against their banks on the grounds that their bank accounts were restrained in violation of the Exempt Income Protection Act (EIPA), which requires banks, when served with restraining notices by judgment creditors, to forward certain notices and forms to judgment debtors. In these cases, the banks allegedly failed to send the required forms. The district courts granted the banks' motions to dismiss, concluding that the EIPA does not imply a private right of action. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, which answered by holding (1) a private right to bring a plenary action for injunctive relief and money damages cannot be implied from the EIPA; but (2) a judgment debtor can secure relief from a bank arising from a violation of the EIPA in an Article 52 special proceeding. View "Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child. Prior to Appellant's release from prison, the Department of Correctional Services transferred Appellant to Kirby Psychiatric Center. During his confinement at Kirby, the State filed a N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 civil management petition against Appellant. A jury found that Appellant suffered from a mental abnormality, and the court assigned him to the Office of Mental Health for confinement in a secure facility. Appellant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that Supreme Court erred when it allowed experts to testify to unreliable hearsay when the hearsay served as the underlying basis for the experts' opinion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding (1) the trial court improperly permitted the State's experts to introduce certain unreliable hearsay as well as some hearsay with a patina of reliability that nevertheless was more prejudicial than probative as a matter of law; and (2) these errors denied Appellant due process. View "State v. Floyd Y." on Justia Law

At issue in these consolidated criminal appeals was whether, prior to permitting a defendant to plead guilty to a felony, a trial court must inform the defendant, if the defendant is not U.S. citizen, that he or she may be deported as a result of the plea. The Court of Appeals held that due process compels a trial court to apprise a defendant that, if the defendant is not a U.S. citizen, he or she may be deported as a consequence of a guilty plea to a felony. In so holding, the Court (1) overruled the portion of its decision in People v. Ford which held that a court's failure to advise a defendant of potential deportation does not affect the validity of the defendant's plea; and (2) held that the trial court's failure to notify a pleading non-citizen defendant of the possibility of deportation does not entitle the defendant to automatic withdrawal or vacatur of the plea, but rather, in order to overturn his or her conviction, the defendant must establish the existence of a reasonable probability that, had the court warned the defendant of potential deportation, the defendant would have rejected the plea and opted to go to trial. View "People v. Peque" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree for possessing a loaded firearm. The count was based on evidence that a loaded gun was found in Defendant's home. With the indictment, the People filed a special information alleging that Defendant had previously been convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. Supreme Court reduced the charge to third degree possession. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the second degree charge. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant was entitled to rely on the so-called "home or business" exception in the definition of second degree weapon possession despite his prior conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Defendant had a previous conviction, the exception did not apply. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant, a convicted criminal, was convicted of the class C felony of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and sentenced to three and one-half years in prison for possessing a loaded weapon in his home. Defendant appealed, arguing that, while the State did have power to punish him for having an unlicensed handgun in his home, his conviction infringed on his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms where his punishment was unusually severe. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant's sentence did not raise constitutional problems in this case. View "People v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Petitioners were current and former elected officials and appointed officers of the Village of Freeport. In 2008, Water Works Realty Corp. commenced lawsuits against the Village and Petitioners alleging, inter alia, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act. The Freeport Board of Trustees authorized the Village to defend and indemnify Petitioners, but after Petitioners refused to settle with Water Works due to Water Works' requirement that Petitioners sign a stipulation of discontinuance containing a nondisparagement clause, the Village withdrew Petitioners' defense and indemnification. Petitioners subsequently filed an action seeking a judgment directing the Village to provide a defense. Supreme Court denied the request. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the municipality could withdraw its defense and indemnification of Petitioners for their failure to accept a reasonable settlement offer, and Petitioners' First Amendment concerns with respect to the settlement's nondisclosure clause did not warrant a different conclusion. View "Lancaster v. Inc. Vill. of Freeport" on Justia Law

Claimant was employed at a secure juvenile detention facility operated by the State Office of Children & Family Services (OCFS) when she was assaulted, raped, and abducted by a resident. Claimant received workers' compensation benefits for her injuries. Claimant also filed a civil rights lawsuit in federal district court against OCFS and three supervisory OCFS employees seeking, inter alia, punitive damages. The federal lawsuit was settled. The New York State Insurance Fund (SIF), the workers' compensation carrier in this case, approved the settlement. In so doing, SIF reserved its right to take a credit against Claimant's payments of benefits until the credit was exhausted. The Workers' Compensation Law judge (WCLJ) decided that SIF was not entitled to offset the proceeds of a civil rights lawsuit that sought punitive damages. On appeal, the Workers' Compensation Board found in SIF's favor. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in light of the terms of the settlement in this case, SIF could take a credit against the settlement proceeds of Claimant's lawsuit against her employer and coemployees for injuries arising from the same incident for which Claimant received worker's compensation benefits. View "Beth V. v. State Office of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law