Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Abacus commenced this action against ADT and Diebold to recover damages under tort and contract theories for losses incurred during a burglary of the bank. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint with one exception. The court concluded that Abacus had adequately stated a cause of action for breach of contract against ADT for its alleged losses other than losses allegedly sustained by its safe deposit box customers. View "Abacus Fed. Sav. Bank v ADT Sec. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose when the superintendent of the school district preferred eight charges of misconduct and/or incompetence against petitioner, then the business manager for the school district. At issue was whether persons who have testified in a Civil Service 75 disciplinary hearing were required to disqualify themselves from subsequently acting upon any of the charges related to that hearing. The court held that, because the testimony of the testifying witnesses, concerning the charges levied pursuant to section 75, rendered them personally involved in the disciplinary process, disqualification was necessary. View "Matter of Baker v Poughkeepsie City School Dist." on Justia Law

The Town commenced this proceeding to challenge the DEC's denial of portions of its request for information under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), Public Officers Law 87[2][g]. Specifically, the Town, a municipality that obtained its drinking water from the Hudson River, sought information relating to the Hudson River dredging project and the availability of alternative water supplies for local residents. The DEC denied access to certain records exchanged with the EPA by invoking the FOIL exception for inter-agency or intra-agency materials. The court agreed with the Town that this exemption was not applicable under the circumstances presented and therefore modified the determinations. View "Matter of Town of Waterford v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation" on Justia Law

Petitioner was on parole in January 2009 when he was arrested for arson in the third degree and related offenses stemming from two separate incidents involving the same victim. Petitioner subsequently commenced a CPLR 70 proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition was dismissed under CPL 520.10(2) where the judge concluded that the statute did not preclude a judge from setting a single form of bail. The Appellate Division affirmed. The court reversed and held that CPL 520.10(2)(b) prohibited a court from fixing only one form of bail. View "People ex rel. McManus v Horn" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that there was a violation of CPL 310.20(2) and that harmless error analysis could not be applied. The court has held that it was reversible error, not subject to harmless error analysis, to provide a jury in a criminal case with a verdict sheet that contained annotations not authorized by CPL 310.20(2). The Legislature, responding to these decisions, amended the statute to expand what was permitted in the verdict sheet, but it left the basic principle unchanged: Nothing of substance could be included that the statute did not authorize. Because that rule was violated in this case, the court's previous holdings required that defendant's conviction be set aside. View "People v Miller" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree, two counts of robbery in the first degree, and robbery in the first degree. At issue was whether CPL 430.10 precluded the Appellate Division from remitting a case for resentencing after concluding that the trial court imposed unlawful consecutive sentences on two of the counts. The court held that, the Appellate Division, having found that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence, possessed the authority to remit the matter to the trial courts for resentencing. By choosing to remit this matter to Supreme Court, the Appellate Division left the determination of the proper resentence to the discretion of Supreme Court. The court also concluded that defendant's remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit where, viewing the record as a whole, defendant received meaningful representation. View "People v Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder in a factory while cleaning a product manufactured by his employer. The product in question was a steel "wall module" made by the third party defendant. At issue was plaintiff's claim under Labor Law 240(1) against Bechtel, the purchaser of the wall module, and defendants, the third party defendant's landlords. The court held that section 240(1) did not apply to an injury suffered while cleaning a product in the course of a manufacturing process. Such injuries could hardly be uncommon; the court inferred that it had been generally and correctly understood that the statue did not apply to them. Accordingly, plaintiff's activity was not protected under section 240(1). View "Dahar v Holland Ladder & Mfg. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose when defendant, landlord, without giving notice to or receiving permission from plaintiff, entered the demised premises at issue and installed cross-bracing between two existing steel support columns on both of plaintiff's leased floors causing a change in the flow of patron foot traffic on the first floor and slight diminution of the second floor waiting area. At issue was whether a minimal and inconsequential retaking of space that had been leased to a commercial tenant constituted an actual partial eviction relieving the tenant from all obligation to pay rent. The court concluded, under the circumstances of the case, where such inference by a landlord was small and had no demonstrable effect on the tenant's use and enjoyment of the space, total rent abatement was not warranted. View "Eastside Exhibition Corp. v 210 E. 86th St. Corp." on Justia Law

Insurer commenced the instant suit against insureds, alleging eight causes of action and requesting a declaration that the insurer's policy provided no coverage or duty to indemnify any amount paid or payable by insured and the plan in an underlying class action suit. At issue was whether the disputed language in an insurance policy extended coverage to alleged violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., by insureds. The court reaffirmed fundamental principles of insurance contract interpretation and held that the plain language of the policy did not cover such acts and, therefore, the Appellate Division correctly held that insurer was entitled to summary judgment and a declaration that was not required to indemnify insured in the manner requested. View "Federal Ins. Co. v Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp." on Justia Law

The Helseths first learned of the underlying foreclosure action and a scheduled auction sale of the property at issue when they were informed by their real estate broker that potential buyers had inquired about the lot. As a result, they moved by order to show cause to stay the sale of the property but Supreme Court declined to sign a temporary restraining order, adjourning the matter to a date after the auction. Consequently, the Helseths appeared at the auction and submitted a winning bid, paying a deposit. However, they failed to remit the remaining balance and the County auctioned the property to another party. At issue was whether the County provided sufficient notice, in accord with constitutional due process, of the release option offered pursuant to Local Law No. 7 of County of Orange. The court concluded that the release option in this appeal was a discretionary, permissive remedy made available to the Helseths after the property was lawfully foreclosed and conveyance to the County did not establish or extend a property right entitled to due process protection as any property interests held by the Helseths were lawfully extinguished as of the expiration of their right to redemption and the entry of the judgment of foreclosure. Rather, the release was simply an option to repurchase property then-owned by the County. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and that branch of respondents' motion, which was to allow them to pay back taxes and interest due for a release with respect to the property, denied. View "Matter of Orange County Commr. of Fin. (Helseth)" on Justia Law