Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Under Real Property Tax Law 523-b, the State Legislature authorized Nassau County to establish the Nassau County Assessment Review Commission (ARC) for the purpose of "reviewing and correcting all assessments of real property." At issue was whether the Nassau County Executive had the authority to terminate the commissioners of the ARC in the absence of cause, prior to the expiration of their fixed, statutory terms. The court found that RPLT 523-b and Nassau County Charter 203 were not incompatible and read them together to accomplish the clear legislative intent to protect the ARC from political influence. The court also concluded that the commissioners were not essentially at-will employees, subject to termination for any reason whatsoever. The court held that the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, by granting judgment declaring that in the absence of cause, the County Executive did not have authority to remove the commissioners prior to the expiration of their statutory terms, and remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings. View "Matter of Sedacca v Kelly" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a nontenured teacher, commenced this action against defendants asserting causes of action for prima facie tort and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff was not granted tenure because of the continuous pressure and influence exerted upon school officials by defendants. At issue was whether defendants' course of conduct in instigating complaints to school authorities against plaintiff was entitled to an absolute privilege under Brandt v. Winchell that would warrant dismissal of plaintiff's cause of actions with prospective contractual rights. Assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint, the court must at this early stage of the litigation, conclude that defendants' conduct was not immunized by Brandt. View "Posner v Lewis" on Justia Law

This case arose when defendants' daughter revealed to her parents that plaintiff had raped and molested her when she was 10 and 12 years old. Defendants notified plaintiff's wife about her husband's alleged actions and informed her that defendants would file a civil suit against plaintiff. Plaintiff was never charged with a crime in connection with these allegations. Plaintiff adamantly denied that he had sexual contact with defendants' daughter and responded to these charges by commencing this action for defamation. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that even if they made the statements that were attributed to them, those utterances were not actionable because they had truthfully relayed their daughter's accusations and merely expressed their belief in her veracity. Supreme Court denied defendants' motions, finding triable issues of fact based on the conflicting testimony of the parties. The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to defendants, concluding that the alleged statements were statements of opinion, not fact. The court held that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because they failed to establish as a matter of law that they did not defame plaintiff where, based on the conflicting recollections in this case, it was impossible to decipher exactly what was said by whom and the precise context in which the statements were made. View "Thomas H. v Paul B." on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute over ownership of Jacques Lipchitz's, the Russian-born cubist sculptor, bronze sculpture, "The Cry." Jacques' wife, Yulla, inherited the work of art after he died. Yulla subsequently entered into a relationship with Biond Fury and, from time to time, would make gifts to Fury of Jacques' works. Yulla's son, Mott, was the executor and a residuary beneficiary of one third of her estate. In July 2004, Mott claimed to have sold "The Cry" and three other sculptures in a package deal to Marlborough International Fine Art Establishment. On September 15, 2005, Fury sold his interest in "The Cry" to David Mirvish. The Surrogate's Court issued an order and subsequent to a settlement agreement, Mott argued in his motion that Mirvish's claim was untimely and he could not prove all elements of a gift. Mirvish countered Mott's motion and contended, inter alia, in his cross motion, that Yulla made a valid gift of the work to Fury. The court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and reinstated the Surrogate's Court's order granting Mirvish's cross motion and denying Mott's motion for summary judgment. The surrogate concluded that Yulla had made a valid inter vivos gift of the work to Fury, observing that the wording of the deed of gift was "in the past tense, i.e., 'I gave this sculpture "The Cry" to my good friend Biond Fury,'" which was not only "indicative of a past transfer," but also "clearly identifie[d] the intended object and [was] consistent with [Yulla's] long pattern of making gifts of similar items to her companion." View "Mirvish v Mott" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of driving while ability impaired after a motor vehicle stop. On appeal, defendant maintained that the trial court erred in permitting the People to introduce as proof of consciousness of guilt evidence that he refused to take a chemical breathalyzer test to determine his blood alcohol content when requested to do so by State Troopers. The court held that, since a reasonable motorist in defendant's position would not have understood that, unlike the prior encounters, the further request to speak to an attorney would be interpreted by the troopers as a binding refusal to submit to a chemical test, defendant was not adequately warned that his conduct would constitute refusal. Therefore, the evidence of that refusal was received in error at trial and the court reversed the conviction, remitting for a new trial. View "People v Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Michael Stolzman and Judith Rost, commenced separate actions against various defendants, including Michael and Susan Oliver, alleging claims for a violation of the Dram Shop Act, General Obligations Law 11-101, after Stolzman left the Olivers' party and backed his truck into oncoming traffic. Plaintiffs alleged that the Olivers served Stolzman an unreasonable amount of alcohol rendering him intoxicated and failed to control him while he was on their property. The court concluded that the Olivers were no longer in a position to control Stolzman when he entered his vehicle and drove away. Furthermore, the court concluded that "requiring social hosts to prevent intoxicated guests from leaving their property would inappropriately expand the concept of duty." The court also concluded that the Olivers had no duty to assist Stolzman as he pulled out of their driveway, or otherwise warn him that vehicles parked along the road to the driveway may obstruct the view when exiting. Accordingly, the Olivers' motion for summary judgment was granted. View "Martino v Stolzman" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree assault, second degree assault, and unlawful imprisonment for attacking his wife. At issue was whether defendant's identity was so conclusively established as to prevent the identity exception to the Molineux rule from being invoked. The court held that the identity was not so conclusively established as to render evidence of a prior crime inadmissible where defendant admitted that he was present at the time when the victim said the acts occurred, and did not accuse anyone else of committing them, but denied that he did what he was accused of doing. Therefore, the Appellate Division erred in holding defendant's identity to be "conclusively established" for Molineux purposes. View "People v Agina" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree for strangling his roommate. The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant's uncharged murder to rebut defendant's extreme emotional disturbance defense concerning the murder for which he was on trial. The court held that the evidence was properly admitted where defendant put his state of mind in issue and evidence of other uncharged crimes or prior bad acts could be admitted to rebut such fact. Additionally, the court rejected defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. Further, defendant's claim, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that he did not authorize defense counsel to raise the extreme emotional disturbance defense involved matters which were dehors the record, and is therefore not reviewable by the court. View "People v Cass" on Justia Law

RECAP, a tax-exempt charitable organization and owner of properties in the City of Middletown, commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding against the City, challenging the legally of the City's tax assessments. In this appeal, the court was asked to determine the statute of limitations governing a taxpayer's claim against a school district for money had and received arising from an erroneous assessment of school taxes and when such claim accrued. The court held that Education Law 3813 (2-b)'s one-year statute of limitations applied and that the claim for money had and received accrued when the taxes were paid. Therefore, the court concluded that RECAP's cause of action for money had and received accrued when it paid the taxes. Even assuming RECAP's last payment was made "under protest" in October 2007, as RECAP claimed, RECAP did not commence this action until April 2009, outside the one-year statute of limitations, rendering RECAP's claim time-barred. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. View "Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v Enlarged City School Dist. of Middletown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a park maintenance worker, sued several defendants, including GFC, claiming that a subcontractor's improper disposal of construction debris caused her serious and permanent injuries when, in the course of her employment in a Bronx park, she attempted to move a garbage barrel containing such waste. The court concluded that GFC failed to meet its burden as the moving party and that, in any event, assuming, for the sake of argument, that GFC had met its burden, plaintiff had set forth evidence sufficient to establish that there were genuine issues of material fact necessitating a trial. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to a trial on the merits of her claims and the lower courts correctly denied summary judgment in favor of GFC. View "Vega v Restani Constr. Corp." on Justia Law