Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued defendants, claiming that Administrative Code of the City of New York 27-1031(b)(1) imposed absolute liability on defendants whose excavation work caused damage to adjoining property. The court held that, though formerly a state law and now a local ordinance, section 27-1031(b)(1) continued to embody the specific legislative policy that in New York City those who undertake excavation work, rather than those whose interest in neighboring land was harmed by it, should bear its costs. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment and held that the majority in the lower court erred in finding that the building's allegedly poor condition raised an issue of fact as to causation. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed. View "Yenem Corp. v 281 Broadway Holdings" on Justia Law

The Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 permitted resentencing for persons in the custody of the Department of Corrections who were serving an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term of more than three years for a Penal Law article 220 class B felony that was committed before January 13, 2005. Defendant Steward moved for resentencing on his March 2004 convictions for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third and fourth degrees. Defendant Wright sought resentencing on his May 2005 conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The trial courts in Steward and Wright concluded that neither defendant was eligible for resentencing because each had been convicted of an "exclusion offense" as defined by CPL 440.46(5)(a)(i). The Appellate Division affirmed in each appeal, holding that the reference to "'predicate felony conviction' does not require that the defendant be so adjudicated." The court affirmed, holding that defendants had predicate felony convictions for an "exclusion offense." View "People v Steward; People v. Wright" on Justia Law

Under the Drug Law Resentencing Act of 2009 (DLRA-3), certain defendants serving indeterminate sentences imposed pursuant to the now repealed Rockefeller Drug Laws for class B drug felonies, may apply for resentencing. Defendant applied for resentencing pursuant to the then recently enacted DLRA-3. The focus of this appeal was upon one threshold condition of eligibility for relief under DLRA-3, namely, that the applicant for resentencing not have committed what was referred to in subsection 5 of CPL 440.46 as an "exclusion offense." The court agreed with the Appellate Division's holding that the critical 10-year "look-back" period should extend from the date of the resentence application and affirmed the judgment. View "People v Sosa" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. At issue was whether Supreme Court abused its discretion by denying defendant's request for the substitution of assigned counsel and a Sandoval ruling which permitted the prosecutor to refer to defendant's prior drug-related felony convictions by naming the specific crimes, should he choose to testify. The court held that, pursuant to People v Hayes, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion where, although the concerns of Sandoval still existed and could have been implicated in this case, the lower court weighed appropriate concerns and limited the scope of cross-examination. View "People v Smith" on Justia Law

This case arose when petitioner, owner of a residential apartment building, passed along the costs of a "major capital improvement" (MCI) to its tenants by filing an application with the DHCR once the work was completed. At issue was whether the DHCR was authorized to grant a MCI rent increase while at the same time permanently exempting particular apartments from the obligation to pay additional rent when circumstances warranted. The court held that DHCR had been granted such authority and, on this record, it was not arbitrary or capricious for DHCR to permanently exempt five apartments. View "Matter of Terrace Ct., LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal" on Justia Law

These cases called upon the court to decide whether petitioners were required to exhaust an available internal appeal procedure before challenging the termination of their probationary employment at the City of New York's Department of Education (DOE). The DOE was obligated by its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the United Federation of Teachers and its own bylaws to afford probationary employees the opportunity for reconsideration of a decision to discontinue their employment. The court held that the DOE's decisions were "final and binding" within the meaning of CPLR 217(1) as of the dates when petitioners' probationary services ended. Petitioners awaited the outcome of the internal reviews provided for under the CBA and the DOE's bylaws before commencing suit. But these reviews "stem[] solely from the [CBA]" and constituted "an optional procedure under which a teacher may ask [DOE] to reconsider and reverse [its] initial decision, ... which was final and which, when made, in all respects terminated the employment of a probationer under Education Law 2573(1)(a);" they were not administrative remedies that petitioners were required to exhaust before litigating the termination of their probationary employment. As a result, petitioners' lawsuits brought more than four months after the dates when their probationary service ended, were time-barred. View "Kahn v New York City Dept. of Educ.; In the Matter of Doreen Nash v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. etc." on Justia Law

This case arose when petitioner, a tenured assistance principal in the City's public school system, approached a principal at a middle school in the district to request favorable treatment for petitioner's son, a teacher at the middle school. Petitioner subsequently commenced a CPLR 78 proceeding, seeking to prohibit the Board and the City's Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) from proceeding with petitioner's scheduled administrative trial. The court held that the Board was authorized to enforce the Conflicts of Interest Law, NY City Charter 2600-2607, against a public servant who was subject to discipline under section 3020 and 3020-a of the Education Law. As a result, the lower courts improperly prohibited the Board and OATH from proceeding with the administrative trial against petitioner. View "Matter of Rosenblum v New York City Conflicts of Interest Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and second degree murder. The principal issues on appeal where whether courtroom seating arrangements wherein court officers stationed themselves directly behind defendant during the course of his trial deprived him of his constitutional right to communicate confidentially with his attorney and prejudicially conveyed to the jury that he was dangerous, whether Supreme Court abused its discretion when it permitted the People under Molineux to introduce certain evidence of defendant's uncharged crimes, and whether the People's evidence elicited at trial exceeded the scope of such ruling. The court concluded that the positioning of the court officers in the case did not infringe upon defendant's constitutional right to counsel or deprive him of a fair trial and defendant's claim as to this issue was without merit. The court also held that Supreme Court exercised its sound discretion in permitting testimony about limited incidents of defendant's uncharged crimes leading to the shootings and the People adhered to the scope of the trial court's Molineux ruling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v Gamble" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for health care fraud in the fourth degree and grand larceny in the third degree. The primary issue on appeal was the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The court held that defendant's convictions were supported by legally sufficient evidence where defendant knowingly and willfully provided materially false information to Medicaid. The court also held that defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v Khan" on Justia Law

In 2007, defendant was indicted for charges related to the sexual assault of his step-granddaughter, Jane. When Jane was 19 years old, she informed police that she had been sexually assaulted by defendant on three occasions in 2002. When Jane was 14 years old, she underwent a medical examination that revealed she was 12 weeks pregnant, which she eventually claimed was a result of consensual, unprotected intercourse with a 14 year old boy in August 2002. At issue was whether the information that Jane disclosed to the police in 2002 was a "report" to the authorities that was sufficient to bar the availability of the tolling provision in CPL 30.10(3)(f) in connection with the indictment against defendant. The court held that the information Jane shared with the police in 2002 did not activate the statutes of limitations under CPL 30.10(3)(f) because she neither identified defendant as the perpetrator nor reported or revealed any of the sex offenses charged in the indictment. Under these facts, the statutes of limitations for the indicted sex crimes did not begin to run until Jane reached 18 years of age in January 2006. Therefore, the charged offenses were not time barred. View "People v Quinto" on Justia Law