Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was a land owner seeking to develop property located in the Town of Brookhaven as a site for a Lowe's Home Improvement Center. The Town sought to rezone property that included Appellant's parcel from "J Business 2" (J-2) to commercial recreation (CR) zoning. The proposed Lowe's Center would not have complied with the CR zone classification. Before a hearing on the classification issue, Appellant's predecessor in interest submitted a site plan application to the Town for the Lowe's Center to be built on the parcel. The Town subsequently adopted a resolution rezoning the parcel to CR. Appellant sought a declaration that the site plan application was subject to review under the previous J-2 zoning classification because the Town had unduly delayed the review of the application. On remand, Supreme Court concluded that special facts warranted the application of the previous J-2 zoning classification to Appellant's application. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to meet the threshold requirement that it was entitled to the requested land use permit under the law as it existed when it filed its application, and the special facts exception did not apply to this case. View "Rocky Point Drive-In, L.P. v Town of Brookhaven" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found inside his car, arguing that it was obtained by police during an invalid inventory search. Supreme Court denied the suppression motion, and Defendant pled guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the inventory search was improper but that Defendant's guilty plea nonetheless was valid under People v. Lloyd, which recognized exceptions to the principle established in People v. Grant that the harmless error doctrine generally cannot be used to uphold a guilty plea that is entered after the improper denial of a suppression motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the erroneous denial of Defendant's motion to suppress was not harmless because there was not sufficient independent proof of Defendant's guilt. View "People v. Wells" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal involved cases involving three defendants, each of whom was convicted of "simple" knowing, unlawful possession of a loaded weapon in addition to one or more other criminal counts. In each case, the trial courts imposed sentences for the weapon possession counts to run consecutively to the sentences for other crimes committed with the same weapon. Defendants appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed in each instance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the three defendants completed the crime of possession independently of their commission of the later crimes, consecutive sentencing was permissible. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

At issue in these two consolidated appeals was whether, for purposes of determining the sequentiality of a defendant's current and prior convictions under the State's sentence enhancement statutes, the controlling date of sentence for the defendant's prior conviction is the original date of sentence for that conviction or the date of a later resentencing rectifying the flawed imposition of postrelease supervision (PRS). The Court of Appeals held (1) under the circumstances presented in these cases, the date of sentence for a defendant's prior conviction is the original date on which the defendant received a lawful prison term upon a valid conviction for that prior crime, regardless of whether the defendant or government sought resentencing on that conviction to correct an improper imposition of PRS; and (2) therefore, at sentencing for a more recent crime, the defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a predicate felony conviction if the original date of sentence precedes the commission of the present offense. View "People v. Boyer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here were related entities that leased a building to The Salvation Army. The Salvation Army operated the building as a homeless shelter under an agreement with the City of New York. After the City terminated its agreement with The Salvation Army, The Salvation Army terminated the lease. Plaintiffs brought this action to collect damages from The Salvation Army, claiming that the leased premises were returned in bad condition in violation of the lease. The appellate division concluded that Plaintiffs had adequately pleaded a breach of the lease. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' claim was barred by the plain language of the lease. View "JFK Holding Co. LLC v. City of New York" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter, second-degree assault, third-degree assault, reckless endangerment, and reckless driving. The Appellate Division affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the second-degree manslaughter and second-degree assault convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the proof was legally sufficient to prove Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt where the evidence demonstrated that Defendant (1) engaged in conduct exhibiting "the kind of seriously blameworthy carelessness whose seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community's general sense of right and wrong," and (2) acted with the requisite mens rea of recklessness by consciously disregarding the risk he created. View "People v. Asaro" on Justia Law

The Office of the Medicaid Inspector General (OMIG) terminated a physician's participation in the Medicaid program on the basis of a Bureau of Professional Medical Conduct (BPMC) consent order, in which the physician pleaded no contest to charges of professional misconduct and agreed to probation. Supreme Court annulled the OMIG's determination. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding (1) the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in barring the physician from treating Medicaid patients when the BPMC permitted him to continue to practice; and (2) the OMIG was required to conduct an independent investigation before excluding a physician from Medicaid on the basis of a BPMC consent order. The Court of Appeals affirmed but for another reason, holding (1) the OMIG is authorized to remove a physician from Medicaid in reliance solely on a consent order between the physician and the BMPC, regardless of whether BPMC chooses to suspend the physician's license or OMIG conducts an independent investigation; but (2) because OMIG did not explain why the BPMC consent order caused it to exclude the physician from the Medicaid program, the agency's determination was arbitrary and capricious. View "Koch v. Sheehan" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for various drug offenses. At a Huntley hearing, the county court judge informed the parties that he may have either represented or prosecuted Defendant on unrelated criminal matters in the past, but neither party object to the judge's continuing to preside over the matter. Later, however, Defendant requested that the judge recuse himself based on the judge's prior representation of him. The judge denied the motion, ultimately finding no reason to disqualify himself. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several counts of criminal possession of marijuana. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, holding that the judge's recusal was not warranted and that Defendant received meaningful representation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself; and (2) Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. View "People v. Glynn" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested after law enforcement officers noticed him walking on a roadway with wet blood stains on his clothes, hands, and shoes. Because the officers believed a person may have been injured, they continued to question Defendant despite his request for legal assistance. Eventually, officers discovered Defendant's business partner lying dead in his driveway. Defendant was indicted for second-degree murder and moved to suppress statements he made to the police and an acquaintance, as well as the physical evidence, claiming he had been arrested without probable cause and interrogated in violation of his right to counsel and without having received Miranda warnings. The county court ruled that the detention and questioning of Defendant were justified under the emergency doctrine. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the record supported the determination that the emergency doctrine justified the police questioning; and (2) the courts below did not err in finding that Defendant's assertions were voluntary and admissible at trial. View "People v. Doll" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a lifelong resident of a housing complex operated under the Limited-Profit Housing Companies Act and the Private Housing Finance Law. After Petitioner's parents vacated the apartment, Petitioner filed a successive application to succeed to the tenancy. The housing complex rejected the application. The Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) denied Petitioner's appeal, basing its denial on the fact that Petitioner's mother had failed to file an annual income affidavit listing Petitioner as a co-occupant for one of the two years prior to her vacatur. Supreme Court annulled DHCR's denial of Petitioner's appeal and granted his succession petition. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the evidence of Petitioner's primary residency was overwhelming, and because the was no relationship between the mother's failure to file the income affidavit and Petitioner's income or occupancy, DHCR's determination was arbitrary and capricious. View "Murphy v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal" on Justia Law