Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued the County alleging that the County was negligent for failing to exercise due care to prevent an unsafe condition, to wit, improperly stacked and stored bales at the recycling center. Plaintiff also claimed that the County was negligent in allowing a defective baler to be used at the recycling center, resulting in improperly wound bales that contributed to the accident. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing that, like an out-of-possession landlord, it had relinquished all control over the maintenance and operations of the recycling center to Metro Waste pursuant to an agreement and was not contractually obligated to repair unsafe conditions on the premises. At issue was whether the courts erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the County relinquished control over the recycling center. The court held that an issue of fact existed as to whether and to what extent the County exercised control over the subject property. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the County's motion for summary judgment denied. View "Gronski v County of Monroe" on Justia Law

Respondent, a 36-year-old tenured high school teacher, was the subject of disciplinary charges pursuant to Education Law 3020-a as a result of her improper conduct with respect to a 15-year-old male student. Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7511 to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the penalty imposed was irrational and contrary to the public policy of protecting children. The court held that the arbitration award did not violate public policy where the award, on it's face, was neither prohibited by statute nor common law. The court also held that the award was not arbitrary, capricious, or irrational where the hearing officer engaged in thorough analysis of the facts and circumstances, evaluated respondent's credibility, and arrived at a reasoned conclusion that a 90-day suspension and reassignment was the appropriate penalty. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "City School Dist. of the City of New York v McGraham" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought to vacate a unanimous arbitration award in favor of Sirius arising out of a breach of contract dispute. Petitioner, which had a non-exclusive agreement with Sirius to distribute radio receivers, claimed that the chairman of the arbitration panel failed to disclose relationships of interest that affected the impartiality and propriety of the arbitration process. The court adopted the Second Circuit's reasonable person standard and held that the Appellate Division erred by imposing upon petitioner a "burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that any impropriety or misconduct of the arbitrator prejudiced its rights." The court held, however, that the Appellate Division correctly determined that there was no basis to vacate the arbitration award. Accordingly, the order was affirmed. View "U.S. Electronics, Inc. v Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over property that was sold by the City to the sponsor of an urban renewal project. The agreement between the City and the sponsor, called a Land Distribution Agreement, contained provisions designed to assure that, for at least 25 years, the land would be used for a Pathmark supermarket. At issue was whether Pathmark breached the Lease Assignment Contract, thus, giving plaintiff a right to terminate it. The court interpreted the contract to assign a lease of real property, and held that the risk that the City might not permit the assignment was one that the buyer agreed to take. That risk did not give the buyer an excuse for terminating the contract. View "CPS Operating Co. LLC v Pathmark Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In this dispute between an employee and his employer and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, the court was asked to interpret Workers' Compensation Law 27(2) and 15(3)(w) amended by the Laws of 2007, as they related to an award for a non-scheduled permanent partial disability made after the effective date for an injury sustained years earlier. The court concluded that the Workers' Compensation Board and the Appellate Division properly construed the amended statute by requiring the carrier to deposit a lump-sum amount into the Aggregate Trust Fund representing the present value of the award. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Matter of Raynor v Landmark Chrysler" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child. At issue was whether Supreme Court abused its discretion when it dismissed a hearing-impaired prospective juror for cause. The court held that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by granting the cause challenge to venire member 1405 because the record supported the determination that his hearing impairment would have unduly interfered with his ability to be a trial juror. Defendant's remaining contentions did not require reversal. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Guay" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of first-degree robbery and on one count of grand larceny in the fourth degree. At issue was whether defendant's written statement threatening to shoot a robbery victim with a gun constituted legally sufficient evidence that he was in actual possession of a dangerous instrument at the time of the crime to support the charge of robbery in the first degree. The court held that a defendant's statement that he was in possession of a dangerous instrument, standing alone, did not supply sufficient proof to establish actual possession of a dangerous instrument at the time of the crime to support the charge of first-degree robbery. The court held that this type of statement - whether in the form of a verbal threat or a handwritten note - not only established the threat of physical force necessary to support the charge of third-degree robbery. Accordingly, the People must furnish additional proof, separate and apart from a defendant's statement, that would permit a rational fact finder to infer that a defendant was in actual possession of a dangerous instrument. View "People v Grant" on Justia Law

Five days after Charmaine D. was admitted to the hospital, petitioner, the director of the psychiatry department at that hospital, applied to Supreme Court for an order that she be retained for 30 days. Charmaine moved to dismiss the retention proceeding, arguing, among other things, that her original commitment was defective because the emergency room psychiatrist at issue was not a proper applicant under Mental Hygiene Law 9.27. The court held that an emergency room psychiatrist was "supervising the treatment of or treating" a patient within the meaning of Mental Hygiene Law 9.27(b)(11), and so had standing to seek an involuntary commitment of the patient pursuant to section 9.27. The psychiatrist was not required to resort to the emergency procedure contained in Mental Hygiene Law 9.39. View "Matter of Rueda v Charmaine D." on Justia Law

Defendants, Makeda Davis and Fayola McIntosh, where charged with offenses stemming from an altercation at a nightclub. The primary issue on appeal was whether the People's withdrawal of their cases from the first grand jury presentation due to witness unavailability constituted the functional equivalent of a dismissal pursuant to CPL 190.75 and the court's holding in People v. Wilkins. In Davis, the court held that the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed because the People had instructed the first grand jury that only McIntosh was the target of the proceedings. Since the People never sought an indictment from the first grand jury against Davis, Wilkins was irrelevant since there were no charges against Davis to be withdrawn. With respect to McIntosh, it was undisputed that she was a target of both grand jury presentations. The court held that the People's withdrawal of the charges under the circumstances did not constitute a dismissal under Wilkins and the People were not therefore required to obtain court authorization before re-presenting the case to another grand jury. Accordingly, the orders of the Appellate Division in both Davis and McIntosh were reversed and the cases remitted for reconsideration. View "People v. Davis; People v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction, upon a jury verdict, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance at or near school grounds. Defendant argued that the withdrawal of the presented counts from the first grand jury constituted a dismissal under People v. Wilkins. The Appellate Division held, instead, that as a matter of statutory interpretation, a failure of a grand jury to agree on either an indictment or a dismissal was not a dismissal and thus did not require leave to re-present. The court held that, although Criminal Procedure Law 190.75(3), read literally, required the People to obtain judicial permission for the resubmission of charges only where the charges have been actually dismissed, it had long been the law that a charge could, under certain circumstances, be deemed "dismissed" within the meaning of CPL 190.75(3) when a prosecutor prematurely took the charge from the grand jury, as is the case here. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the indictment dismissed with leave to the People to apply for an order permitting resubmission of the charges to another grand jury. View "People v. Credle" on Justia Law