Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs claimed they were fraudulently induced to sell their ownership interests in a company they co-owned with one of the defendants, and fraudulently induced to release defendants from claims arising out of that ownership. At issue was whether the appellate court erred in finding that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the general release they granted defendants in connection with the sale of their interest. The court held that the release was intended to bar the very claims that plaintiffs have brought and that plaintiffs failed to allege that the release was induced by any fraud beyond that contemplated in the release. The court also held that the fraudulent statements plaintiffs point to could not support a conclusion that the release was fraudulently induced, since plaintiffs alleged that they released defendants from claims relating to the sale of their Telmex Wireless Ecuador LLC units without conducting minimal diligence to determine the true value of what they were selling. The court further held that the appellate division majority was therefore correct in concluding that, fully crediting plaintiffs' allegations, they would not be able to prevail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the order of the appellate division was affirmed. View "Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.A.B. de C.V." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs executed a general agreement with defendant regarding management of their real estate business which contained a general release. At issue was whether the appellate court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' fraud cause of action. The court held that plaintiffs have failed to allege that the release was induced by separate fraud and failed to allege that they justifiably relied on defendant's fraudulent misstatements in executing the release. The court also held that plaintiffs, by their own admission, who were sophisticated parties, had ample indication prior to June 2005 that defendant was not trustworthy, yet they elected to release him from the very claims they now bring without investigating the extent of his alleged misconduct. Accordingly, dismissal of plaintiffs' fraud cause of action was therefore appropriate. View "Arfa, et al. v. Zamir, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for second degree murder, second degree assault, and second degree weapon possession in connection with a shooting. Defendant had also been arrested for a drug crime in Manhattan where he was represented by counsel for the drug charge. Counsel for his drug charge told detectives that defendant "was represented by counsel and that they should not question him." In defendant's view, if counsel made this assertion and gave this direction, the right to counsel had attached, and the statements subsequently given by defendant in the absence of counsel must be suppressed even though counsel was not, in fact, representing defendant in the murder case. Thus, at issue was whether the appellate court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress inculpatory statements that he made to the police, after defendant was arraigned and released on his own recognizance for the drug charge and the detective arrested him for the "homicide," on the ground that they were obtained in violation of his right to counsel. The court concluded that it had never held that an attorney could unilaterally create an attorney-client relationship in a criminal proceeding in this fashion, and declined to do so now. The court also concluded that counsel made no statements during the arraignment on the drug crime even arguably related to the homicide and there was no ambiguity about whether defendant could have intended to invoke his right to counsel before making the inculpatory statements. Therefore, the court affirmed the order of the appellate court and held that nothing about defendant's conduct suggested that he meant to invoke his right to counsel before he made the statements and counsel had not already conspicuously represented defendant in an aspect of the homicide matter, causing the indelible right to attach. View "The People v. Pacquette" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and other crimes for the shooting of an individual in 2002. Defendant's principal argument on appeal was that his trial counsel's failure to object to certain remarks made by the prosecutor in summation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and deprived him of a fair trial. Defendant also challenged the lineup in which he was identified by two witnesses as unduly suggestive. The court held that defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a lack of strategic or other legitimate reasons for his defense lawyer's failure to object in a single instance. The court also held that it was entirely plausible that counsel chose not to object because the prosecutor's remarks impugned the People's witnesses as well as defendant and therefore were consistent with his own theory that the People's witnesses were simply not credible. The court further held that the fact that the witnesses knew that the suspect whom they had tentatively identified from a photographic array would be in a lineup did not, under the circumstances of the case, "present a serious risk of influencing the victim's identification of defendant from the lineup." View "The People v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with multiple counts of first and second degree robbery, as well as various weapon possession offenses where the charges stemmed from a robbery that occurred outside a Manhattan nightclub. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a five-minute limitation on counsel for the questioning of jurors during each round of voir dire. The court held that the trial court erred in adhering to the unusually short time restriction after defense counsel objected based on the seriousness and number of charges, the identity of the victim, and certain characteristics of prospective jurors that were revealed during examination by the court. View "The People v. Steward" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree where defendant, an experienced archery hunter, shot an arrow from his compound bow towards his neighbor's yard, fatally striking the victim. On appeal, defendant principally contended that he was entitled to an intoxication charge. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support an inference that defendant was so intoxicated as to be unable to form the requisite intent. The court held, however, that the uncontradicted record evidence, including defendant's own account, supported the conclusion that his overall behavior on the day of the incident was purposeful. Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to an intoxication charge. View "The People v. Sirico" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession and sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and promptly appealed his conviction arguing that the supreme court erred in its suppression ruling. At issue was whether the People must timely object to defendant's failure to prove standing in order to preserve that issue for appellate review. The court held that the People were required to alert the suppression court if they believed that defendant had failed to meet his burden to establish standing where the preservation requirement served the added purpose of alerting the adverse party of the need to develop a record for appeal. Accordingly, because the People failed to preserve the issue, the appellate division erred in entertaining it and the matter was reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff commenced a personal injury action against defendant after she slipped and fell on ice in a parking lot owned and maintained by defendant. The appellate court held that defendant met its burden of demonstrating that it had not received written notice and that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing either exception to the written notice requirement. The appellate court also certified to the court the question of whether its decision and order was properly made. The court agreed with the appellate court and held that defendant was entitled to notice and an opportunity to correct any defect before being required to respond to any claim of negligence with respect thereto where the parking lot owned and maintained by defendant was accessible to the general public for vehicular travel. Accordingly, the order of the appellate division was affirmed, with costs, and the certified question was not answered upon the ground that it was unnecessary.

Petitioners, two tenured teachers in the New York City School system, commenced Article 78 proceedings against the Board of Education for orders compelling respondent to expunge "letters of reprimand" from their personnel files for failure to follow Education Law 3020-a procedures. Respondent contended that the letters were properly placed in petitioners' files because, pursuant to the 2007-2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"), petitioners' union waived the section 3020-1 procedures with respect to the placement of letters of reprimand in tenured teacher's files and agreed to replace them with a different procedure described in Article 21A. The court found that there was ample basis to conclude that the union knowingly waived the procedural rights granted in section 3020-a and held that, because the letters at issue were not subject to section 3020-a procedures, petitioners were not entitled to have them expunged.

Plaintiff sued defendants over whether plaintiff had been fully paid for construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance work performed for defendants. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that plaintiff was not licensed to do home improvement business in his individual name. At issue was whether plaintiff, by doing business in his own name and not the name on his license, violated Westchester County Administrative Code 863.319(1)(b). The court held that a licensed home improvement contractor who entered into a contract using a name other than the one on his license was not barred from enforcing the contract unless the other party was deceived or otherwise prejudiced by the misnomer. The court also held that the forfeiture of the right to be paid for work done was an excessive penalty in this case for what seemed to have been an inadvertent and harmless violation of the County Code. Accordingly, the order of the appellate division should be reversed with costs and defendants' motion for summary judgment denied.