Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several months into a criminal trial on charges related to alleged Medicaid fraud, the supreme court determined that the prosecution failed to meet their obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland. Having concluded that defendants could not receive a fair trial under the circumstances, the supreme court dismissed the indictments with prejudice. At issue was whether the prosecution lacked the statutory right to bring appeal from a dismissal of an indictment in response to a discovery violation. The court held that the prosecution had a right to appeal the dismissal of the indictments where CPL 240.70 did not provide an express grant of dismissal power. Accordingly, the court reversed and remitted to the appellate division for consideration of the merits of the appeal.

Defendant was charged with rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, and three counts of endangering the welfare of a child. At issue was whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence of the victim's sexual conduct around the time of the incident pursuant to New York's rape shield law and in disqualifying one juror and failing to discharge another. The court held that the county court appropriately accepted defendant's argument that evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct would be relevant to his defense if the prosecution introduced evidence of her bruising caused by sexual contact and attributed such evidence to him. The court concluded that such evidence would have been relevant to both charges of rape but the prosecutor decided not to offer evidence of bruising. The court also held that although the county court failed to make a probing inquiry regarding a sworn juror's ability to render an impartial verdict, its discharge was not error as such action was authorized by CPL 270.15(4) and that there was no error in refusing to disqualify a prospective juror due to a former professional relationship with the prosecutor where the relationship was distant in time and limited in nature.

Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated while his conditional license was in effect. At issue was whether the offense in section 1196(7)(f), regarding traffic infractions for conditional license-holders, and section 511, regarding the aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, of the Vehicle and Traffic Law may be prosecuted at the same time. The court held that a driver whose license had been revoked, but who had not received a conditional license and failed to comply with its conditions, may be prosecuted only for the traffic infraction of driving for a use not authorized by his license, not for the crime of driving while his license was revoked.

In September 2002, an accounting firm hired by plaintiff discovered irregularities in plaintiff's financial records. An audit revealed that the assistant superintendent had stolen over $200,000 from plaintiff's accounts. The Roslyn Union Free School District Board ("Board") was notified of the misconduct and decided to allow the assistant superintendent time to repay misappropriated funds and retire. Plaintiff initiated a lawsuit in 2005 against former and current members of the Board, including defendant who was on the Board for a year starting in 2000, for the Board's allegedly lax management during the years the funds disappeared and their attempt to keep the illegal activities under wraps. At issue was whether a three or six year statute of limitations applied to causes of action for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by a school district against a former member of the school board. The court held that a six year statute of limitations period under CPLR 213(7) was applicable and therefore, the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and declaratory judgment should be reinstated as timely.

Plaintiff sued a former employee after a number of the former employee's clients left plaintiff's wealth management and investment advisory firm for the firm that the former employee currently works at. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified the following question for the court: "What degree of participation in a new employer's solicitation of a former employer's client by a voluntary seller of that client's good will constitutes improper solicitation?" In answering the certified question, the court continued to apply its precedents in Von Breman v. MacMonnies and Mohawk Maintenance Co. v. Kessler and held that the "implied covenant" barred a seller of "good will" from improperly soliciting his former clients. The court also held that, while a seller may not contact his former clients directly, he may, "in response to inquiries" made on a former client's own initiative, answer factual questions. The court further held that the circumstances where a client exercising due diligence requested further information, a seller may assist his new employer in the "active development... of a plan" to respond to that client's inquires. Should that plan result in meeting with a client, a seller's "largely passive" role at such a meeting did not constitute improper solicitation in violation of the "implied covenant." As such, a seller or his new employer may then accept the trade of a former client.

Petitioner, a New York City police officer, retired in 2004 and was awarded disability benefits. In the following years, the police department received information indicating that petitioner was not disabled; that he made false representations to the Police Pension Fund ("Fund"); and that he had ingested cocaine, thus becoming ineligible to return to duty. At issue was whether the city should continue to pay petitioner a pension. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's order annulling the termination of petitioner's pension benefits and held that the benefits can only be terminated by the trustee of the Fund, who has not taken necessary action.

Defendants, six individuals, sought relief upon resentencing from their statutory obligation to serve postrelease supervision ("PRS"). At issue was whether Double Jeopardy barred their resentencing to PRS; whether substantive due process barred their resentencing to PRS; whether a resentencing court may reconsider a defendant's sentence at a resentencing to correct a People v. Sparber error; and whether the appellate division may reduce a defendant's sentence on appeal from a resentencing to correct a Sparber error. The court rejected defendants' Double Jeopardy argument and held that after it handed down People v. Sparber, the legislature promptly adopted legislation to allow resentencing as many defendants as possible to sentences that include PRS. The court also rejected defendants' substantive due process argument where defendants did not give reason for the court to interpret substantive due process more broadly in these circumstances as a matter of state constitutional law. The court also held that resentencing to set right the flawed imposition of PRS at the original sentencing was not a plenary proceeding. The court further held that the Appellate Division could not reduce the prison sentence on appeal in the interest of justice when a trial court lacked discretion to reconsider the incarceratory component of a defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Appellate Division's order except People v. Sharlow, where the the order should be reversed and the resentence imposed by the Supreme Court reinstated.