Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Respondent was convicted of second degree forgery and sentenced to a term of probation. One of the conditions of Respondent's probation was a requirement that he submit to random drug testing. Appellant, a drug testing laboratory, was engaged by the County to conduct the testing. After Appellant detected the presence of THC in Respondent's fluid sample, Respondent's probation was revoked. Respondent subsequently commenced this action alleging that Appellant had issued the report reflecting the positive test result both negligently and as part of a policy of deliberate indifference to his rights. Supreme Court granted Appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the complaint stated a cause of action against Appellant for the negligent testing of Respondent's biological specimen notwithstanding the absence of a contractual relationship between the parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant owed a duty to Respondent under these circumstances. View "Landon v. Kroll Lab. Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

The Suffolk County Legislature imposed term limits on county officials, including the district attorney. Respondent, who was elected district attorney in 2001, was designated as a candidate in the upcoming primary election even though he would have served more than the term limit if elected. Petitioners, registered voters and a candidate for district attorney, commenced this special proceeding seeking to invalidate the designating petitions. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the authority to enact a restriction on the number of consecutive years a person can serve as district attorney rests with the State rather than the County. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order finding the designating petitions valid, holding that the County is without the power to regulate the number of terms the district attorney may serve, and therefore, Respondent was eligible to hold the office he sought. View "Hoerger v. Spota" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time, was charged with several counts of felony drug possession. Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and was sentenced to five years in prison plus two years of post-release supervision. Defendant appealed, arguing that the sentencing court erred in failing to address the question of youthful offender treatment at sentencing. The appellate division affirmed, concluding that Defendant waived his right to be considered for youthful offender treatment by failing to request he be treated as a youthful offender. At issue on appeal was N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 720.20(1), which provides that, where a defendant is eligible to be treated as a youthful offender, the sentencing court must determine whether he is to be so treated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute requires that there be a youthful offender determination in every case where the defendant is eligible even if the defendant fails to request the determination or agrees to forgo it as part of a plea bargain. Remitted for a determination of whether Defendant was a youthful offender. View "People v. Rudolph" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants, a medical doctor and his practice, for medical malpractice after the doctor failed to remove a localization guide wire during a biopsy of part of Plaintiff's lung. After a second operation two months after the first procedure, the doctor removed the wire. The trial court granted a directed verdict in Defendants' favor and dismissed Plaintiffs' amended complaint based on Plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate a prima facie case of medical malpractice. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the amended complaint was properly dismissed where Plaintiff failed to establish that the doctor's judgment deviated from accepted community standards of practice and that such deviation was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury; and (2) to the extent that Plaintiff argued that res ipsa loquitur applied in this case, Plaintiff failed to establish the elements of res ipsa. View "James v. Wormuth" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a State employee. Suspecting that Petitioner was submitting false time reports, the State attached a global positioning system (GPS) device to Petitioner's car. After a report by the Inspector General based on evidence obtained from the GPS device, the Commissioner of Labor terminated Petitioner's employment. The appellate division confirmed the Commissioner's determination and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to People v. Weaver and United States v. Jones, the State's action was a search within the meaning of the State and Federal Constitutions; (2) the search in this case did not require a warrant; but (3) the State failed to demonstrate that the search was reasonable. Remanded. View "Cunningham v. State Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant, which operated floating dry docks where workers repaired and maintained vessels for tug and barge companies and for the City of New York. Plaintiffs sued Defendant and its sureties seeking enforcement of contractual provisions requiring the payment of the prevailing rate of wages and supplemental benefits. Specifically, Plaintiffs contended the vehicles they worked on were "public works" within the meaning of N.Y. Lab. Law 220 and N.Y. Const. art. I, 17. The lower courts found that the vessels in question were not "public works" and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a three-prong test should be applied to determine whether a particular project is subject to the prevailing wage requirements of Labor Law 200 and N.Y. Const. art. I, 17; and (2) because the three-prong test was met in this case, including the requirement that the vessels' primary objective is to benefit the general public, Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability should be granted. View "De La Cruz v. Caddell Dry Dock & Repair Co." on Justia Law

In these two unrelated cases, Defendants were resentenced because the sentencing court failed to impose mandatory postrelease supervision (PRS) as part of the original sentence. Defendants appealed, concluding that the imposition of PRS to their determinate sentences at resentencing violated Double Jeopardy Clause. The Appellate Division affirmed the resentences, concluding that Defendants did not have a legitimate expectation of finality in their respective determinate sentences because they had not completed their aggregated sentences prior to resentencing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants' respective resentences did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because Defendants did not have a legitimate expectation of finality until they had completed their aggregated sentences under N.Y. Penal Law 70.30. View "People v. Brinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was severely intoxicated, arrived at the emergency room of a hospital, where he sought admission to Defendant's detoxification facility. Defendant was accepted to the program, and, four hours after his arrival, was waiting to be transported to the facility when he left the grounds unescorted. An emergency room doctor notified hospital security but did not call the police. Plaintiff was subsequently hit by a car. Plaintiff's estate sued the hospital, the doctor, and the doctor's professional corporation (together, Defendants) for negligence and medical malpractice. Supreme Court denied Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Defendants lacked authority to confine Plaintiff upon his departure from the hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants did not have a duty to prevent Plaintiff from leaving the hospital. View "Kowalski v. St. Francis Hosp. & Health Ctrs. " on Justia Law

Under N.Y. Labor Law 196-d, an employer's "agent" may not retain tips. Two former Starbucks baristas brought a putative class action in the U.S. district court alleging that Starbucks' policy of allowing shift supervisors to receive distributions violated section 196-d. The district court concluded that the supervisors could participate in tip pools because their responsibilities did not render them Starbucks agents. Meanwhile, several former Starbucks assistant store managers filed a separate complaint asserting that assistant store managers should be entitled to participate in the tips pools. The U.S. district court concluded that section 196-d does not compel an employer to include any particular eligible employee in a tip pool. On appeal from both cases, the court of appeals certified two questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, which answered by holding (1) an employee whose personal service to patrons is a principal part of his duties may participate in a tip allocation arrangement under section 196-d even if he possesses limited supervisory responsibilities, but an employee granted meaningful control over subordinates is not eligible to participate in a tip pool; and (2) Starbucks' decision to exclude assistant store managers from the tip pool was not contrary to section 196-d. View "Barenboim v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree and robbery in the second degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that his arrest was illegal, and therefore, his subsequent lineup identification as the perpetrator of the crime was the fruit of an illegal arrest. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding (1) the officer who arrested Defendant lacked probable cause to stop and arrest Defendant; but (2) an "intervening event" attenuated the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the lineup identification. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the initial arrest of Defendant was without probable cause and therefore illegal; but (2) at the time of the lineup identification, any taint of the illegal arrest had been attenuated. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law