Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved three defendants, who were charged with multiple counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance. In each case, the trial court concluded that the courtroom should be closed to the general public during the testimony of two undercover officers on the ground that closure was necessary to protect the officers' safety and ongoing investigations. After jury trials, Defendants were convicted as charged. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly closed the courtroom to the general public during the testimony of the undercover officers. The Court of Appeals held that the limited closures comported with Sixth Amendment public trial principles but that a new trial was required in one case based on an erroneous jury charge on the agency defense. View "People v. Echevarria" on Justia Law

Father was an inmate in New York's correctional system. Father, who had acknowledged paternity of a child prior to his imprisonment, sought visitation with the child, who was then three years old, after Mother refused to bring the child to the prison. The family court granted Father's petition for visitation and awarded Father periodic four-hour visits at the prison with the child. The appellate division affirmed. Mother appealed, arguing that the lower courts employed an incorrect legal standard in reviewing the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower courts used the appropriate legal standard, applying the presumption in favor of visitation and considering whether Mother rebutted the presumption through showing that visitation would be harmful to the child. View "Granger v. Misercola" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of the Northern Marina Islands obtained two tax judgments in the U.S. district court against the Millars for unpaid taxes. The Millards, who previously resided in the Commonwealth, relocated before the Commonwealth was able to obtain the judgments. The Commonwealth commenced proceedings as a judgment creditor asseking a turnover order against garnishees holding assets of the Millars. The Commonwealth named a Canadian bank (Bank) headquartered in Toronto, with a branch in New York, as a garnishee under the theory that the Millards maintained accounts in a foreign subsidiary of Bank. The district court denied the Commonwealth's motion for a turnover order against Bank. The Court of Appeals accepted certification to answer questions of law, holding (1) for a court to issue a post-judgment turnover order pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b) against a banking entity, the entity itself must have actual, not merely constructive, possession or custody of the assets sought; and (2) therefore, it is not enough that the banking entity's subsidiary might have possession or custody of a judgment debtor's assets. View "Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce" on Justia Law

Petitioners were paraprofessionals employed in the New York City schools and were defendants in civil suits brought by students who alleged that Petitioners hit them. Petitioners did not dispute the actions they were found to have committed violated a rule of the Board of Regents prohibiting corporal punishment. Both petitioners asked the City of New York to defend the lawsuits for them. The City refused in both cases. Petitioners brought these proceedings to annual the City's determinations, and the lower courts dismissed the proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed and annulled the challenged determination, holding that employees of the New York City Department of Education who are sued for using corporal punishment are entitled to a defense provided by the City even though the employees' conduct violated a State regulation. Remitted for further proceedings. View "Sagal-Cotler v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y." on Justia Law

Petitioner served as family court judge for twenty-seven years. The catalyst for Petitioner's resignation was the allegation that, in 1972, Petitioner engaged in sexual misconduct involving a five-year-old girl. Petitioner admitted to sexual contact with the child. In these post-resignation removal proceedings, the State Commission on Judicial Conduct sustained the charge of judicial misconduct against Petitioner and determined he should be removed from office. The Court of Appeals accepted the determined sanction of removal, holding that Petitioner engaged in misconduct warranting removal from office by committing an act of moral turpitude involving a child. View "In re Hedges" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the family court determined that Father and Mother abused their two-year-old child and that they neglected and derivatively abused three of their other children. The family court dismissed the petition of the Commissioner of the City Administration for Children's Services insofar as it alleged severe abuse against their infant son, concluding that severe abuse under N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law 384-b(8)(a)(i), which requires a finding that Father acted "under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, could not be established in view of the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Suarez unless an eyewitness testified to the manner in which the harm was inflicted. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the phrase "circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" does not mean the same thing for purposes of N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law 384-b(8)(a)(i) as it does under the Penal Law; and (2) a showing of diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship is not prerequisite to a finding of severe abuse under Family Court Act 1051(e) where the fact-finder determines that such efforts would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. View "In re Dashawn W." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, an accountant, was convicted of one count of second-degree larceny and several counts second-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument (CPFI), forty of which related to checks Defendant endorsed in a client's (Client) name. Defendant appealed, arguing that because the power of attorney Client executed granting Defendant powers to act in her stead with respect to a long list of subjects vested Defendant with the legal right to sign Client's name on the checks, his act in doing so was not forgery. The appellate division reversed Defendant's forty check-related CPFI convictions and dismissed those counts of the indictment, concluding that the evidence was not legally sufficient to convict Defendant of those crimes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Defendant was empowered to sign Client's name at the times when he drew or endorsed the forty checks at issue, there was legally insufficient evidence to convict him of CPFI. View "People v. Ippolito" on Justia Law

Upon Defendant's arraignment on charges of attempted robbery and robbery, the Legal Aid Society was assigned as Defendant's counsel. The Legal Aid Society later requested an adjournment date that would allow for a new Legal Aid attorney to prepare for trial, which the trial court rejected. The court then relieved the Legal Aid Society and assigned new counsel. Defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree and attempted robbery in the second degree. The appellate division reversed the conviction, concluding that the trial court's discharge of Defendant's counsel without consulting Defendant was an abuse of discretion and interfered with Defendant's right to counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not forfeit his Sixth Amendment claim by pleading guilty; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it removed the Legal Aid Society. View "People v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered symptoms that resulted from an aneurysm in a blood vessel near his brain. The aneurysm went undetected until it ruptured twenty days later, causing a severe stroke that left Plaintiff permanently disabled. Plaintiff consulted several doctors in the twenty-day interim, including Defendants. Plaintiff and his wife brought this medical malpractice action against Defendants, and a jury found in favor of Plaintiffs. After a new trial on damages, the jury awarded damages totaling approximately $16.7 million. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division's order to require a new trial on damages for pain and suffering, holding that the trial court erred in prohibiting Defendants from litigating issues of causation at the second, damages-only trial. View "Oakes v. Patel" on Justia Law

In 2002, the City of Yonkers and Yonkers Fire Fighters entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Pursuant to the CBA, the City offered its firefighters the option of enrolling in retirement plans in which the City would bear the complete cost of contributions. In the CBA terminated in June 2009. In 2010, the Legislature enacted N.Y. Retir. & Soc. Sec. 22, which required new members of the state and local fire retirement system to contribute three percent of their salaries toward their pensions. Thereafter, the City required firefighters who were hired after June 2009 to pay three percent of their wages toward retirement benefits. The Union protested to the New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), alleging that the City erred in failing to apply the CBA to firefighters hired by the City after the CBA's termination date. PERB referred the matter to arbitration. The City requested a permanent stay of arbitration on the ground that arbitration was statutorily barred. The Court of Appeals found that the arbitration sought by the Union was barred as an impermissible negotiation of pension benefits, as the non-contributory pension benefits to which firefighters were entitled pursuant to the CBA were prohibited by article 22. View "City of Yonkers v. Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628" on Justia Law