Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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In 1993, 11-year-old Michael Nellenback was placed in the care of Madison County's Department of Social Services (DSS) and assigned to caseworker Karl Hoch. Over the next three years, Hoch sexually abused Nellenback. Hoch was later convicted of various sex crimes and died in prison in 2001. In 2019, Nellenback filed a lawsuit against Madison County under the Child Victims Act, alleging negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Hoch.The Supreme Court granted Madison County's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The court found that the County lacked actual or constructive knowledge of Hoch's propensities for abuse and that no further investigation or supervision would have uncovered the abuse. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, with two Justices dissenting, arguing that there were triable issues of fact regarding the County's liability for negligent supervision.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that Nellenback failed to raise a triable issue of fact on his negligent supervision claim. The evidence did not show that the County had actual or constructive knowledge of Hoch's propensity for abuse. The Court found that the absence of records documenting Hoch's interactions with Nellenback was not sufficient to establish a triable issue, as the records were routinely destroyed after a certain period. Additionally, the Court noted that the primary role of caseworkers was to transport children, and it was speculative to suggest that increased review of records would have put the County on notice of the abuse. Thus, the Court concluded that Nellenback's claim could not withstand summary judgment. View "Nellenback v Madison County" on Justia Law

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Rebecca Flanders, a postal carrier, was bitten by a dog owned by Stephen and Michelle Goodfellow while delivering a package to their residence. Flanders filed a lawsuit seeking damages for her injuries, asserting claims of strict liability and negligence. The dog had previously exhibited aggressive behavior, including growling, barking, and slamming into windows when postal workers approached the house. Despite this, the Goodfellows claimed they were unaware of the dog's vicious propensities.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Goodfellows, dismissing both claims. The court found no triable issue of fact regarding the Goodfellows' knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities, which is necessary for strict liability. The negligence claim was dismissed based on precedent from Bard v Jahnke, which barred negligence liability for harm caused by domestic animals. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, agreeing that Flanders failed to raise a factual dispute requiring a trial.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that there was a triable issue of fact regarding the Goodfellows' constructive knowledge of their dog's aggressive behavior, thus reinstating the strict liability claim. The court also overruled Bard to the extent that it barred negligence liability for harm caused by domestic animals, recognizing that this rule was inconsistent with ordinary tort principles and had proven unworkable. Consequently, the court reinstated Flanders's negligence claim and reversed the Appellate Division's order, denying the Goodfellows' motion for summary judgment. View "Flanders v Goodfellow" on Justia Law

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David Katleski, an experienced golfer, was struck by an errant golf ball while participating in a tournament at Cazenovia Golf Club. The accident occurred during a "shotgun start" tournament, where players tee off simultaneously from different holes. Katleski was hit while searching for a ball on the seventh fairway by a ball hit from the third hole. He sued the golf club, alleging negligent design and operation of the course, particularly the placement of tee box A on the third hole.The Supreme Court denied the club's motion for summary judgment, finding a triable issue of fact regarding whether the course's design unreasonably enhanced the risk. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the club, emphasizing Katleski's experience and awareness of the course layout. The court found no evidence that the course design exposed Katleski to risks beyond those inherent in golf. Katleski appealed to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine precluded Katleski's negligence claim. The court found that being struck by a mishit golf ball is an inherent risk of the sport, and there was no evidence that the course design unreasonably enhanced this risk.Mary Galante was injured in a separate incident at Elma Meadows Golf Course when she collided with a car while driving a golf cart in the parking lot. The Appellate Division denied her motion to strike the County's primary assumption of risk defense and granted summary judgment to the County. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply as Galante was not participating in a protected athletic or recreational activity at the time of her injury. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for further consideration. View "Katleski v Cazenovia Golf Club, Inc." on Justia Law

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David Katleski, an experienced golfer, was struck by an errant golf ball while competing in a tournament at Cazenovia Golf Club. The accident occurred during a "shotgun start" tournament, where players tee off simultaneously from different holes. Katleski was hit in the eye by a ball from another player teeing off from a nearby hole. He filed a negligence action against the golf club, claiming the course was negligently designed and operated, particularly pointing to the placement of a tee box that increased the risk of such accidents.The Supreme Court denied the golf club's motion for summary judgment, finding that there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether the course's design unreasonably enhanced the risk of being struck by a golf ball. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision, granting summary judgment to the golf club. The court emphasized Katleski's experience and awareness of the course layout, concluding that the design did not expose him to risks beyond those inherent in the sport of golf. Katleski appealed to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine precluded Katleski's negligence claim. The court found that being struck by a mishit golf ball is an inherent risk of the game, and there was no evidence that the course's design unreasonably enhanced this risk.In a related case, Mary Galante was injured in a parking lot at a golf course before she began playing. The Appellate Division had applied the primary assumption of risk doctrine to dismiss her claim. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the doctrine did not apply because Galante was not participating in a protected athletic or recreational activity at the time of her injury. The case was remitted for further proceedings. View "Katleski v Cazenovia Golf Club, Inc." on Justia Law

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Adam Schulze, a retired firefighter from the City of Newburgh, was injured on the job in 2012 and classified as permanently partially disabled in 2015. He received full salary payments from the City under General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) and workers' compensation benefits until December 2015. In 2016, Schulze was approved for performance of duty (POD) retirement, entitling him to a 50% pension and supplemental payments from the City under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2).A Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) awarded Schulze workers' compensation payments for periods before and after his retirement. The City sought reimbursement from these payments for its prior payments under General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) and (2). The WCLJ granted reimbursement for the period before Schulze's retirement but denied it for the period after. The Workers' Compensation Board upheld this decision, and the Appellate Division affirmed, citing Matter of Harzinski v Village of Endicott, which held that General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) payments are not "wages" under Workers' Compensation Law §§ 25 (4) (a) and 30 (2).The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that neither Workers' Compensation Law § 25 (4) (a) nor § 30 (2) entitles the City to reimbursement from workers' compensation awards for payments made under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2). The court emphasized that General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) payments are pension supplements, not wages, and that the statutory scheme requires the City to reduce its payments by the amount of workers' compensation benefits, not to seek direct reimbursement. The court concluded that the City is not entitled to reimbursement directly from Schulze's workers' compensation award for its prior payments. View "Matter of Schulze v City of Newburgh Fire Dept." on Justia Law

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Claimant Chi Bartram Wright filed a claim under the Child Victims Act (CVA) alleging that he was sexually abused by numerous men at a state-owned performing arts center in Albany, New York, between 1986 and 1990. Wright sought seventy-five million dollars in damages, asserting various theories of negligence by the State, including negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and direction. The claim described the abuse in general terms but did not provide specific details about the abusers or the exact dates of the incidents.The Court of Claims dismissed Wright's claim, finding that it did not meet the specificity requirements of section 11 (b) of the Court of Claims Act, which mandates that claims against the State must include specific details to enable prompt investigation and ascertainment of liability. The court concluded that the CVA did not relax these requirements. Wright appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the four-year period alleged in Wright's claim was sufficiently specific given the decades that had passed since the abuse occurred.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the CVA did not alter the substantive pleading requirements of section 11 (b) of the Court of Claims Act. The court found that Wright's claim lacked the necessary specificity to enable the State to promptly investigate and determine its liability. The claim did not provide sufficient details about the abusers, the context of the abuse, or the State's potential responsibility. As a result, the court granted the State's motion to dismiss the claim and answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Wright v State of New York" on Justia Law

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In 2019, the New York legislature passed the Child Victims Act (CVA), allowing previously time-barred tort claims based on sex offenses against children to be brought within a specific period. The CVA stipulated that such claims could be filed between August 14, 2019, and August 14, 2021. The plaintiff, alleging sexual misconduct by a teacher in 2009 and 2010, filed a negligence action against the defendant school district on April 26, 2019, before the CVA's filing window opened. The teacher had pleaded guilty to rape in the third degree in 2013.The defendant removed the case to federal court and asserted a statute of limitations defense. After extensive litigation, the defendant moved for summary judgment on September 3, 2021, arguing that the plaintiff's action was premature. The District Court granted the motion, noting that the plaintiff conceded the premature filing but argued for equitable estoppel, which the court rejected.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the CVA's six-month waiting period constituted a statute of limitations. The Second Circuit concluded that the CVA revived claims immediately upon its effective date and imposed a two-year filing window. However, it was unclear if the start date was a statute of limitations, leading the court to certify the question to the New York Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals determined that the six-month waiting period is neither a statute of limitations nor a condition precedent. The court explained that statutes of limitations bar claims asserted too late, not too early, and the CVA's waiting period was intended to allow the court system to prepare for the influx of cases. The court's response to the certified question clarified that the waiting period does not create a statute of limitations or condition precedent, impacting the Second Circuit's handling of the appeal. View "Jones v Cattaraugus-Little Val. Cent. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, a former foster child, filed a lawsuit under the Child Victims Act against Cayuga County and other unnamed defendants, alleging negligence. The plaintiff claimed that the County placed her in a foster home where she suffered severe sexual and physical abuse from her foster parent over several years. She argued that the County had a duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting, retaining, and supervising her foster placement and breached this duty by failing to ensure her safety.The Supreme Court denied the County's motion to dismiss the complaint, recognizing that the plaintiff was asserting a common-law negligence claim rather than a statutory claim. The court distinguished this case from previous cases by noting that the plaintiff was in the County's custody. However, the Appellate Division reversed the decision, granting the County's motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that the County owed her a special duty under the three recognized categories of the special duty doctrine.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court of Appeals held that municipalities owe a duty of care to children placed in foster homes because they have assumed custody of those children. The court determined that the special duty doctrine did not apply in this case, as the County had a common-law duty to safeguard the plaintiff from foreseeable risks of harm due to its custodial relationship. The court emphasized that this duty arises from the government's assumption of custody, which limits the child's avenues for self-protection. The Court of Appeals concluded that the County's motion to dismiss should be denied, and the case should proceed. View "Weisbrod-Moore v Cayuga County" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was injured when he lost control of his motorcycle on Lark Street in Albany, allegedly due to a road defect the City knew about but failed to repair. The case centers on whether reports submitted through the City's online system, SeeClickFix (SCF), constituted "written notice" of the defect and if those reports were "actually given" to the designated official.The Supreme Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, holding that SCF reports might constitute prior written notice but that factual issues precluded summary judgment. These issues included whether the complaints were based on verbal or written communications, whether the defects described were related to the accident, and whether the City's actions created or exacerbated the defect. The court also rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity.The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, agreeing that SCF complaints could be considered written notice and rejecting the City's immunity argument. The Appellate Division granted the City leave to appeal and certified the question of whether it erred in affirming the denial of the City's motion.The New York Court of Appeals held that SCF reports could constitute written notice and that the City's implementation of SCF meant the reports were "actually given" to the Commissioner of General Services. The court also found that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on whether the City's negligence created a dangerous condition and rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity, as the repair of the road was a proprietary function. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order and answered the certified question in the negative. View "Calabrese v City of Albany" on Justia Law

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On February 9, 2017, a bus owned and operated by New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJT) allegedly struck and injured Jeffrey Colt in Manhattan. Colt and his wife, Betsy Tsai, filed a lawsuit on September 18, 2017, claiming negligence, negligent hiring, and loss of consortium. NJT and its employee, Ana Hernandez, who was driving the bus, denied many of the allegations and asserted various defenses, including a lack of jurisdiction and immunity from suit. In 2020, NJT moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it was protected by sovereign immunity as an arm of the State of New Jersey.The Supreme Court of New York County denied NJT's motion, ruling that NJT had waived its right to assert sovereign immunity by waiting three years to raise the defense. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision but on different grounds, concluding that NJT was an arm of the State of New Jersey and entitled to sovereign immunity. However, it held that dismissing the case would be unjust since the plaintiffs could not sue in New Jersey due to venue rules.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's order but on different grounds. The Court of Appeals held that NJT is not entitled to invoke sovereign immunity in New York courts. The court considered factors such as how New Jersey defines NJT and its functions, the state's power to direct NJT's conduct, and the effect of a judgment against NJT on the state's dignity. The court concluded that allowing the suit to proceed would not offend New Jersey's sovereign dignity because NJT operates with significant independence and New Jersey would not be liable for a judgment against NJT. Therefore, NJT and the other defendants could not claim sovereign immunity. View "Colt v. New Jersey Tr. Corp." on Justia Law