Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In April 2020, a store manager working for a retail employer contracted COVID-19, followed by a stroke one week later. He alleged that both the infection and the subsequent stroke were caused by exposure to COVID-19 while working in a high-traffic store environment during the early months of the pandemic. The claimant described frequent, close interactions with the public and stated that employer-provided protective measures, such as masks and sneeze guards, were not implemented until mid-April. The claimant also testified that he had minimal contact with others outside of work. Medical evidence linked the stroke to the COVID-19 infection, and it was noted that the claimant lacked typical stroke risk factors.The Workers’ Compensation Law Judge initially established the claim as an occupational disease with a consequential stroke. On review, the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board modified the determination, finding instead that the claimant suffered an accidental injury, not an occupational disease, but otherwise affirmed the compensability of both injuries. The Board applied its “prevalence” framework, which looks to whether the workplace presented an extraordinarily high risk of exposure to COVID-19 due to conditions such as significant public contact in an area where the virus was prevalent. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the Board’s decision.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that the Board’s “prevalence” framework is consistent with New York Workers’ Compensation Law as interpreted by prior case law. The Court found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s findings that the claimant’s COVID-19 infection and consequential stroke arose out of and in the course of employment, given the extraordinary risk presented by the claimant’s work environment and the credible medical evidence linking the injuries. The Court rejected the employer’s argument that a specific exposure event must be identified. View "Matter of Aungst v Family Dollar" on Justia Law

Four individuals—three transit workers and one teacher—filed claims for Workers' Compensation benefits in 2020, alleging psychological injuries such as PTSD that resulted from workplace exposure to COVID-19. The Workers' Compensation Board determined that the claimants experienced stress comparable to that faced by other employees in similar roles during the pandemic. Therefore, the Board denied the claims, finding that the stress encountered did not meet the threshold for a compensable "accident" under the Workers' Compensation Law.The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed the Board’s decisions. It held that the Board erred by not considering each claimant’s individual vulnerabilities and by applying different burdens for psychological injury claims compared to claims for contracting COVID-19 itself. The Appellate Division cited Matter of Wolfe v Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., stating that psychological injuries precipitated by psychic trauma should be compensable to the same extent as physical injuries. It further concluded that the Board should apply its “prevalence rule”—which allows proof of an elevated risk via workplace prevalence of COVID-19—to psychological injury claims as well as physical injury claims.Upon review, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s orders and reinstated the Board’s decisions. The Court of Appeals held that the Board is not required to consider a claimant’s particular vulnerabilities when evaluating psychological injury claims. It clarified that, at the relevant time, claimants needed to show that their workplace stress was greater than that ordinarily experienced by similarly situated workers in the normal work environment for the injury to be deemed accidental. The Court found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s conclusion that the claimants’ stress was not exceptional, and ruled that the prevalence of COVID-19 in the workplace does not alter the legal standard for compensable psychological injury. View "Matter of McLaurin v New York City Tr. Auth." on Justia Law

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the New York Legislature enacted Article 8-A of the Workers' Compensation Law to allow both employees and volunteers who participated in rescue, recovery, and cleanup operations at designated sites to seek compensation for health conditions resulting from exposure to hazardous materials. In this case, a volunteer who had received lifetime workers’ compensation benefits for conditions contracted during his service died in July 2016. His spouse filed a claim for death benefits with the Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) more than two years after his death.A Workers’ Compensation Law Judge initially awarded death benefits to the claimant. However, after administrative review requested by the Uninsured Employers’ Fund, the WCB disallowed the award, concluding that the death benefits claim was untimely under Workers’ Compensation Law § 28’s two-year statute of limitations. The Board found that Article 8-A did not exempt such claims from the two-year limit, and that the claim was not for an occupational disease. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that the statutory extension for filing claims under Article 8-A (Workers’ Compensation Law § 168) applies only to claims filed by “participants” themselves, not by their survivors or beneficiaries. The dissent would have remitted the matter for further proceedings under Workers’ Compensation Law § 163, regarding notice requirements.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that the statutory extension of time for filing certain claims under Workers’ Compensation Law § 168 applies solely to claims brought by statutorily defined “participants,” and not to claims brought by their survivors or beneficiaries. Consequently, the spouse’s claim for death benefits was barred by the two-year limitation period in Workers’ Compensation Law § 28. View "Matter of Garcia v WTC Volunteer" on Justia Law

After her pregnancy extended past her due date, a woman was admitted to a hospital and came under the care of a physician who, along with hospital staff, induced labor. When a vacuum extraction delivery attempt failed, the physician performed an emergency cesarean section, delivering a baby who was born alive but in critical condition. The infant died eight days later after being treated in neonatal intensive care and ultimately removed from life support.The woman brought suit against the physician, the hospital, and a nurse-midwife, asserting several claims, including medical malpractice and lack of informed consent, both on behalf of her deceased son’s estate and on her own behalf. As relevant here, she sought damages for her own emotional distress based on an alleged lack of informed consent for the vacuum extraction procedure. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, granted summary judgment dismissing her direct medical malpractice claim but denied summary judgment on her lack of informed consent claim, finding factual disputes. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, holding that precedent barring recovery for purely emotional damages in prenatal torts did not apply to lack of informed consent claims, and alternatively invited the Court of Appeals to revisit its precedent.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed whether its prior decision in Sheppard-Mobley v King, which bars recovery for purely emotional damages by a birthing parent when medical malpractice causes in utero injury to a fetus born alive, also applies to lack of informed consent claims. The Court held that it does, reasoning that lack of informed consent is a form of medical malpractice and that no legal or logical basis exists to treat such claims differently for purposes of emotional damages. The Court declined to overrule its precedent, reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissed the lack of informed consent claim for emotional damages, and answered the certified question in the negative. View "SanMiguel v. Grimaldi" on Justia Law

In 1993, 11-year-old Michael Nellenback was placed in the care of Madison County's Department of Social Services (DSS) and assigned to caseworker Karl Hoch. Over the next three years, Hoch sexually abused Nellenback. Hoch was later convicted of various sex crimes and died in prison in 2001. In 2019, Nellenback filed a lawsuit against Madison County under the Child Victims Act, alleging negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Hoch.The Supreme Court granted Madison County's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The court found that the County lacked actual or constructive knowledge of Hoch's propensities for abuse and that no further investigation or supervision would have uncovered the abuse. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, with two Justices dissenting, arguing that there were triable issues of fact regarding the County's liability for negligent supervision.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that Nellenback failed to raise a triable issue of fact on his negligent supervision claim. The evidence did not show that the County had actual or constructive knowledge of Hoch's propensity for abuse. The Court found that the absence of records documenting Hoch's interactions with Nellenback was not sufficient to establish a triable issue, as the records were routinely destroyed after a certain period. Additionally, the Court noted that the primary role of caseworkers was to transport children, and it was speculative to suggest that increased review of records would have put the County on notice of the abuse. Thus, the Court concluded that Nellenback's claim could not withstand summary judgment. View "Nellenback v Madison County" on Justia Law

Rebecca Flanders, a postal carrier, was bitten by a dog owned by Stephen and Michelle Goodfellow while delivering a package to their residence. Flanders filed a lawsuit seeking damages for her injuries, asserting claims of strict liability and negligence. The dog had previously exhibited aggressive behavior, including growling, barking, and slamming into windows when postal workers approached the house. Despite this, the Goodfellows claimed they were unaware of the dog's vicious propensities.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Goodfellows, dismissing both claims. The court found no triable issue of fact regarding the Goodfellows' knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities, which is necessary for strict liability. The negligence claim was dismissed based on precedent from Bard v Jahnke, which barred negligence liability for harm caused by domestic animals. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, agreeing that Flanders failed to raise a factual dispute requiring a trial.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that there was a triable issue of fact regarding the Goodfellows' constructive knowledge of their dog's aggressive behavior, thus reinstating the strict liability claim. The court also overruled Bard to the extent that it barred negligence liability for harm caused by domestic animals, recognizing that this rule was inconsistent with ordinary tort principles and had proven unworkable. Consequently, the court reinstated Flanders's negligence claim and reversed the Appellate Division's order, denying the Goodfellows' motion for summary judgment. View "Flanders v Goodfellow" on Justia Law

David Katleski, an experienced golfer, was struck by an errant golf ball while participating in a tournament at Cazenovia Golf Club. The accident occurred during a "shotgun start" tournament, where players tee off simultaneously from different holes. Katleski was hit while searching for a ball on the seventh fairway by a ball hit from the third hole. He sued the golf club, alleging negligent design and operation of the course, particularly the placement of tee box A on the third hole.The Supreme Court denied the club's motion for summary judgment, finding a triable issue of fact regarding whether the course's design unreasonably enhanced the risk. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the club, emphasizing Katleski's experience and awareness of the course layout. The court found no evidence that the course design exposed Katleski to risks beyond those inherent in golf. Katleski appealed to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine precluded Katleski's negligence claim. The court found that being struck by a mishit golf ball is an inherent risk of the sport, and there was no evidence that the course design unreasonably enhanced this risk.Mary Galante was injured in a separate incident at Elma Meadows Golf Course when she collided with a car while driving a golf cart in the parking lot. The Appellate Division denied her motion to strike the County's primary assumption of risk defense and granted summary judgment to the County. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply as Galante was not participating in a protected athletic or recreational activity at the time of her injury. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for further consideration. View "Katleski v Cazenovia Golf Club, Inc." on Justia Law

David Katleski, an experienced golfer, was struck by an errant golf ball while competing in a tournament at Cazenovia Golf Club. The accident occurred during a "shotgun start" tournament, where players tee off simultaneously from different holes. Katleski was hit in the eye by a ball from another player teeing off from a nearby hole. He filed a negligence action against the golf club, claiming the course was negligently designed and operated, particularly pointing to the placement of a tee box that increased the risk of such accidents.The Supreme Court denied the golf club's motion for summary judgment, finding that there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether the course's design unreasonably enhanced the risk of being struck by a golf ball. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision, granting summary judgment to the golf club. The court emphasized Katleski's experience and awareness of the course layout, concluding that the design did not expose him to risks beyond those inherent in the sport of golf. Katleski appealed to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine precluded Katleski's negligence claim. The court found that being struck by a mishit golf ball is an inherent risk of the game, and there was no evidence that the course's design unreasonably enhanced this risk.In a related case, Mary Galante was injured in a parking lot at a golf course before she began playing. The Appellate Division had applied the primary assumption of risk doctrine to dismiss her claim. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the doctrine did not apply because Galante was not participating in a protected athletic or recreational activity at the time of her injury. The case was remitted for further proceedings. View "Katleski v Cazenovia Golf Club, Inc." on Justia Law

Adam Schulze, a retired firefighter from the City of Newburgh, was injured on the job in 2012 and classified as permanently partially disabled in 2015. He received full salary payments from the City under General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) and workers' compensation benefits until December 2015. In 2016, Schulze was approved for performance of duty (POD) retirement, entitling him to a 50% pension and supplemental payments from the City under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2).A Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) awarded Schulze workers' compensation payments for periods before and after his retirement. The City sought reimbursement from these payments for its prior payments under General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) and (2). The WCLJ granted reimbursement for the period before Schulze's retirement but denied it for the period after. The Workers' Compensation Board upheld this decision, and the Appellate Division affirmed, citing Matter of Harzinski v Village of Endicott, which held that General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) payments are not "wages" under Workers' Compensation Law §§ 25 (4) (a) and 30 (2).The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that neither Workers' Compensation Law § 25 (4) (a) nor § 30 (2) entitles the City to reimbursement from workers' compensation awards for payments made under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2). The court emphasized that General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) payments are pension supplements, not wages, and that the statutory scheme requires the City to reduce its payments by the amount of workers' compensation benefits, not to seek direct reimbursement. The court concluded that the City is not entitled to reimbursement directly from Schulze's workers' compensation award for its prior payments. View "Matter of Schulze v City of Newburgh Fire Dept." on Justia Law

Claimant Chi Bartram Wright filed a claim under the Child Victims Act (CVA) alleging that he was sexually abused by numerous men at a state-owned performing arts center in Albany, New York, between 1986 and 1990. Wright sought seventy-five million dollars in damages, asserting various theories of negligence by the State, including negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and direction. The claim described the abuse in general terms but did not provide specific details about the abusers or the exact dates of the incidents.The Court of Claims dismissed Wright's claim, finding that it did not meet the specificity requirements of section 11 (b) of the Court of Claims Act, which mandates that claims against the State must include specific details to enable prompt investigation and ascertainment of liability. The court concluded that the CVA did not relax these requirements. Wright appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the four-year period alleged in Wright's claim was sufficiently specific given the decades that had passed since the abuse occurred.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the CVA did not alter the substantive pleading requirements of section 11 (b) of the Court of Claims Act. The court found that Wright's claim lacked the necessary specificity to enable the State to promptly investigate and determine its liability. The claim did not provide sufficient details about the abusers, the context of the abuse, or the State's potential responsibility. As a result, the court granted the State's motion to dismiss the claim and answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Wright v State of New York" on Justia Law