Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was a land owner seeking to develop property located in the Town of Brookhaven as a site for a Lowe's Home Improvement Center. The Town sought to rezone property that included Appellant's parcel from "J Business 2" (J-2) to commercial recreation (CR) zoning. The proposed Lowe's Center would not have complied with the CR zone classification. Before a hearing on the classification issue, Appellant's predecessor in interest submitted a site plan application to the Town for the Lowe's Center to be built on the parcel. The Town subsequently adopted a resolution rezoning the parcel to CR. Appellant sought a declaration that the site plan application was subject to review under the previous J-2 zoning classification because the Town had unduly delayed the review of the application. On remand, Supreme Court concluded that special facts warranted the application of the previous J-2 zoning classification to Appellant's application. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to meet the threshold requirement that it was entitled to the requested land use permit under the law as it existed when it filed its application, and the special facts exception did not apply to this case. View "Rocky Point Drive-In, L.P. v Town of Brookhaven" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a lifelong resident of a housing complex operated under the Limited-Profit Housing Companies Act and the Private Housing Finance Law. After Petitioner's parents vacated the apartment, Petitioner filed a successive application to succeed to the tenancy. The housing complex rejected the application. The Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) denied Petitioner's appeal, basing its denial on the fact that Petitioner's mother had failed to file an annual income affidavit listing Petitioner as a co-occupant for one of the two years prior to her vacatur. Supreme Court annulled DHCR's denial of Petitioner's appeal and granted his succession petition. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the evidence of Petitioner's primary residency was overwhelming, and because the was no relationship between the mother's failure to file the income affidavit and Petitioner's income or occupancy, DHCR's determination was arbitrary and capricious. View "Murphy v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the owner of an apartment building, complained when Armory Plaza, the owner of the lot next to Plaintiff's building, began excavating the lot to make way for a new building. The excavation purportedly caused cracks in the walls and foundations of Plaintiff's building. After Plaintiff's insurer (Defendant) rejected Plaintiff's claims under its policy, Plaintiff brought suit. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, holding that the alleged conduct of Armory and its contractors was not "vandalism" within the meaning of the policy. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, which answered by holding (1) for purposes of construing a property insurance policy covering acts of vandalism, malicious damage may be found to result from an act not directed specifically at the covered property; and (2) the state of mind required to find malicious damage is a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct in question may be called willful or wanton. View "Georgitsi Realty, LLC v. Penn-Star Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner commenced a N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law 7 proceeding challenging the valuation by the City of Syracuse's Board of Assessment Review of five houses near Syracuse University used as rental housing for college students. Petitioner claimed that the property valuations, which took place over a four-year period, did not account for the adverse effect the presence of lead paint would have on market value. Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that Petitioner failed to establish that the properties were overvalued or that the assessments were incorrect. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to proffer substantial evidence demonstrating that the presence of lead paint resulted in devaluation in the market value of the five properties for the years at issue. View "Roth v. City of Syracuse" on Justia Law

This mortgage foreclosure action arose from a failed redevelopment of a hotel complex. The complex consisted of several interconnected properties, including the hotel property, a tower building, and another building. The lender for the redevelopment and numerous mechanic's lienors dispute the priority of their respective claims to the proceeds from the foreclosure sale of the tower building. At issue before the Court of Appeals was N.Y. Lien Law 22, which subordinates a building loan mortgage made pursuant to an unfiled building loan contract to subsequently filed mechanic's liens. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the loan agreement made with the lender was a building loan contract, but the lender's mortgage was not entitled to first priority because the lender never filed the loan agreement; and (2) the lender was entitled to priority with respect to the loan proceeds used to refinance the existing mortgage, as the subordination penalty did not apply in this circumstance. View "Altshuler Shaham Provident Funds, Ltd. v. GML Tower, LLC" on Justia Law

M&T Real Estate Trust foreclosed on commercial mortgages executed by Defendant. After a public auction, the referee sold M&T the property. M&T's attorney twice declined to accept or retain physical possession of the referee's deed dated May 11, 2010. As a result, the referee took back the deed and other closing documents and ultimately executed a deed on August 9, 2010 when M&T's attorney accepted it on behalf of MAT Properties, Inc. The deed was recorded on August 17, 2010. M&T subsequently filed a motion seeking to confirm the referee's report of sale and enter a deficiency judgment. Defendants argued that M&T's request for a deficiency judgment was untimely. The county court granted M&T's motion, determining that it was timely under the relevant ninety-day period because the consummation of the sale occurred on August 9, 2010 and was recorded on August 17, 2010. The appellate division reversed, concluding that the ninety-day period commenced in May 2010 upon the delivery of the referee's deed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that M&T's motion was timely because it was brought within ninety days after the date of the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the deed to the purchaser on August 9, 2010. View "M&T Real Estate Trust v. Doyle" on Justia Law

The Whites signed a contract to buy the Farrells' property and tendered a $25,000 deposit. The Whites later terminated the contract due to a faulty "drainage situation." The Whites subsequently sued the Farrells to recover their down payment, alleging, inter alia, fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation. The Farrells counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court concluded (1) the Whites had breached the contract and were not entitled to a return of their down payment; and (2) the measure of the Farrells' actual damages was the difference between the contract price and the market value of the property at the time of the breach, and thus, the Farrells did not suffer damages on account of the Whites' breach. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the measure of damages for the Whites' breach was the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach; and (2) there was conflicting evidence as to the property's fair market value when the Whites default, which precluded summary judgment. Remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings. View "White v. Farrell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant were adjoining landowners. Defendant sought to develop a residential subdivision on his land. The Town approved a plan that required water from the west side of the development to flow into a storm sewer and then into a ditch that was located on Plaintiff's property. Defendant used the ditch without Plaintiff's permission. Because the ditch did not have the capacity to contain the water Defendant diverted, Defendant installed two drainage pipes and routed the water onto Plaintiff's land without Plaintiff's permission, resulting in more than thirty acres of flooded wetland. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant and the Town, alleging trespass and nuisance and seeking damages for the alleged intentional diversion of water onto his property. The trial court returned a verdict for Plaintiff for compensatory damages and awarded punitive damages against Defendant. The appellate division affirmed the punitive damages award. The Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the part of the judgment awarding punitive damages, holding that Defendant's behavior did not rise to the level of purposefully causing injury or of moral turpitude. View "Marinaccio v. Town of Clarence" on Justia Law

A building zone ordinance of the Town of Hemptead provided that in any use district, with the exception of two districts, check-cashing establishments were expressly prohibited. In a memorandum supporting the provision, the deputy town attorney discussed the perceived social evil of check-cashing services and that public policy was served by this use of the zoning power. Several check-cashing establishments brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was invalid, and an injunction against its enforcement. Supreme Court granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the ordinance was not a legitimate object of the zoning power, nor could it be justified on the ground that it protected the health and safety of the community against the dangers created by armed robbery. View "Sunrise Check Cashing & Payroll Servs., Inc. v. Town of Hempstead" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were owners of real property in the Town of Chester (Town), New York. Plaintiffs then lived in New Jersey, and their address there appeared on the deed. Plaintiffs subsequently moved without informing the Town taxing authorities of their new address. After Plaintiffs failed to pay taxes on their New York property for three years, Plaintiffs defaulted in a foreclosure proceeding brought by the County on their New York property. The property was later sold. Plaintiffs subsequently sued the County, asserting that the attempts to give them notice of the foreclosure were constitutionally inadequate and seeking a declaration that they still owned the property. Supreme Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) when notice mail to Plaintiffs at their last known address proved undeliverable, the tax collector was not constitutionally required to find some means of making personal service on them, or to address a notice to "occupant" at the former address, or to search New Jersey public records for a new address; and (2) therefore, Plaintiffs were not deprived of their property without due process of law. View "Naughton v. Warren County" on Justia Law