Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The primary question in this commercial dispute involving, among other things, the right to a leasehold to certain commercial property, was whether, pursuant to the "necessary affects" requirement under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(a)(1), Defendants' appeal to the appellate division from a judgment declaring Plaintiff the lawful tenant of the subject property brought up for review two non-final supreme court orders: one dismissing Defendants' counterclaims and third-party complaint and the other denying Defendants' motion for leave to amend their answer. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the appellate division, concluding that the appellate division improperly held that Defendants' appeal from the judgment did not bring up for review the order dismissing Defendants' counterclaims and third-party complaint. In other words, the appellate division erred in ruling that this order did not necessarily affect the final judgment. View "Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v. E. 149th Realty Corp." on Justia Law

Defendants owned land on the shore of a pond. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants claimed to be the owners of the land under the pond that was adjacent to Defendants' waterfront land. The parties' claims depended on the interpretation of two 1973 deeds from Anthony and Marilyn Furlano to Defendants' predecessors in title. According to Defendants, the deeds conveyed both waterfront land and land under the water. Plaintiffs claimed that only the waterfront land was conveyed. Plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin Defendants from interfering with or using the underwater property "and the water thereon." The supreme court granted summary judgment for defendants, but the appellate division modified and ruled in Plaintiffs' favor. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that since the deeds did not expressly exclude underwater lands, they must be read as conveying such land, to the center of the pond, to Defendants' predecessors. View "Knapp v. Hughes" on Justia Law

In this action, a real estate company that prepared due diligence reports for a developer in connection with the potential purchase of commercial properties alleged that a rival brokerage firm was unjustly enriched when it acquired the material from the developer and later obtained a commission on the ultimate sale of the properties. Supreme Court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim against the rival brokerage firm, and the appellate division affirmed. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether a sufficient relationship existed between the two real estate firms to provide a basis for an unjust enrichment cause of action. Based on the allegations presented in the complaint, the Court of Appeals held that the relationship between the two parties was too attenuated and affirmed. View "Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder" on Justia Law

Nicole Tausend, the beneficiary of a trust together with her father, Ronald, commenced a N.Y.C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding against Ronald and the partnership (NJR) formed by Ronald for the purpose of acquiring and selling property. Nicole commenced the proceeding in order to obtain access to the partnership documents and an accounting of its finances. In response, NJR issued a demand for arbitration. Supreme Court ordered the parties to arbitration, and the appellate division affirmed. Nicole appeared in the arbitration and asserted several counterclaims, which lead to NJR's commencement of this court proceeding seeking to stay arbitration of the counterclaims on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitations. Supreme Court granted the petition and stayed arbitration of the counterclaims. The appellate division modified by dismissing NJR's petition to stay arbitration of the counterclaims, reasoning that the partnership was precluded from obtaining a stay because it had initiated and participated in the arbitration. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because NJR initiated and participated in the arbitration of issues stemming from the dispute, its timeliness challenge to the counterclaims must be decided by an arbitrator. View "N.J.R. Assocs. v. Tausend" on Justia Law

At issue here was national assets stolen by President Ferdinand Marcos. Victims of Marcos' human rights abuses ("Pimentel class") obtained a judgment against Marcos' estate and, in enforcing the judgment, sought to obtain assets also sought by the Republic of the Philippines and its commission organized to retrieve the assets (collectively, Republic). In dispute was the assets of Arelma, a Panamanian corporation, which were held in a brokerage account. The brokerage firm commenced an interpleader action in federal court. The district court awarded ownership of the Arelma assets to the Pimentel claimants. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the assertion of sovereign immunity by the Republic required dismissal for lack of a required party. Petitioner then commenced this turnover proceeding seeking to execute the Pimental judgment against the Arelma account. Meanwhile, a Philippine court determined the assets had been forfeited to the Republic. PNB and Arelma moved to intervene, requesting dismissal. Supreme Court denied the motion. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate division did not err in concluding that dismissal was required under N.Y.C.P.L.R. 1001, as the Republic was a necessary party but could not be subject to joinder in light of the assertion of sovereign immunity. View "Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, owner of a New York City loft, brought an action in ejection against defendant because she occupied an apartment in the loft for which she had not paid any rent since 2003. The court held that the landlord had not complied with Multiple Dwelling Law 302 because the loft did not have a residential certificate of occupancy. The landlord had not received an extension of time to comply and thus could not maintain an ejectment action based on non-payment of rent. View "Chazon, LLC v Maugenest" on Justia Law

This case involved Baygold's lease with MPH, the owner of the premises, for a ten-year term. Baygold, with the consent of MPH, thereafter subleased the premises to its affiliate, Monsey Park. Monsey Park, with MPH's permission, subsequently sub-leased the premises to a non-affiliate, Orzel. At issue was whether the Appellate Division erred in holding that the out-of-possession tenant, Baygold, was not entitled to equitable relief excusing its failure to timely exercise its option to renew a commercial lease with the landlord, MPH. The court concluded that the Appellate Division properly held that Baygold failed to meet the second prong of the J.N.A. Realty v Cross Bay Chelsea test where, among other things, Baygold nor any of its affiliates was a tenant in possession of the premises at the time of the failure to comply with the lease provision; nor can it be said that Baygold, having proffered from its sublease with Orzel since 1985 while having expended no monies or improvements, would incur a "substantial loss" should the lease not be renewed. Finally, the court rejected Baygold's assertion that it was entitled to equitable relief. View "Baygold Assoc., Inc. v Congregation Yetev Lev of Monsey, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute over the ownership of the land upon which a boardwalk and dock was constructed by the deceased. At issue was whether plaintiff estate established that its decedent acquired title to a certain parcel of land by adverse possession. The court held that the evidence that the deceased possessed, used, and controlled the disputed land for the 21 years prior to and including 1984 was sufficient to establish title by adverse possession and grant summary judgment in plaintiff estate's favor. The court need not determine whether it acquired title to the disputed property pursuant to the doctrine of practical location. Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed. View "Estate of Becker v Murtagh" on Justia Law

Verizon attached a box to a building that plaintiffs owned and used the box to transmit telephone communications to and from Verizon's customers in other buildings. Plaintiffs claimed that Verizon took their property without paying them just compensation and deceived them into believing that no compensation was owed. The court held that plaintiffs have stated a valid "inverse condemnation" claim for just compensation, and that the claim was not time-barred. However, their claim for an alleged violation of General Business Law 349 was barred by the statute of limitations, and their unjust enrichment claim was legally insufficient. The court also held that the courts below properly denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification. View "Corsello v Verizon N.Y., Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose when defendant, landlord, without giving notice to or receiving permission from plaintiff, entered the demised premises at issue and installed cross-bracing between two existing steel support columns on both of plaintiff's leased floors causing a change in the flow of patron foot traffic on the first floor and slight diminution of the second floor waiting area. At issue was whether a minimal and inconsequential retaking of space that had been leased to a commercial tenant constituted an actual partial eviction relieving the tenant from all obligation to pay rent. The court concluded, under the circumstances of the case, where such inference by a landlord was small and had no demonstrable effect on the tenant's use and enjoyment of the space, total rent abatement was not warranted. View "Eastside Exhibition Corp. v 210 E. 86th St. Corp." on Justia Law