Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner purchased an apartment building on Staten Island. Petitioner’s parents lived in the building, and Petitioner stayed in their apartment on occasion to attend to their medical needs. Petitioner leased the other two apartments in the building to tenants. For the tax years in question, Petitioner filed nonresident income tax returns in New York. The Department of Taxation and Finance later issued a notice of deficiency, determining that Petitioner owed additional New York income taxes because he maintained a “permanent place of abode” at the Staten Island property during the relevant years. The Tax Appeals Tribunal sustained the deficiency, concluding that in order to qualify as a statutory resident under the Tax Law, a taxpayer need not actually dwell in the permanent place of abode but need only maintain it. Petitioner challenged the Tribunal’s determination, contending that the standard to be applied when determining whether a person “maintains a permanent place of abode” in New York should turn on whether he maintained living arrangements for himself to reside at the dwelling. The Court of Appeals agreed with Petitioner, holding that in order for an individual to qualify as a statutory resident, there must be some basis to conclude that the dwelling was utilized as the taxpayer’s residence.View "Gaied v. N.Y. State Tax Appeals Tribunal" on Justia Law

In 2010, Nassau County passed Local Law 18, which shifted the obligation to pay real property tax refunds from the County to its individual taxing districts. Various interested parties filed three actions seeking a declaration that Local Law 18 was null, void and unenforceable because its violated the Municipal Home Rule Law (MHRL) provisions limiting the powers of local government and the State Constitution’s home rule and taxation articles. Supreme Court effectively granted summary judgment to the County in all three actions. The Appellate Division reversed, entering a declaratory judgment that Local Law 18 violated the Constitution and the MHRL. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the County exceeded its statutory and constitutional authority in its attempt to supersede a special State tax law.View "Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist. v. County of Nassau" on Justia Law

The Board of Managers of the French Oaks Condominium, a residential complex located in the Town of Amherst, commenced a Real Property Tax Law article 7 proceeding against the Town challenging the Town’s tax assessment of the development as excessive. A referee concluded that the Board established that its property was overassessed and directed the Town to amend its tax roll and remit any tax overpayments to the Board. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Board did not rebut the presumption that the initial tax assessment was valid. View "Bd. of Managers of French Oaks Condo. v. Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here were a group of travel companies that enable customers to make online travel arrangements, including hotel reservations. Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of Local Law 43, a hotel room occupancy tax applicable to online travel companies. Alternatively, Plaintiffs contended that the law did not apply to them because their service fees were not "rent" within the meaning of the state enabling legislation. Supreme Court held (1) the law was constitutional, and (2) the plain language of the state statute authorized the City's tax. The Appellate Division reversed, holding (1) the enabling legislation did not provide the City with broad taxation powers to tax Plaintiffs' fees, and (2) the City's tax was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the City had the authority to enact the tax and that the Appellate Division erred when it declared the tax unconstitutional. View "Expedia, Inc. v. City of New York Dep't of Fin." on Justia Law

The Empire Zones Program Act offered state tax incentives designed to enhance business development in the state. In 2009, the program was amended to introduce two new criteria businesses must meet to retain their certificates for the program. Plaintiffs were five businesses which were certified under the program prior to 2008. In 2009, Plaintiffs were decertified from the program for failing to meet the new criteria. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the James Square plaintiffs, concluding that the state defendants acted without legal authority when they applied the new criteria for the program retroactively. The legislature subsequently clarified its intention, stating that the 2009 amendments to the program were to be applied retroactively to January 1, 2008. Supreme Court adhered to its prior determination, declaring that the legislature's clarification as applied was unconstitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed. Regarding the additional plaintiffs, the Appellate Division modified Supreme Court's holding to the extent of granting Plaintiff's petitions seeking a declaration that the 2009 amendments could not be applied retroactively to January 1, 2008. The State appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's determinations in all five cases that the 2009 amendments should not be applied retroactively. View "James Square Assocs. LP v. Mullen" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of the Northern Marina Islands obtained two tax judgments in the U.S. district court against the Millars for unpaid taxes. The Millards, who previously resided in the Commonwealth, relocated before the Commonwealth was able to obtain the judgments. The Commonwealth commenced proceedings as a judgment creditor asseking a turnover order against garnishees holding assets of the Millars. The Commonwealth named a Canadian bank (Bank) headquartered in Toronto, with a branch in New York, as a garnishee under the theory that the Millards maintained accounts in a foreign subsidiary of Bank. The district court denied the Commonwealth's motion for a turnover order against Bank. The Court of Appeals accepted certification to answer questions of law, holding (1) for a court to issue a post-judgment turnover order pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b) against a banking entity, the entity itself must have actual, not merely constructive, possession or custody of the assets sought; and (2) therefore, it is not enough that the banking entity's subsidiary might have possession or custody of a judgment debtor's assets. View "Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were Amazon.com and Overstock.com. Both companies were formed in states other than New York, were located in states other than New York, and sold their merchandise solely through the Internet. At issue was N.Y. Tax Law 1101(b)(8)(vi) (the Internet tax), which was amended in 2008 to provide that vendors who paid New York residents to actively solicit business in the State would be required to pay New York taxes. Plaintiffs challenged the Internet tax, alleging that it was unconstitutional on its face as a violation the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. Supreme Court dismissed the complaints for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Internet tax did not subject online retailers without a physical presence in the State to New York sales and compensating use taxes; and (2) the tax did not create an irrational, irrebuttable presumption of solicitation of business within the State. View "Overstock.com, Inc. v State Dep't of Taxation & Fin." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a national satellite television provider, purchased equipment used to deliver programming to its customers. Between March 2000 an February 2004, Petitioner did not pay sales or use taxes on its equipment purchases from manufacturers, and instead, collected sales taxes from its customers at the time the equipment was leased to them. Following an audit in 2005, the Department of Taxation and Finance issued a notice of determination assessing Petitioner an additional $1.8 million in use taxes in use taxes for the same period on the basis that Petitioner owed taxes at the time it purchased the equipment from manufacturers. The Tax Appeals Tribunal upheld the notice of determination. The Appellate Division confirmed the Tribunal's determination. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner's purchases of equipment used to deliver programming to its customers were exempt from sales and use taxes under New York's Tax Law. View "EchoStar Satellite Corp. v. State Tax Appeals Tribunal" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were owners of real property in the Town of Chester (Town), New York. Plaintiffs then lived in New Jersey, and their address there appeared on the deed. Plaintiffs subsequently moved without informing the Town taxing authorities of their new address. After Plaintiffs failed to pay taxes on their New York property for three years, Plaintiffs defaulted in a foreclosure proceeding brought by the County on their New York property. The property was later sold. Plaintiffs subsequently sued the County, asserting that the attempts to give them notice of the foreclosure were constitutionally inadequate and seeking a declaration that they still owned the property. Supreme Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) when notice mail to Plaintiffs at their last known address proved undeliverable, the tax collector was not constitutionally required to find some means of making personal service on them, or to address a notice to "occupant" at the former address, or to search New Jersey public records for a new address; and (2) therefore, Plaintiffs were not deprived of their property without due process of law. View "Naughton v. Warren County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a credit union, commenced this declaratory judgment action against Defendants, the state department of taxation and finance, its commissioner, and the state. The credit union asserted it was not required to pay the mortgage recording tax (MRT) on mortgage obligations issued to members because (1) the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA) exempts federal credit unions and their property from state taxation, and (2) as instrumentalities of the United States, federal credit unions are immune from state taxation under the Supremacy Clause. Supreme court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, based on principles of statutory interpretation and the legislative history of the FCUA, federal credit unions are not exempt from the state's MRT. View "Hudson Valley Fed. Credit Union v. Dep't of Taxation & Fin." on Justia Law