Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners are owners and residents of units in SoHo and NoHo buildings designated under New York City’s Joint Living-Work Quarters for Artists (JLWQA) program, which, since 1971, has limited legal occupancy to certified artists or those who obtained amnesty through later amendments. In 2021, the City rezoned the area, allowing JLWQA units to be voluntarily converted to unrestricted residential use upon payment of a one-time fee calculated by square footage. The fee supports an arts fund. Petitioners challenged this fee, claiming it was an unconstitutional condition and a taking under the Fifth Amendment.The case was first heard in New York Supreme Court, which dismissed the petition, finding that the fee was a monetary obligation not subject to the Takings Clause. The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, holding that the fee was a permit condition subject to heightened scrutiny under the Nollan and Dolan unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The court found that the City failed to show the fee had an essential nexus to a legitimate governmental interest or was roughly proportional to any harm caused by conversion, declared the fee unconstitutional, and enjoined its enforcement.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals held that petitioners did not have a compensable property interest within the meaning of the Takings Clause regarding the opportunity to convert their JLWQA units. The fee did not constitute a taking because it did not diminish or extinguish existing property rights, nor was it imposed in lieu of a direct appropriation of property. The Court further clarified that a standalone monetary fee for conversion does not implicate the Takings Clause and that heightened scrutiny under Nollan/Dolan only applies to direct exactions or in-lieu-of-property conditions. Judgment was granted for the City. View "Matter of Coalition for Fairness in Soho & Noho, Inc. v City of New York" on Justia Law

A property owner sought to develop a parcel of land in a town, which required rezoning and environmental review. In 2017, while preparing its zoning petition, the owner and the town entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that purported to bind the town and its successors to continue reviewing the zoning petition until a final determination was reached, based on empirical data. The owner submitted its petition and participated in the environmental review process, investing significant resources. After local elections in 2019, a new town supervisor and board, who opposed the project, voted to terminate review of the zoning petition and the related environmental process.The property owner filed suit against the town, its board, and the supervisor, alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, based on the town’s termination of the review process. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the MOU was unenforceable under the term limits doctrine and contract zoning doctrine. The Supreme Court, Dutchess County, dismissed the complaint, holding the MOU invalid. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed that decision.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case after granting leave to appeal. The Court held that the MOU was invalid and unenforceable under the term limits doctrine because it impermissibly bound successor town boards in the exercise of their legislative discretion over zoning matters. The Court found that such an agreement was not specifically authorized by statute or charter, and did not fall within an exception for proprietary acts. As a result, the property owner’s contractual claims failed as a matter of law. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. View "Hudson View Park Co. v Town of Fishkill" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court granting Respondents' motions to dismiss Petitioners' amended N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 petition as time-barred, holding that the relation back doctrine applied.In 2012, Petitioners secured an injunction barring Respondents from using part of their property for nonresidential purposes. Thereafter, Respondents sought a variance from the Village of Hancock Board of Appeals (ZBA), which was granted. Petitioners later commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking annulment of the use variation. The appellate division granted the request and reversed. In 2016, Respondents sought a variance, which the ZBA granted. Petitioners subsequently commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking annulment of the ZBA's decision. This time, however, Petitioners omitted Respondent Rosa Kuehn. Supreme Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition was time-barred against Rosa and that the claims against the remaining respondents must be dismissed for lack of a necessary party. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the relation back doctrine is not limited to cases where the amending party's omission results from doubts regarding the omitted party's identity or status. View "Nemeth v. K-Tooling" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision confirming the determination of the Environmental Control Board (ECB) concluding that petitioner corporations were outdoor advertising companies (OACs), holding that by advertising a distinct legal entity on their buildings, petitioner corporations made space available to "others" under Administrative Code 28.502.1.Petitioner corporations were owned either by John Ciafone or by both Ciafone and his spouse. Each of the buildings owned by the corporations had signage affixed to it advertising Ciafone's law practice. The New York City Department of Buildings cited the corporations for violations of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, as well as the New York City Zoning Resolution. The determination was affirmed on administrative appeal. The court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Ciafone, his professional corporation, and the petitioner corporations were separate legal entities, and therefore, the petitioner corporations were OACs under the plain language of Administrative Code 28-502.1. View "Franklin Street Realty Corp. v. NYC Environmental Control Board" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division affirming a Supreme Court judgment enjoining a three-day music and camping festival on Landowner's rural property in the Town of Delaware, holding that the challenged provisions of local zoning laws did not unconstitutionally restrict Landowner's First Amendment rights and were not void for vagueness.Landowner planned to sponsor on his sixty-eight-acre property a three-day event during which attendees would camp on the property and view live outdoor music performances. The Town commenced this action seeking an injunction against the event, alleging it was prohibited by the Town's Zoning Law. Supreme Court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined Landowner from holding the festival on his property. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that that relevant Zoning Law provisions were content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions compatible with the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the zoning provisions at issue satisfied the intermediate scrutiny test for content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions and survived Defendant's overbreadth challenge; and (2) Landowner's facial and as-applied void for vagueness challenges likewise failed. View "Town of Delaware v. Leifer" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division affirming the decision of Supreme Court annulling the decision of the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission (LPC) to approve the redevelopment of 346 Broadway, a historic building that the LPC previously designated as a landmark, holding that the LPC's decision was not irrational or affected by errors of law.If an application seeks to alter or demolish a landmark, the LPC must issue a certificate of appropriateness (COA) before the proposed work can begin. In this case, a developer seeking to convert the 346 Broadway into private residences sought a COA from the LPC. The LPC approved the proposal. Supreme Court annulled the COA, The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the LPC acted with "no rational basis" and that the LPC's decisions were not affected by an error of law. View "Save America's Clocks, Inc. v City of New York" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the Town of Champion, which replaced a fire protection district with two substitute fire protection districts, complied with its statutory obligation to dissolve and terminate the fire protection district.Petitioners filed this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding claiming that the Town of Champion failed to accomplish and complete the dissolution of the Town of Champion Fire Protection District, as required by the General Municipal Law. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, concluding that the Town followed the required procedures and acted within its authority. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Town’s actions were not improper because the Town prepared, approved, and implemented a dissolution plan in compliance with the applicable statutory requirements and lawfully created two legally distinct fire protection districts to deliver fire protection services to Town residents, in accordance with Town Law section 170. View "Waite v. Town of Champion" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was New York City’s 2001 zoning amendments that affected the City’s adult entertainment industry. Plaintiffs, an adult video store and an establishment that showed adult films, brought this case seeking a declaration that the 2001 amendments were facially unconstitutional as a violation of free speech. After years of litigation, the Court of Appeals ruled that judgment be granted in favor of the City, holding that the City met its burden of demonstrating that the establishments affected by the City’s 2001 zoning amendments retained a continued focus on sexually explicit materials or activities. Therefore, under a 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, the amendments did not violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. View "For the People Theatres of N.Y. Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Petitioner maintained a large outdoor advertising sign on the sign of its building that was grandfathered in as a legal, non-conforming use. In 2008, the building and the sign were demolished. Petitioner applied with the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) to erect a new support structure and a new sign. The Manhattan Borough Building Commissioner approved the new sign permit. Thereafter, DOB issued the permit. In 2010, the DOB revoked the permits for both the support structure and the sign, as the zoning resolution did not permit display of advertising signs in the zoning district at issue and the new sign did not qualify as a grandfathered replacement. Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding arguing that it had relied in good faith on the Commissioner’s approval and subsequently-issued permits in expending substantial funds to install the new sign. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) by relying on the erroneously issued permit for the advertising sign, Petitioner did not acquire a vested right to maintain the sign on its property; and (2) the appropriate procedure to resolve the issue of Petitioner’s good-faith reliance on the erroneously issued permit was an application for a zoning variance. View "Perlbinder Holdings, LLC v. Srinivasan" on Justia Law

Petitioner maintained a large outdoor advertising sign on the sign of its building that was grandfathered in as a legal, non-conforming use. In 2008, the building and the sign were demolished. Petitioner applied with the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) to erect a new support structure and a new sign. The Manhattan Borough Building Commissioner approved the new sign permit. Thereafter, DOB issued the permit. In 2010, the DOB revoked the permits for both the support structure and the sign, as the zoning resolution did not permit display of advertising signs in the zoning district at issue and the new sign did not qualify as a grandfathered replacement. Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding arguing that it had relied in good faith on the Commissioner’s approval and subsequently-issued permits in expending substantial funds to install the new sign. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) by relying on the erroneously issued permit for the advertising sign, Petitioner did not acquire a vested right to maintain the sign on its property; and (2) the appropriate procedure to resolve the issue of Petitioner’s good-faith reliance on the erroneously issued permit was an application for a zoning variance. View "Perlbinder Holdings, LLC v. Srinivasan" on Justia Law