Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and Defendant formed a partnership by oral agreement. Defendant later withdrew from the venture after Plaintiff refused his demand for majority ownership of the partnership. Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract, claiming that Defendant could not unilaterally terminate his obligations under the agreement. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the complaint failed to allege that the partnership agreement provided for a definite term or a defined objective, and therefore, dissolution was permissible under N.Y. P'ship Law 62(1)(b). The Appellate Division modified by reinstating the breach of contract cause of action, reasoning that the complaint adequately described a definite term and alleged a particular undertaking. The Court of Appeals reversed with directions that the breach of contract cause of action of the complaint be dismissed, holding (1) the complaint did not satisfy the "definite term" element of section 62(1)(b) because it did not set forth a specific or a reasonably certain termination date; and (2) the alleged scheme of anticipated partnership events detailed in the complaint were too amorphous to meet the statutory "particular undertaking" standard for precluding unilateral dissolution of a partnership. View "Gelman v. Buehler" on Justia Law

The Whites signed a contract to buy the Farrells' property and tendered a $25,000 deposit. The Whites later terminated the contract due to a faulty "drainage situation." The Whites subsequently sued the Farrells to recover their down payment, alleging, inter alia, fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation. The Farrells counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court concluded (1) the Whites had breached the contract and were not entitled to a return of their down payment; and (2) the measure of the Farrells' actual damages was the difference between the contract price and the market value of the property at the time of the breach, and thus, the Farrells did not suffer damages on account of the Whites' breach. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the measure of damages for the Whites' breach was the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach; and (2) there was conflicting evidence as to the property's fair market value when the Whites default, which precluded summary judgment. Remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings. View "White v. Farrell" on Justia Law

After a joint trial with his co-defendant, Defendant was convicted on an accomplice theory of reckless endangerment in the first degree and attempted murder in the first degree. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the conviction; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, as (i) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the sufficiency arguments identified on appeal because they were not fairly characterized as dispositive in Defendant's favor, and (ii) Defendant's remaining ineffective assistance of counsel contentions were similarly unavailing. View "People v. McGee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant were adjoining landowners. Defendant sought to develop a residential subdivision on his land. The Town approved a plan that required water from the west side of the development to flow into a storm sewer and then into a ditch that was located on Plaintiff's property. Defendant used the ditch without Plaintiff's permission. Because the ditch did not have the capacity to contain the water Defendant diverted, Defendant installed two drainage pipes and routed the water onto Plaintiff's land without Plaintiff's permission, resulting in more than thirty acres of flooded wetland. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant and the Town, alleging trespass and nuisance and seeking damages for the alleged intentional diversion of water onto his property. The trial court returned a verdict for Plaintiff for compensatory damages and awarded punitive damages against Defendant. The appellate division affirmed the punitive damages award. The Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the part of the judgment awarding punitive damages, holding that Defendant's behavior did not rise to the level of purposefully causing injury or of moral turpitude. View "Marinaccio v. Town of Clarence" on Justia Law

Claimant sustained a back injury while employed by Respondent. Claimant applied for and received workers' compensation benefits. Later, Claimant entered a plea of guilty to insurance fraud in the fourth degree by entering an Alford plea. At a subsequent workers' compensation hearing, Respondent's workers' compensation carrier sought to preclude Claimant from further benefits based on the guilty plea. The Workers' Compensation Board gave preclusive effect to Claimant's guilty plea and found Claimant violated the Workers' Compensation Law. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it was impossible to conclude that Claimant's conviction was based upon the same circumstances alleged to be fraudulent in the workers' compensation proceeding, and therefore, the plea did not prohibit Claimant from challenging the workers' compensation violation alleged. View "Howard v. Stature Elec., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery, menacing, and possession of a weapon. Defendant appealed, arguing that the People violated N.Y. Crim. Proc. 710.30, which Defendant argued entitled him to the suppression of testimony about the victim's post-arrest identification. Defendant also argued that trial counsel's failure to raise that issue deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, assuming there was a section 710.30, if defense counsel did make a mistake in failing to object to the evidence, the mistake was not so egregious and prejudicial as to deprive Defendant of a fair trial. View "People v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

After his vehicle was stopped by a police officer, Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated, and a breathalyzer test computed his blood alcohol content at close to twice the legal limit. Defendant was subsequently indicted for felony DWI. During the jury trial, the People offered into evidence documents pertaining to the routine calibration and maintenance of the breathalyzer machine used in Defendant's breath test to demonstrate it was in proper working order at the time Defendant was tested. Defendant raised a Confrontation Clause challenge to the documents, contending that he was entitled to cross-examine the authors of the records. The county court allowed the documents to be received in evidence, and Defendant was convicted of felony DWI. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that documents pertaining to the routine inspection, maintenance, and calibration of breathalyzer machines are nontestimonial, and consequently, the Confrontation Clause was not implicated in this case, and the trial judge did not err in declining Defendant's request to cross-examine the authors of the testing records before the court ruled on their admissibility. View "People v. Pealer" on Justia Law

The Bath Volunteer Fire Department (BVFD), a not-for-profit fire corporation, obtained its own financing for the construction of a new firehouse and hired Petitioner as the general contractor. The Department of Labor subsequently concluded that the firehouse project was a public work subject to the prevailing wage law. BVFD agreed to indemnify Petitioner and its subcontractors against any liability resulting from their failure to pay the prevailing wages, and thereafter, the project was completed. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination that the project was subject to the prevailing wage law. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because no public agency, as contemplated by N.Y. Labor Law 220, was a party to the contract, the prevailing wage law did not apply. View "M.G.M. Insulation, Inc. v. Gardner" on Justia Law

These three cases stemmed from a residency policy that called for employees of the City of Niagara Falls School District hired or promoted after the policy's effective date to reside in the City and maintain residency there during their employment. Here the District's Administrator for Human Resources notified three employees that they were suspected of violating the residency policy. The Board then terminated the employees' employment for failure to comply with the policy. On appeal, the Appellate Court (1) found that the District did not meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the employee had changed her domicile in the first case; (2) found the Board's determination was not arbitrary and capricious in the second case; and (3) determined that the third employee's termination was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals reversed in the first case, affirmed in the second case, and reversed and remanded in the third case, holding (1) the residency policy and its implementing regulations were clear and unambiguous; (2) the District's notice-and-hearing procedures easily complied with due process; and (3) in the majority of these cases, the Board's determinations were not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. View "Beck-Nichols v. Bianco" on Justia Law

A building zone ordinance of the Town of Hemptead provided that in any use district, with the exception of two districts, check-cashing establishments were expressly prohibited. In a memorandum supporting the provision, the deputy town attorney discussed the perceived social evil of check-cashing services and that public policy was served by this use of the zoning power. Several check-cashing establishments brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was invalid, and an injunction against its enforcement. Supreme Court granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the ordinance was not a legitimate object of the zoning power, nor could it be justified on the ground that it protected the health and safety of the community against the dangers created by armed robbery. View "Sunrise Check Cashing & Payroll Servs., Inc. v. Town of Hempstead" on Justia Law