Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In one agreement, Cammeby's Equity Holdings LLC (Cam Equity) received an option to acquire 99.99 percent of the ownership units of SVCare at the strike price of $100 million. In a second agreement, Cammeby's Funding III LLC (Cam III) agreed to lend $100 million to SVCare. Cam III and Cam Equity were controlled by the same person. In anticipation that Cam Equity would exercise the option, SVCare commenced an action alleging that the option was unenforceable because the consideration underlying its agreement to offer the option was contingent on Cam III loaning it $100 million, which SVCare claimed was never paid. Cam Equity brought a separate lawsuit seeking specific performance of the option agreement. Supreme Court (1) found in in favor of Cam Equity in the first action, concluding that the option and loan were entirely separate agreements and that SVCare could not offer extrinsic evidence regarding the $100 million loan obligation that was not mentioned in the option agreement; and (2) in the second action, determined that Cam III had, in fact, fully funded the $100 million loan to SVCare pursuant to the loan agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower court did not err in its judgment. View "Schron v. Troutman Saunders LLP" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a tenant in a New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) public housing apartment. After Petitioner became employed, she failed to disclose her new earnings to her landlord, an omission that allowed her to pay a substantially lower rent than she would have had she revealed the income. After NYCHA discovered the misrepresentation, Petitioner was criminally charged for failing to report her income. Petitioner pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of petit larceny and received a conditional discharge upon her agreement to pay restitution to NYCHA. Thereafter, NYCHA ordered that Petitioner's tenancy be terminated. Petitioner subsequently challenged that determination, claiming that eviction might leave her and her children homeless. Supreme Court affirmed NYCHA's determination. The Appellate Division reversed and vacated the penalty of termination, concluding that the termination of tenancy was so disproportionate to the offense, in light of the circumstances, as to shock the judicial conscience. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the NYCHA's decision to terminate Petitioner's tenancy was not so disproportionate to her misconduct as to shock the judicial conscience. View "Perez v. Rhea" on Justia Law

Cammeby's Funding LLC (Cam Funding) and Fundamental Long Term Care Holdings LLC (Fundamental) entered into an option agreement entitling Cam Funding to acquire one-third of Fundamental's membership units for a strike price of $1,000. Cam Funding subsequently notified Fundamental that it was exercising the option and sent Fundamental a check for $1,000. Fundamental respondent that, pursuant to its operating agreement, no membership units in Fundamental would be issued until Cam Funding provided a required capital contribution of 33.33 percent. Fundamental then sought a declaration that Cam Funding was bound by the membership requirements in the operating agreement. Cam Funding filed a counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Supreme Court ruled that the option agreement unambiguously granted Cam Funding the right to acquire a one-third interest in Fundamental upon payment of $1,000 and that enforcement of the operating agreement would interfere with Cam Funding's rights under the terms of the option agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mere reference in the option agreement to the operating agreement was not enough to evidence clear intent for the two separate contracts to be read as one. View "Fund. Long Term Care Holdings, LLC v. Cammeby's Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant and three codefendants - Eric Young, Marvin Howard and Nathaniel Williams - were jointly indicted on a theory of accomplice liability for second-degree murder and second-degree weapon possession. Young and Howard waived their right to a jury, and Defendant and Williams were tried jointly. Howard testified during the trial. Defendant and Williams were convicted of both crimes, and the judge acquitted Howard. Defendant appealed on the ground that the judge's refusal to direct Howard to testify outside the jury's presence deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The appellate division agreed and reversed the judgment of conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was prejudiced by the judge's decision to allow the jury to hear Howard's defense. View "People v. Warren" on Justia Law

Under the Sex Offender and Registration Act (SORA), offenders are assessed fifteen points if they have a history of drug or alcohol abuse or if they were abusing drugs or alcohol at the time of their sex offense. At issue in these two appeals was the extent of proof necessary to constitute clear and convincing evidence of drug or alcohol abuse under the SORA guidelines. At a SORA hearing for Defendant Michael Palmer, Supreme Court assessed Palmer fifteen points for drug or alcohol abuse based upon his admission that he was using alcohol at the time of his sexual offense. At Defendant Cornell Long's SORA hearing, Long was assessed fifteen points under the history of alcohol abuse risk factor because he admitted to drinking alcohol 1 1/2 hours prior to committing his sexual offense. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted both cases, holding that the extent of proof in these cases failed to meet the statutory standard of clear and convincing evidence of drug or alcohol abuse under the SORA guidelines. View "People v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Defendant pleaded guilty to all three counts. At the time of the guilty plea, Defendant had a prior undischarged state sentence stemming from a felony drug conviction and also faced a federal violation of supervised release in connection with two prior federal felonies. Defendant was later sentenced to a determinate prison term of twelve years. The sentencing court stated that the sentence would be concurrent to the federal sentence. In addition, as a second felony drug offender, N.Y. Penal Law 70.25(2-a) required Defendant's twelve-year prison term to run consecutively to his prior undischarged state sentence. Defendant appealed, asserting that his guilty plea was involuntary because the trial court did not advise him of the consequence of his plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the failure of the trial court to address the impact of section 70.25(2-a) during the plea colloquy did not require vacatur of the plea. View "People v. Belliard" on Justia Law

An insurance company (USF&G), having settled asbestos claims for nearly a billion dollars, sought to recover a share of its settlement payment from its reinsurers. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to USF&G. The Appellate Division affirmed, with one justice dissenting on the ground that there was a genuine triable issue of fact as to whether a portion of the settlement was for bad faith claims. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division's order to deny summary judgment on two issues and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) there was an issue of fact as to whether USF&G, in allocating the settlement amount, reasonably attributed nothing to the so-called "bad faith" claims made against it; and (2) there was a genuine issue of triable fact as to whether certain claims were given unreasonable values for settlement purposes. View "U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Am. Re-Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Following a verbal exchange between Defendant and a police officer in which Defendant swore at the officer and accused the officer of harassing him, Defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct. In a search incident to arrest, the police discovered Defendant was in possession of twenty-five bags of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress the drugs found on his person, contending that the arrest for disorderly conduct was illegal, rendering the contraband fruit of the poisonous tree. After the motion was denied, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance third degree and assault second degree. The Court of Appeals reversed, vacated Defendant's guilty plea, and granted Defendant's motion to suppress, holding (1) Defendant's arrest for disorderly conduct was not supported by probable cause due to insufficient proof on the public harm element; and (2) because the arrest was unlawful, the cocaine seized during the search incident to that arrest should have been suppressed. View "People v. Baker" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff's father (Decedent) collapsed and at a health club owned and operated by Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York, Inc. (Bally). Ambulance personnel administered shocks to Decedent with an automatic external defibrillator (AED), but he never revived. Plaintiff, as executor of Decedent's estate, brought a wrongful death suit against Bally, alleging that Bally employees negligently failed to use an available AED, or failed to use it within sufficient time, to save Decedent's life. Bally primarily argued that it was immune from liability under the State's Good Samaritan Law. Supreme Court denied Bally's motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding (1) N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 627-a imposes an affirmative duty of care upon health clubs so as to give rise to a cognizable cause of action in negligence for failure to operate an available AED; and (2) the complaint stated a cause of action based upon common law negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) section 627-a does not create an affirmative duty for health clubs to use the AEDs they are required to have available; but (2) Plaintiff pleaded a viable cause of action at common law. View "Miglino v. Bally Total Fitness of Greater N.Y., Inc." on Justia Law

After falling on the street and injuring her leg, Plaintiff commenced this negligence action against Communications Specialists, Inc. (CSI) for creating a hazardous condition in the road by failing to properly pave over a trench CSI cut to install high-speed fiber-optic cable underneath the street. To rebut Plaintiff's testimony that a dip in the trench caused her to fall, CSI subpoenaed a physician who treated Plaintiff shortly after the accident and declared that Plaintiff "tripped over a dog." CSI paid the doctor $10,000 for appearing at trial. Plaintiff's counsel asked the court to charge the jury that, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8001, the doctor was entitled to a witness fee of $15 per day. The court gave the jury a general bias charge but made no specific reference to the payment the doctor received for appearing at trial. The jury found that CSI was negligent but that such negligence was not a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court should have issued a bias charge specifically tailored to address the payment CSI made to the doctor; but (2) the court's failure to issue such an instruction in this case was harmless. View "Caldwell v. Cablevision Sys. Corp." on Justia Law