Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was whether the parties' contract language specifying that Seller's "sole remedy" was liquidated damages and Seller had "no further rights" against the defaulting purchaser (Buyer), trumped language in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5001(a) directing that statutory interest be awarded in a contract dispute. Buyer commenced this action to recover its down payment. Supreme Court rendered a judgment awarding Buyer the down payment plus statutory interest. The Appellate Division modified to vacate the award of statutory interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the contract language controlled in this instance; and (2) therefore, Buyer was not entitled to statutory pre-judgment interest. View "J. D'Addario & Co. v. Embassy Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

East Midtown Plaza Housing Company, a limited-profit housing company organized under the Mitchell-Lama Law, sought to withdraw from the Mitchell-Lama program and become a private cooperative apartment complex. A vote was taken on a revised privatization plan, and the proposal would have been approved if the votes were tallied using a one-vote-per-share rule, but not if counted under a one-vote-per-household formula as directed by the certificate of incorporation and City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD). Following the vote, East Midtown filed a proposed second amendment stating that the plan had been adopted by the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the outstanding shares of East Midtown. The Attorney General refused to accept the amendment. East Midtown responded by commencing this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding seeking to compel the Attorney General to accept the second amendment declaring the plan effective and to direct HPD to recognize that the plan achieved the necessary two-thirds shareholder vote. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the courts below correctly held that the vote should be calculated using the one-vote-per-apartment formula, and therefore, the necessary two-thirds approval was not met. View "E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co. v. Cuomo " on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether an action for negligence and breach of contract lies against an insurance broker for failure to procure adequate insurance coverage where the insured receive the policy without complaint. Plaintiff commenced this action against its broker for negligence and breach of contract in connection with Defendant's procurement of insufficient insurance. Supreme Court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that issues of fact existed as to Plaintiff's request for specific coverage. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Plaintiff's failure to read and understand the policy precluded recovery in this action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) because there were issues of fact as to whether Plaintiff requested specific coverage for its employees and whether Defendant failed to secure a policy as requested, summary judgment was inappropriate in this matter; and (2) Plaintiff's failure to read and understand the policy should not be an absolute bar to recovery under the circumstances of this case. View "Am. Bldg. Supply Corp. v. Petrocelli Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent had an extensive criminal record that included various sexual offenses involving nonconsenting or underage, adolescent victims. A licensed psychologist examined Respondent and concluded that he suffered from a mental abnormality within N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 that predisposed him to the commission of sexual offenses and made it difficult for him to control such behavior. Thereafter, the State filed a petition commencing a proceeding under article 10 for the civil management of Respondent. Supreme court concluded Respondent suffered from a mental abnormality under article 10. Respondent was found to be a dangerous sex offender and was ordered to be civilly committed. The appellate division affirmed. Respondent appealed, contending that absent a diagnosis of a mental disease or disorder listed within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the evidence was legally insufficient to support a determination that an individual suffers from a mental abnormality under the Mental Hygiene Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence showed Respondent was diagnosed by the State's experts as suffering from paraphilia NOS, a mental condition included in the DSM; and (2) the evidence supported a finding that Respondent suffered from a mental abnormality within article 10. View "State v. Shannon S." on Justia Law

The lawyer who represented Defendant at a pre-trial hearing and at trial was simultaneously representing, in an unrelated matter, a police officer who testified for the People that Defendant had confessed to one of the charged crimes. Defendant appealed, contending that his lawyer's conflict denied him the effective assistance of counsel. The appellate division affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) Defendant's waiver of any conflict of interest was invalid, but (2) Defendant failed to establish that any conflict affected the conduct of the defense. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that, because there was no valid waiver of the lawyer's conflict of interest, Defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "People v. Solomon" on Justia Law

The question presented by these consolidated appeals was whether a defendant must preserve the argument that he was deprived of the right to a public trial when his family members were excluded from the courtroom during a portion of voir dire. In People v. Alvarez, the appellate division rejected Alvarez's argument that he had been deprived of a public trial as unpreserved and, in any event, without merit. In People v. George, the appellate division found George's argument that his right to a public trial had been violated was unpreserved and, in any event, without merit. The Court of Appeals (1) affirmed in George, as preservation is required; and (2) reversed in Alvarez and remitted for a new trial, as the issue was adequately preserved. View "People v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the City of New York's 2010 plan for indigent defense, permitting representation by both institutional providers and private attorneys in cases in which a conflict of interest precludes representation by the initial provider, constitutes a valid combination plan within the meaning of County Law 722. Petitioners, various county bar associations, challenged the proposed plan and its implementing regulations as violative of N.Y. County Law 722 and N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law 11(1)(e). The Court of Appeals concluded that the City may assign conflict cases to institutional providers, that its ability to do so is not contingent on the consent of the county bar associations, and that the City's proposed indigent defense plan did not run afoul of the County Law or Municipal Home Rule Law. View "Matter of N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Bloomberg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff broke her hip when she tripped and fell while rollerblading in her residential neighborhood in the Town of Amherst. Plaintiff and her husband brought a negligence action against the Town. Supreme court granted summary judgment for Defendants, holding that Plaintiff assumed the risk of her injuries. A divided appellate court reversed and reinstated the complaint, concluding that the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk did not apply to Plaintiff's activity and that a triable issue of fact existed on the question of proximate cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) assumption of the risk did not apply to the fact pattern in this appeal; and (2) Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of proximate causation. View "Custodi v. Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs acquired a homeowners' insurance policy from Defendant effective as of the closing date of the home they had entered into a contract to purchase. The closing date was scheduled to take place on March 31 but was delayed until May 20. On May 15, a fire completely destroyed the house. Defendant disclaimed coverage on the pertinent grounds that the dwelling was unoccupied at the time of the loss, and therefore, it did not qualify as a "residence premises" under the policy. Supreme court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The appellate division modified the order, concluding that the "residence premises" requirement in the policy failed to define what qualifies as "resides" for the purpose of attaching coverage and that the policy was ambiguous in the circumstances of this case, and otherwise denied summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there were issues of fact as to whether Plaintiffs' daily presence in the house, coupled with their intent to eventually move in, was sufficient to satisfy the policy's requirements; and (2) the term "residence premises" in the contract was ambiguous. View "Dean v. Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and arraigned on charges of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. The accusatory information was titled "Complaint/Information" and contained some factual information. Defendant pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor. Defendant violated the terms of his conditional discharge and was sentenced to thirty days incarceration. Defendant subsequently challenged his conviction by arguing that the accusatory instrument was a facially insufficient misdemeanor complaint because it omitted an element of the offense charged. The police department answered that the accusatory instrument was a simplified traffic information, which required no factual allegations. The appellate term held that the accusatory instrument was a sufficient simplified traffic information and that the title of the instrument was not controlling. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly held that that the accusatory instrument was sufficient as a simplified traffic information despite its title and the fact that it included more factual detail than was required. View "People v. Fernandez" on Justia Law