Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate division affirming Defendant's convictions for second degree robbery and petit larceny, holding that admission of a criminalist's testimony and underlying exhibits was error, and the error was not harmless, thus entitling Defendant to a new trial.On appeal, the appellate division ruled that Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was not violated when the criminalist performed his own analysis about the creation of DNA profiles. The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed, holding that because the record failed to establish that the testifying analyst had the requisite involvement with the DNA profiles the admission of the criminalist's testimony and underlying exhibits was erroneous, and the People did not establish that there was no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to Defendant's conviction. View "People v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of murder in the second degree, holding that the admission of two autopsy reports through an expert witness who did not perform the autopsies, combined with that witness's testimony, violated Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, but the error was harmless.Defendant was convicted of murdering the two young children in her care by repeatedly stabbing them. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding (1) People v. Freycinet, 11 NY3d 38 (NY 2008), should no longer be followed because it is inconsistent with the demands of the Confrontation Clause as recently articulated by the Supreme Court; and (2) Defendant's constitutional right to confrontation was violated by the admission of the autopsy reports and the testimony of the witness at issue, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Ortega" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the legislature's grant of rulemaking authority to the Commission on Forensic Sciences was sufficient to authorize the Commission's promulgation of the Familial DNA Search (FDS) Regulations codified at 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 6192.1 and 6192.3.In 2017, the DNA Subcommittee submitted to the Commission a recommendation to authorize familial DNA searches. The Commission adopted the recommendation, and the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) formally adopted the recommendation as part of the FDS Regulations. Petitioners brought this N.Y. C.L.P.R. 78 proceeding arguing that Respondents lacked statutory authority to promulgate the FDA Regulations, therefore violating the New York Constitution's separation of powers doctrine. Supreme Court denied the petition on the merits, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Commission had the statutory authority to promulgate the FDS Regulations. View "Stevens v. N.Y. State Division of Criminal Justice Services" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court denying Defendant's motion to suppress the firearm found in the vehicle he was driving, holding that the People sustained their burden of demonstrating that the inventory search protocol in this case met "the constitutional minimum."Two New York Police Department officers observed Defendant commit multiple traffic infractions while driving, stopped him, and arrested him for carrying a gravity knife in his pocket. At the precinct, the officers conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and recovered a firearm from the truck. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the firearm on the grounds that the NYPD's inventory search protocol was unconstitutional. The motion was denied, and Defendant pled guilty to criminal possession of a firearm. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to overcome the People's proof establishing a valid inventory search protocol. View "People v. Douglas" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court granting Respondents' motions to dismiss Petitioners' amended N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 petition as time-barred, holding that the relation back doctrine applied.In 2012, Petitioners secured an injunction barring Respondents from using part of their property for nonresidential purposes. Thereafter, Respondents sought a variance from the Village of Hancock Board of Appeals (ZBA), which was granted. Petitioners later commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking annulment of the use variation. The appellate division granted the request and reversed. In 2016, Respondents sought a variance, which the ZBA granted. Petitioners subsequently commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking annulment of the ZBA's decision. This time, however, Petitioners omitted Respondent Rosa Kuehn. Supreme Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition was time-barred against Rosa and that the claims against the remaining respondents must be dismissed for lack of a necessary party. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the relation back doctrine is not limited to cases where the amending party's omission results from doubts regarding the omitted party's identity or status. View "Nemeth v. K-Tooling" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the charges against Petitioner, a Justice of the Whitehall Town Court and Whitehall Village Court, Washington County, were sustained by the evidence and that the sanction of removal from office for his acts of misconduct was appropriate.The State Commission on Judicial Misconduct served Petitioner with formal written complaints charging him with with judicial misconduct for brandishing a loaded firearm at a litigant during a case and engaging in improper fundraising. The Court of Appeals upheld the sanction of removal, holding (1) the investigation was procedurally proper; (2) there was no reason to set aside the Commission's finding of racial bias; and (3) the record supported the conclusion that Petitioner's misconduct transcended poor judgment and warranted removal. View "In re Putorti" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the trial court applying New York's Rape Shield Law, N.Y. C.P.L. 60.42, to exclude forensic evidence proffered by Defendant to demonstrate that that the evidence the prosecution was seeking to attribute to him was consistent with masturbation or sexual contact with a third-party, holding that the trial court erred in applying the Rape Shield Law in this case, depriving Defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense.Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse arising from allegations that he digitally penetrated his minor relative's vagina and fondled her breasts. The jury convicted Defendant of the sexual abuse charge related to the alleged digital penetration of the complainant's vagina. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Defendant's argument that the trial court improperly excluded the forensic evidence under CPL 60.42. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's exclusion of the forensic evidence at issue deprived Defendant of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. View "People v. Cerda" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals answered in the negative the question of whether Insurance Law 3203(a)(2), which requires insurers to refund a portion of a life insurance premium "if the death of the insured occurs during a period for which the premium has been paid," holding that the plain language of section 3203(a)(2) does not apply to discretionary payments like those at issue in this case.In this action concerning a contract for a life insurance policy entered into between a family trust with Defendant, Plaintiff, as trustee of the trust, filed this putative class action against Defendant for breach of contract, alleging that its refusal to refund a prorated portion of the final year's planned premium violated section 3203(a)(2). The federal district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that section 3203(a)(2) did not require the refund. The federal court of appeals certified to the Court of Appeals a question of law. The Court of Appeals answered that section 3203(a)(2) did not apply to discretionary payments like those at issue in this case. View "Nitkewicz v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of N.Y." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the appellate division in this case challenging the devaluation of certain securities, holding that the relevant language in the governing agreements did not impose an affirmative duty on the part of the trustee to enforce repurchase obligations.Plaintiffs were commercial banks incorporated in Germany that invested in residential mortgage-backed securities issued by securitization trusts. Defendants served as trustees for the trusts. When the securities lost significant value in 2008, Plaintiffs sued, alleging that Defendants breached multiple statutory, contractual, and fiduciary duties. Supreme Court rejected Defendants' argument that the action was barred because Plaintiffs did not comply with the requirements of the no-action clause. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) failure to comply with the no-action clause did not bar this suit; and (2) this Court declines to recognize an implied contractual duty on Trustees' part to enforce the repurchase protocol obligations of other parties. View "IKB Int'l S.A. v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the appellate court reversing a county court order designating Defendant a level three sex offender and remitting the matter for consideration of whether an upward departure was warranted, holding that, under the circumstances, the appellate division had the authority to remit for consideration of an upward departure.Defendant pleaded guilty to sexual assault in the first degree. After Defendant's probation was revoked and prior to his subsequent release, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders deemed Defendant a level three sex offender. County Court adjudicated Defendant a level three sexually violent offender. The appellate division reversed based on Defendant's risk factor point assessment and remitted the case for further proceedings. On remittal, County Court again adjudicated Defendant a level three sexually violent offender. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate division had power to remit for consideration of a departure request after it reversed the order determining Defendant's risk level. View "People v. Weber" on Justia Law