Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs acquired a homeowners' insurance policy from Defendant effective as of the closing date of the home they had entered into a contract to purchase. The closing date was scheduled to take place on March 31 but was delayed until May 20. On May 15, a fire completely destroyed the house. Defendant disclaimed coverage on the pertinent grounds that the dwelling was unoccupied at the time of the loss, and therefore, it did not qualify as a "residence premises" under the policy. Supreme court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. The appellate division modified the order, concluding that the "residence premises" requirement in the policy failed to define what qualifies as "resides" for the purpose of attaching coverage and that the policy was ambiguous in the circumstances of this case, and otherwise denied summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there were issues of fact as to whether Plaintiffs' daily presence in the house, coupled with their intent to eventually move in, was sufficient to satisfy the policy's requirements; and (2) the term "residence premises" in the contract was ambiguous. View "Dean v. Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and arraigned on charges of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. The accusatory information was titled "Complaint/Information" and contained some factual information. Defendant pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor. Defendant violated the terms of his conditional discharge and was sentenced to thirty days incarceration. Defendant subsequently challenged his conviction by arguing that the accusatory instrument was a facially insufficient misdemeanor complaint because it omitted an element of the offense charged. The police department answered that the accusatory instrument was a simplified traffic information, which required no factual allegations. The appellate term held that the accusatory instrument was a sufficient simplified traffic information and that the title of the instrument was not controlling. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly held that that the accusatory instrument was sufficient as a simplified traffic information despite its title and the fact that it included more factual detail than was required. View "People v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

Shareholders commenced this action against Corporation seeking a declaration that Corporation must repurchase their shares of preferred stock after Corporation merged with two other corporations. Shareholders owned preferred stock by Corporation by way of an agreement that conferred special benefits requiring that Corporation repurchase the preferred stock in the event that a "fundamental change" occurred. Shareholders argued that a fundamental change took place when the merger occurred. Supreme court denied Corporation's motion to dismiss. The appellate division reversed and dismissed the complaint, finding that details of the merger triggered an exception of the fundamental change provision. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the facts presented, there was ambiguity in the interpretation and effect of the preferred stock agreement and, as such, Corporation was not entitled to dismissal of Shareholders' complaint. View "Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P. v. Superior Well Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Travelers Indemnity Company issued to Plaintiff an insurance policy covering direct physical loss of or damage to a building. The policy contained an exclusion for loss or damage caused by earth movement, which included earth sinking whether "naturally occurring or due to made made or other artificial causes." The building suffered cracks as a result of an excavation being conducted on the lot next door to it. Travelers rejected Plaintiff's claim, relying on the earth movement exclusion. Plaintiff sued for breach of the policy. Supreme court denied Travelers' motion for summary judgment, and the appellate division affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether Pioneer Tower Owners Ass'n v. State Farm, in which the Court held that an "earth movement" exclusion in an insurance policy did not unambiguously apply to excavation, applied in this case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the policy in the instant case had added language expressly making the earth movement exclusion applicable to "man made" movement of earth, the exclusion was unambiguous and the loss caused by excavation was excluded from the policy. View "Bentoria Holdings, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant contested his second violent felony offender adjudication, predicated upon a prior conviction in Pennsylvania that occurred when he was eighteen years old, contending (1) because he could have been accorded youthful offender status had he committed that crime in New York, he was entitled to such status for the purpose of enhanced sentencing, and (2) N.Y. Penal Law 70.04(1)(b)(v)'s tolling provision violated the equal protection clause of the State Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant did not receive youthful offender treatment for the underlying offense at issue, he was not now entitled to a retroactive application of youthful offender status to a foreign felony conviction; and (2) section 70.04(1)(b)(v)'s tolling provision, as applied to persons with differing years of incarceration may result in disparate punishment, does not violate the equal protection clause. View "People v. Meckwood" on Justia Law

The primary question in this commercial dispute involving, among other things, the right to a leasehold to certain commercial property, was whether, pursuant to the "necessary affects" requirement under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(a)(1), Defendants' appeal to the appellate division from a judgment declaring Plaintiff the lawful tenant of the subject property brought up for review two non-final supreme court orders: one dismissing Defendants' counterclaims and third-party complaint and the other denying Defendants' motion for leave to amend their answer. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the appellate division, concluding that the appellate division improperly held that Defendants' appeal from the judgment did not bring up for review the order dismissing Defendants' counterclaims and third-party complaint. In other words, the appellate division erred in ruling that this order did not necessarily affect the final judgment. View "Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v. E. 149th Realty Corp." on Justia Law

At Defendant's trial for second-degree murder, the trial judge agreed with the defense attorney that a reasonable view of the evidence supported his request to submit the lesser-included offenses of first- and second-degree manslaughter to the jury. But contrary to defense counsel's request and repeated statements that, in his professional judgment, the lesser-included offenses should be given to the jury, the judge did not do so because Defendant objected. The jury found Defendant guilty of murder. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding (1) the trial judge denied Defendant the expert judgment of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, as the decision regarding whether to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses is for the defense attorney, not the accused, to make; and (2) the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Colville" on Justia Law

Defendant's paramour, Maria, obtained an order of protection requiring Defendant to refrain from contacting her in any manner and to stay away from her. Defendant violated the order and was charged with criminal contempt in the second degree. Another order of protection was issued, which Defendant violated by trying to open the door of Maria's apartment. Based on this incident, Defendant was indicted for attempted burglary in the second degree and several counts of criminal contempt in the first degree. Defendant was convicted on all counts. At issue on appeal was whether the intent to do something inside the residence that would be legal in the absence of the order of protection establishes the requisite criminal state of mind to elevate the trespass to a burglary. The appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even an act that would otherwise be legal but for the issuance of the order of protection can be viewed as a crime, and the intent to commit this act inside a building may be used to prove a burglary charge. View "People v. Cajigas" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the New York City School Construction Authority (Authority) violated the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) during a construction project by failing to discuss in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) the methods it adopted for long-term maintenance and monitoring of the controls it used to prevent or mitigate environmental harm. Petitioners brought this action challenging that Authority's SEQRA compliance. Supreme court ordered the Authority to prepare a supplemental EIS based on any changes to the final EIS as a result of the Authority's completed, detailed long-term maintenance and monitoring plan. The Authority did not file a supplemental EIS but, instead, moved for reargument and renewal, asserting that its submission of a site management plan removed the need for any further SEQRA filing. Supreme court adhered to its previous ruling on reargument, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) where important decisions about mitigation can only be made after the initial remedial measures are complete, a supplemental EIS may be called for, as it is here; and (2) nor does the submission of a site management plan justify short-circuiting SEQRA review. View "Bronx Comm. for Toxic Free Schs. v. N.Y. City Sch. Constr. Auth." on Justia Law

Appellants were indicted for enterprise corruption based in essential part on their commission of numerous predicate offenses. There was proof before the grand jury that three of them repeatedly purchased stolen credit card data which they then used for fraudulent purposes, and that the remaining appellant, through the company he controlled, Western Express International, Inc., facilitated transactions by which the purloined credit card data was transferred. Supreme court granted Appellants' respective motions to dismiss the indictment's enterprise corruption count upon the ground that the proof before the grand jury did not make out the existence of a "criminal enterprise." The appellate division reversed and reinstated the enterprise corruption count, concluding that the evidence permitted the inference that Appellants knowingly played roles in the enterprise even though, for the most part, they had no personal interaction. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the orders of supreme court, holding that although there was evidence of many arms' length transactions, there was no proof of concerted activity from which a petit jury might reasonably have gathered that Appellants were knowing participants in the affairs of a "criminal enterprise" within the meaning of N.Y. Penal Law 460.10(3). View "People v. W. Express Int'l Inc." on Justia Law