Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between two long-time friends and business associates, where the plaintiff invested $3 million in Digipac LLC, controlled by the defendant, based on an oral agreement. The agreement promised the plaintiff an exit opportunity from the investment either if Remark Holdings, Inc.'s share price hit $50 or after five years based on the value of Digipac's Remark holdings. The plaintiff made the investment in two installments in 2012 and 2013. In 2014, the defendant unilaterally amended the LLC agreement, which included a merger clause stating that it superseded all prior agreements.The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court for breach of contract and promissory estoppel, seeking $11.6 million. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the oral agreement was superseded by the amended LLC agreement. The Supreme Court granted the motion, finding the oral agreement unenforceable and the promissory estoppel claim unreasonable. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the plaintiff was bound by the amended LLC agreement and its merger clause, which nullified the oral agreement. The court also dismissed the promissory estoppel claim, noting that it was duplicative of the breach of contract claim.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the amended LLC agreement, governed by Delaware law, unambiguously nullified the prior oral agreement through its merger clause. The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the defendant acted in a personal capacity and that the agreements involved different subject matters. The court also dismissed the promissory estoppel claim, as the amended LLC agreement governed the promise at issue. The court emphasized the importance of scrutinizing LLC agreements and protecting contractual rights in closely held LLCs. View "Behler v Kai-Shing Tao" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Hobish Irrevocable Trust purchased a universal life insurance policy from AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company to insure Toby Hobish. The policy provided a $2 million death benefit and allowed flexible premium payments into a Policy Account, from which monthly cost of insurance (COI) charges were deducted. In 2015, AXA announced an increase in COI charges for certain policies, including the Trust's, leading to a significant rise in the monthly COI charge. The Trust surrendered the policy in 2016, receiving the remaining account balance minus a surrender fee.The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court, alleging breach of contract and violation of General Business Law § 349. They claimed the COI rate increase was not equitable to all policyholders of a given class and that AXA had misled elderly consumers about the likelihood of such increases. The Supreme Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment on liability, finding the term "a given class" ambiguous and requiring further examination of extrinsic evidence. The court also dismissed several of plaintiffs' damages theories, including claims for the full value of the death benefit and restitutionary damages.The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's rulings, agreeing that the term "a given class" was ambiguous and that the extrinsic evidence did not resolve this ambiguity. The court also upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs' damages claims, including compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages, and limited punitive damages under General Business Law § 349 to three times the actual damages.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, agreeing that the term "a given class" was ambiguous and that the extrinsic evidence did not resolve this ambiguity. The court also upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs' damages claims and confirmed that punitive damages under General Business Law § 349 are limited to the statutory treble damages. View "Hobish v AXA Equit. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

While incarcerated for manslaughter, the defendant engaged in a fight with another inmate, resulting in the defendant cutting his finger and the opponent sustaining a face wound. Correction officers found a bloody, sharpened porcelain shard near the defendant. The defendant was convicted of promoting prison contraband in the first degree and sentenced as a second felony offender to 3½ to 7 years in prison.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting the defendant's challenge to the severity of his sentence. The court stated that there were no extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the Appellate Division applied an erroneous standard by requiring extraordinary circumstances or abuse of discretion for a sentence reduction. The Court of Appeals clarified that the intermediate appellate courts have broad, plenary power to reduce a sentence that is unduly harsh or severe without deference to the sentencing court. The Court of Appeals reversed the order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the defendant's excessive sentence claim under the proper standard. View "People v Brisman" on Justia Law

Edward Mero was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of tampering with physical evidence. The first murder involved his roommate, who was found dead in their apartment after a fire in 2013. The second murder involved a woman he hired for a date in December 2014, whose body was found in a shallow grave in May 2015. Mero was arrested in 2017 and charged with both murders and related tampering charges.The trial court joined the charges in a single indictment and denied Mero's motion to sever them, reasoning that the distinct evidence for each murder would allow the jury to consider each charge separately. During the trial, a juror was dismissed after overhearing derogatory comments made by defense counsel. Mero later moved to vacate his convictions, arguing that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest due to an undisclosed business relationship with an Assistant District Attorney (ADA). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the potential conflict did not affect the defense.The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decisions, including the denial of the severance motion and the motion to vacate. The court found that the evidence for each murder was distinct enough for the jury to consider separately and that the potential conflict of interest did not impact the defense. Two Justices dissented, arguing that the proof for the second murder was significantly stronger and that the jury would likely be prejudiced by the joinder.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever, as the jury was capable of considering the evidence for each charge separately. The court also found that the potential conflict of interest did not operate on the defense, and Mero's other claims were either without merit or unreviewable. View "People v Mero" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) after being stopped by state troopers for crossing the fog line three times within a short distance. The defendant argued that the stop was unlawful and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. During the suppression hearing, the troopers testified that they observed the defendant's vehicle crossing the fog line multiple times, and upon stopping him, noted signs of intoxication, including the smell of alcohol, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes. The defendant failed several sobriety tests and admitted to drinking.The suppression court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the troopers had probable cause to stop the vehicle based on the observed traffic violation. At the bench trial, the troopers' testimonies were consistent with their earlier statements, and the court admitted the police report of the defendant's refusal to take a chemical test. The court found the defendant guilty of driving while intoxicated and sentenced him accordingly.The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding that the troopers had probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle for violating VTL § 1128 (a) by crossing the fog line multiple times. The majority rejected the defendant's claims, while the dissenting justices argued that there was no evidence of unsafe driving. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the troopers had probable cause for the stop and that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction. The court also found that the weight of the evidence claim was unreviewable. View "People v Rufus" on Justia Law

A property owner sought to deregulate certain Manhattan apartments under the luxury deregulation provisions of the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL). The Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) issued deregulation orders for these apartments, but the leases did not expire until after the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA) repealed luxury deregulation. The property owner argued that the apartments should still be deregulated despite the repeal.The Supreme Court dismissed the property owner's proceeding, holding that DHCR's interpretation of the HSTPA was reasonable. The court found that the apartments did not become deregulated because their leases had not expired before the HSTPA took effect. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, agreeing that DHCR's interpretation was correct and that there was no improper delay by DHCR in processing the deregulation applications.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that DHCR properly interpreted the HSTPA as eliminating luxury deregulation for apartments whose leases expired after the statute's effective date. The court found that the statutory language and legislative intent supported DHCR's interpretation. Additionally, the court rejected the property owner's argument that DHCR caused undue delay in processing the deregulation applications, finding no evidence of negligence or willfulness by DHCR. The court concluded that the apartments remained subject to rent stabilization under the HSTPA. View "Matter of 160 E. 84th St. Assoc. LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal" on Justia Law

The case involves the interpretation of Administrative Code of the City of New York § 12-126, which mandates that New York City pay the full cost of health insurance coverage for active employees, retirees, and their dependents, up to a specified cap. The dispute centers on whether the City is required to pay up to the statutory cap for any health insurance plan it offers or just one plan. Petitioners argue that the City must pay for any plan offered, while the City contends it only needs to pay for one plan and any additional plans are subject to collective bargaining agreements.The Supreme Court of New York County granted a preliminary injunction preventing the City from enforcing an opt-out date for a new Medicare Advantage plan and later permanently enjoined the City from passing any costs of the current plan to retirees, except where costs exceed the statutory cap. The court did not determine the exact statutory cap but suggested that the cost of the Senior Care plan did not exceed it. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, agreeing that the City must pay the full cost, up to the statutory cap, for any health insurance plan it offers to retirees.The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that § 12-126 requires the City to pay up to the statutory cap for each health insurance plan it offers to employees and retirees. The court did not address the issue of how the statutory cap should be determined for Medicare-eligible retirees, as the City had not preserved this question for review. The court concluded that the legislative history supported the interpretation that the City must pay for any plan it offers, aligning with the intent to provide a choice of health insurance plans to employees and retirees. View "Matter of NYC Org. of Pub. Serv. Retirees, Inc. v Campion" on Justia Law

Petitioner Maryanne McCabe lived with her long-time romantic partner, David Burrows, in a New York City cooperative building. Upon Burrows' death, he bequeathed his unit to McCabe. She sought to acquire his lease and shares under a lease provision allowing automatic transfer to a shareholder's "spouse." The cooperative board did not recognize McCabe as a spouse but offered to consider her under a clause for family members. McCabe argued that the board's refusal violated the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) prohibition against marital status discrimination.The Supreme Court denied McCabe's petition, stating that the denial was not due to her being unmarried but because she was not married to Burrows, which did not constitute marital status discrimination. The court also found that McCabe had not proven she was a family member or financially responsible. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision on the same grounds.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the term "marital status" under the NYCHRL refers to the legal condition of being single, married, legally separated, divorced, or widowed, and does not extend to individuals in long-term romantic relationships who are not legally married or in a registered domestic partnership. The Court concluded that the cooperative board's actions did not constitute marital status discrimination under the NYCHRL, the New York State Human Rights Law, or federal law. The Court also deferred to the board's decision to reject McCabe's application based on her financial representations. View "Matter of McCabe v. 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when he lost control of his motorcycle on Lark Street in Albany, allegedly due to a road defect the City knew about but failed to repair. The case centers on whether reports submitted through the City's online system, SeeClickFix (SCF), constituted "written notice" of the defect and if those reports were "actually given" to the designated official.The Supreme Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, holding that SCF reports might constitute prior written notice but that factual issues precluded summary judgment. These issues included whether the complaints were based on verbal or written communications, whether the defects described were related to the accident, and whether the City's actions created or exacerbated the defect. The court also rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity.The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, agreeing that SCF complaints could be considered written notice and rejecting the City's immunity argument. The Appellate Division granted the City leave to appeal and certified the question of whether it erred in affirming the denial of the City's motion.The New York Court of Appeals held that SCF reports could constitute written notice and that the City's implementation of SCF meant the reports were "actually given" to the Commissioner of General Services. The court also found that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on whether the City's negligence created a dangerous condition and rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity, as the repair of the road was a proprietary function. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order and answered the certified question in the negative. View "Calabrese v City of Albany" on Justia Law

A former police officer, the petitioner, sought to annul the Comptroller's decision denying him accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits. The petitioner was injured while on desk duty when his rolling chair tipped due to a rut in the floor, causing him to grab his desk and injure his shoulder and neck. He applied for ADR benefits, claiming the injury was accidental.The Comptroller denied the application, concluding that the petitioner could have reasonably anticipated the hazard. The petitioner testified that he was aware of the ruts in the floor and had been working desk duty for months. Photographs documented the floor's condition. The Comptroller determined that the injury was not the result of an "accident" as defined for ADR benefits.The petitioner challenged this decision through a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division confirmed the Comptroller's determination and dismissed the proceeding, stating that an event is not an accident if it could have been reasonably anticipated. One Justice dissented, arguing that the "reasonably anticipated" standard was inconsistent with precedent and that the chair tipping was a sudden, unexpected event.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment. The court held that a precipitating event that could or should have been reasonably anticipated by a person in the claimant's circumstances is not an "accident" for ADR benefits. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Comptroller's determination that the petitioner could have reasonably anticipated the near-fall from his desk chair, given his familiarity with the ruts in the floor and the documented condition of the precinct floor. The judgment was affirmed with costs. View "Bodenmiller v. DiNapoli" on Justia Law