Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff's multi-unit apartment building in Staten Island was damaged by fire on August 4, 2014. At the time, she had an insurance policy with Tower Insurance Company of New York, which required any legal action to be brought within two years of the damage and stipulated that replacement costs would only be paid if repairs were made as soon as reasonably possible. Restoration was completed in July 2020, and her claim was denied on September 1, 2020. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit on August 4, 2020, seeking full replacement value and coverage for lost business income, alleging that Tower/AmTrust's bad faith conduct delayed the restoration process.The Supreme Court granted the Tower/AmTrust defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the policy's two-year suit limitation provision. The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she attempted to repair the property within the two-year period or took any action to protect her rights as the limitation period expired. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff did not allege that she reasonably attempted to repair the property within the two-year period but was unable to do so. Consequently, the claims against the broker defendants were also dismissed as the plaintiff's failure to recover was due to her own actions.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order. The court held that the plaintiff did not raise an issue as to whether the suit limitation provision was unreasonable under the circumstances. The plaintiff's allegations were deemed conclusory and lacked specific details about the extent of the damage or efforts to complete repairs within the two-year period. The court concluded that the Tower/AmTrust defendants' motion to dismiss was properly granted, and the claims against the broker defendants were also correctly dismissed. View "Farage v Associated Insurance Management Corp." on Justia Law

Two men entered a Brooklyn warehouse on May 9, 2016, one displaying a badge and the other remaining outside an office door. The man with the badge, a Black man, drew a firearm and forced an Asian victim to surrender $3,000. The robbers fled, and the victims called 911 and pursued them. Surveillance footage captured the robbery, but the robbers' facial features were unclear. Four days later, the first victim identified the defendant, who was wearing the same clothes as during the robbery. The defendant was arrested, and his sweatshirt, which was later destroyed by mold, was vouchered as evidence.The defendant was charged with robbery in the first degree and proceeded to a jury trial. After jury selection and opening statements, the defense counsel indicated an intention to call an expert on cross-race effect. Later, the defense sought to expand the expert testimony to include other factors affecting eyewitness reliability. The trial court requested case law to support the additional factors but received none. The court allowed expert testimony only on cross-race effect, citing the late application and potential trial delay. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to 20 years to life. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, noting sufficient corroborating evidence.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the expert testimony to cross-race effect. The court emphasized that the trial court properly weighed the probative value of the testimony against potential trial delay and other factors. The court clarified that corroborating evidence should not be the sole basis for admissibility decisions and affirmed the Appellate Division's order. View "People v Vaughn" on Justia Law

In 1977, the defendant, then 19 years old, committed a series of serious sexual offenses, including rape and sodomy, after breaking into a stranger's home. He had a history of sexual misconduct dating back to 1968, including incidents of sexual abuse and attempted rape. He was convicted of multiple charges, including rape in the first degree, and sentenced to 8⅓ to 30 years in prison. After serving 21 years, he was released on parole in 1998 and classified as a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA).The defendant petitioned the County Court in 2021 to modify his risk level classification from level three to level one, citing his rehabilitation, stable employment, and supportive family relationships. The Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders did not oppose the modification to level one. However, the People opposed any modification, emphasizing the seriousness of his past crimes. The County Court partially granted the petition, reducing his classification to level two but denying the request for level one, citing the seriousness of his 1977 crimes and his criminal history, including a 2003 misdemeanor conviction.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the County Court's decision. The Court held that the County Court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the defendant's classification to level two but denying further modification to level one. The Court emphasized that the seriousness of the defendant's past crimes and his criminal history were relevant factors in assessing his risk of reoffense. The Court concluded that the defendant had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that he was so unlikely to reoffend as to warrant a level one classification. View "People v Shader" on Justia Law

Victor Ibhawa, a Black, Nigerian Catholic priest, was hired by the Diocese of Buffalo in 2016 as the Parish Administrator of the Blessed Trinity Church. He was reappointed in January 2019 for another three-year term but was terminated on September 28, 2020. Ibhawa filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR) in November 2020, alleging racial discrimination, including incidents involving racial slurs and xenophobic remarks. He claimed that Diocesan officials failed to investigate these incidents and made offensive remarks about foreign priests. Ibhawa's employment was terminated, and his priestly faculties were removed, preventing him from applying for another priest position in the Diocese. He alleged hostile work environment and unlawful termination based on race and national origin.The DHR dismissed Ibhawa's complaint, citing the "ministerial exception" under the First Amendment, which it interpreted as a jurisdictional bar. The New York Supreme Court partially reversed this decision, finding that while the unlawful termination claim was properly dismissed, the hostile work environment claim required further consideration. The Appellate Division, however, reinstated the DHR's dismissal, emphasizing deference to the agency's expertise and noting the lack of controlling precedent on the ministerial exception's applicability to hostile work environment claims.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that the DHR erred in treating the ministerial exception as a jurisdictional bar rather than an affirmative defense. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order and remitted the case to the DHR for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Ibhawa v New York State Div. of Human Rights" on Justia Law

In June 2019, the petitioner's 13-year-old daughter, T., disclosed to a friend, a teacher, a police officer, and a caseworker from the New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS) that the petitioner had struck her with an extension cord. The caseworker took photographs of T.'s injuries, and a physician confirmed that the injuries were consistent with being struck by an extension cord. ACS initiated a Family Court article 10 neglect proceeding against the petitioner and her husband. The Family Court authorized an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD), and the case was dismissed in February 2020 after the petitioner complied with the court's conditions.The police officer reported the incident to the Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (SCR). In July 2019, ACS determined the report against the petitioner was indicated. The petitioner challenged this determination, but the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) upheld it after an internal review. A fair hearing was held in August 2020, and OCFS concluded that the allegations were substantiated by a fair preponderance of the evidence.The petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge OCFS's determination. The Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division, which confirmed OCFS's determination, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. The Appellate Division held that the petitioner had no constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR hearing and that the statutory changes to Social Services Law § 422 did not apply retroactively.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the petitioner had no constitutional right to assigned counsel during the SCR administrative hearing. It also concluded that the statutory amendments to Social Services Law § 422 (8) (b) (ii) did not apply retroactively to OCFS determinations rendered before the effective date of the amendments. The Court further held that OCFS's determination was supported by substantial evidence. View "Matter of Jeter v. Poole" on Justia Law

On February 9, 2017, a bus owned and operated by New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJT) allegedly struck and injured Jeffrey Colt in Manhattan. Colt and his wife, Betsy Tsai, filed a lawsuit on September 18, 2017, claiming negligence, negligent hiring, and loss of consortium. NJT and its employee, Ana Hernandez, who was driving the bus, denied many of the allegations and asserted various defenses, including a lack of jurisdiction and immunity from suit. In 2020, NJT moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it was protected by sovereign immunity as an arm of the State of New Jersey.The Supreme Court of New York County denied NJT's motion, ruling that NJT had waived its right to assert sovereign immunity by waiting three years to raise the defense. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision but on different grounds, concluding that NJT was an arm of the State of New Jersey and entitled to sovereign immunity. However, it held that dismissing the case would be unjust since the plaintiffs could not sue in New Jersey due to venue rules.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's order but on different grounds. The Court of Appeals held that NJT is not entitled to invoke sovereign immunity in New York courts. The court considered factors such as how New Jersey defines NJT and its functions, the state's power to direct NJT's conduct, and the effect of a judgment against NJT on the state's dignity. The court concluded that allowing the suit to proceed would not offend New Jersey's sovereign dignity because NJT operates with significant independence and New Jersey would not be liable for a judgment against NJT. Therefore, NJT and the other defendants could not claim sovereign immunity. View "Colt v. New Jersey Tr. Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, the decedent's son and Administrator of her estate, filed a negligence, medical malpractice, and wrongful death lawsuit in the Supreme Court, New York County, against Dewitt Rehabilitation and Nursing Center and other defendants. The decedent was a resident at Dewitt in February and March 2019. Dewitt moved to transfer the venue to Nassau County based on a forum selection clause in two electronically signed admission agreements. Dewitt supported its motion with the agreements and an affidavit from its director of admissions, Francesca Trimarchi. The plaintiff contested the authenticity of the agreements, claiming the signatures were forged and provided an exemplar of the decedent's handwritten signature for comparison.The Supreme Court granted Dewitt's motion, finding that Dewitt met its initial burden to show the forum selection clause was applicable and enforceable, and that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the alleged forgery. The case was ordered to be transferred to Supreme Court, Nassau County. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Dewitt failed to adequately authenticate the admission agreements as Trimarchi did not witness the signing, and thus the forum selection clause was unenforceable. The dissent argued that the burden should be on the plaintiff to prove the clause should not be enforced.The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the Appellate Division's decision, reinstating the Supreme Court's order. The court held that Dewitt met its burden of establishing the authenticity of the agreements through circumstantial evidence, including Trimarchi's affidavit and the agreements themselves. The plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the authenticity of the signatures. The court also clarified that CPLR 4539(b) was inapplicable as the documents were originally created in electronic form. The certified question was answered in the negative. View "Knight v New York & Presbyt. Hosp." on Justia Law

In July 2020, the plaintiff used Uber's app to request a ride. Upon being dropped off in the middle of a roadway, she was struck by another vehicle and sustained injuries. She filed a personal injury lawsuit against Uber in November 2020, serving the complaint via the New York Secretary of State. Uber did not respond within the required 30 days, allegedly due to mail processing delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.In January 2021, Uber updated its terms of use, including an arbitration agreement, and notified users via email. The plaintiff received and opened this email. When she next logged into the Uber app, she was presented with a pop-up screen requiring her to agree to the updated terms to continue using the service. She checked a box and clicked "Confirm," thereby agreeing to the terms, which included a clause delegating the authority to resolve disputes about the agreement's applicability and enforceability to an arbitrator.The plaintiff moved for a default judgment in March 2021, and Uber responded by asserting that she had agreed to arbitrate her claims. Uber then sent a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate. The plaintiff moved to stay Uber's arbitration demand, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and violated ethical rules. Uber cross-moved to compel arbitration.The Supreme Court granted Uber's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the arbitration agreement and had assented to it. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that the plaintiff's challenges to the agreement's validity must be decided by an arbitrator due to the delegation provision.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the clickwrap process used by Uber resulted in a valid agreement to arbitrate. The court also held that the delegation provision was valid and that the plaintiff's challenges to the arbitration agreement's enforceability should be resolved by an arbitrator. The court found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's decision not to sanction Uber for the alleged ethical violation. View "Wu v. Uber Tech., Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon after police recovered a handgun from him following a report of shots fired. Before being read his Miranda rights, the defendant made an incriminating statement to the police. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress both the handgun and his statement. Subsequently, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree criminal possession of a weapon.The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, and the defendant accepted a plea deal. During the plea colloquy, the defendant, representing himself, expressed his desire to appeal the suppression ruling. The court accepted the plea and imposed the agreed-upon sentence. The Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting, agreed that the defendant's statement should have been suppressed but deemed the error harmless, concluding that the gun's admissibility at trial meant there was no reasonable possibility the error influenced the defendant's decision to plead guilty.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that the erroneous suppression ruling could have contributed to the defendant's decision to plead guilty. The court emphasized that harmless error analysis in the context of guilty pleas is challenging and requires evaluating whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error influenced the plea decision. The court found the record ambiguous regarding the defendant's motivation for pleading guilty and noted the defendant's concern about appealing the suppression ruling. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order, vacated the defendant's guilty plea, and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for further proceedings on the indictment. View "People v Robles" on Justia Law

The case involves a shooting that occurred during a dispute over a drug transaction at a barbershop in the Bronx. The barbershop owner and the victim had several confrontations, including a fistfight and threats from the victim. The victim returned to the shop, and the owner called the defendant, a friend. When the defendant arrived, the victim confronted him with a razor blade, and the defendant shot and killed the victim. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and second-degree criminal weapon possession. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the defense of justification.During the trial, the court heard testimony from an eyewitness and the medical examiner. The trial court denied the defendant's request for a justification charge, concluding it was not appropriate based on the evidence. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the defendant was not justified in firing additional shots into the victim's back after stepping back and not being cut by the victim.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in not providing a justification instruction for the second-degree murder charge. The court found that there was a reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant was justified in his actions, given the rapid unfolding of events and the imminent threat posed by the victim. The court also noted that the failure to provide the justification instruction could have affected the jury's verdict on the possession count, as the jury might have concluded that the defendant lacked the intent to use the weapon unlawfully if they found the shooting justified. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order and ordered a new trial. View "People v. Castillo" on Justia Law