Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the trial court applying New York's Rape Shield Law, N.Y. C.P.L. 60.42, to exclude forensic evidence proffered by Defendant to demonstrate that that the evidence the prosecution was seeking to attribute to him was consistent with masturbation or sexual contact with a third-party, holding that the trial court erred in applying the Rape Shield Law in this case, depriving Defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense.Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse arising from allegations that he digitally penetrated his minor relative's vagina and fondled her breasts. The jury convicted Defendant of the sexual abuse charge related to the alleged digital penetration of the complainant's vagina. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Defendant's argument that the trial court improperly excluded the forensic evidence under CPL 60.42. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's exclusion of the forensic evidence at issue deprived Defendant of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. View "People v. Cerda" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals answered in the negative the question of whether Insurance Law 3203(a)(2), which requires insurers to refund a portion of a life insurance premium "if the death of the insured occurs during a period for which the premium has been paid," holding that the plain language of section 3203(a)(2) does not apply to discretionary payments like those at issue in this case.In this action concerning a contract for a life insurance policy entered into between a family trust with Defendant, Plaintiff, as trustee of the trust, filed this putative class action against Defendant for breach of contract, alleging that its refusal to refund a prorated portion of the final year's planned premium violated section 3203(a)(2). The federal district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that section 3203(a)(2) did not require the refund. The federal court of appeals certified to the Court of Appeals a question of law. The Court of Appeals answered that section 3203(a)(2) did not apply to discretionary payments like those at issue in this case. View "Nitkewicz v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of N.Y." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the appellate division in this case challenging the devaluation of certain securities, holding that the relevant language in the governing agreements did not impose an affirmative duty on the part of the trustee to enforce repurchase obligations.Plaintiffs were commercial banks incorporated in Germany that invested in residential mortgage-backed securities issued by securitization trusts. Defendants served as trustees for the trusts. When the securities lost significant value in 2008, Plaintiffs sued, alleging that Defendants breached multiple statutory, contractual, and fiduciary duties. Supreme Court rejected Defendants' argument that the action was barred because Plaintiffs did not comply with the requirements of the no-action clause. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) failure to comply with the no-action clause did not bar this suit; and (2) this Court declines to recognize an implied contractual duty on Trustees' part to enforce the repurchase protocol obligations of other parties. View "IKB Int'l S.A. v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the appellate court reversing a county court order designating Defendant a level three sex offender and remitting the matter for consideration of whether an upward departure was warranted, holding that, under the circumstances, the appellate division had the authority to remit for consideration of an upward departure.Defendant pleaded guilty to sexual assault in the first degree. After Defendant's probation was revoked and prior to his subsequent release, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders deemed Defendant a level three sex offender. County Court adjudicated Defendant a level three sexually violent offender. The appellate division reversed based on Defendant's risk factor point assessment and remitted the case for further proceedings. On remittal, County Court again adjudicated Defendant a level three sexually violent offender. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate division had power to remit for consideration of a departure request after it reversed the order determining Defendant's risk level. View "People v. Weber" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the conclusion of the appellate division that the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) court acted within its discretion by upwardly departing to level three in determining Defendant's risk level classification, holding that the SORA court deprived Defendant of basic due process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard.Defendant's convictions required him to register under SORA. At the SORA hearing, the court noted that Defendant would normally be required to register as a level two sex offender but upwardly departed to level three due to Defendant's "extensive prior disciplinary history." The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the proceeding failed to comport with due process because Defendant was provided no notice or meaningful opportunity to be heard in response to the District Attorney's request for an upward departure. View "People v. Worley" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division reversing Supreme Court's conclusion that the application of the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) to Petitioner violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal Constitution when applied to offenders whose crimes predated the 2005 amendments to the Act, holding that the effect of SARA's school grounds condition, as codified in N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14), was not punitive.In 1986, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree and other crimes. Petitioner was unable to locate SARA-compliant housing before his open release date and therefore remained in custody until he could locate suitable housing under SARA's school grounds condition prohibiting him from living within 1,000 feet of a school. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that SARA's residency restriction violated ex post facto principles. Supreme Court granted Petitioner's application and ordered his release. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the condition does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "People ex rel. Rivera v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate division reversing the judgment of Supreme Court denying Petitioner's N.Y. C.P.L.R. 70 habeas corpus petition and dismissing the proceeding, holding that the Sexual Assault Reform Act's (SARA) mandatory restriction prohibiting a person who is serving a sentence for an enumerated offense against a minor victim and is released on parole from coming within 1,000 feet of school grounds applies to youthful offenders.Petitioner was eighteen years old at the time he pleaded guilty to the attempted second-degree rape of a thirteen-year-old victim and was adjudicated a youthful offender. The Board of Parole granted Petitioner an open date for release subject to numerous conditions, including SARA's school grounds condition. Unable to obtain suitable housing and still imprisoned, Petitioner brought this proceeding alleging that, as a youthful offender, he was not subject to the school grounds condition. Supreme Court denied the petition, but the appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the legislature did not mean to exclude youthful offenders from SARA's school grounds condition. View "People ex rel. E.S. v. Superintendent, Livingston Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that warrantless inspections authorized by New York regulations adopting a rule promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) requiring the installation of electronic logging devices (ELD) in commercial motor vehicles fell within the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement.The FMCSA promgulated the rules at issue in 2015, and the rules were permanently incorporated into New York law in 2019. Petitioner commenced this combined N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action challenging New York's adoption of the rule. Supreme Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that the searches authorized by the rule were valid under the exception to the warrant requirement for administrative searches. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the lower courts properly determined that the ELD rule is constitutional; but (2) Supreme Court should have declared the rights of the parties rather than dismissing the complaint. View "Owner Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. N.Y. State Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

In this defamation suit involving a music producer and the singer and songwriter known as "Kesha" the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division reversing Supreme Court's decision granting Defendant's motion for a ruling that 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute applied to this action and then granting Defendant leave to file a counterclaim, holding that the appellate division's orders were not properly made.Plaintiff, the producer, brought this action alleging that statements made by Defendant with respect to an alleged sexual assault were defamatory. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, Defendant arguing that Plaintiff was a public figure and that some of her alleged defamatory statements were privileged. Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiff. While Defendant's appeal was pending, the Legislature amended the anti-SLAPP statute. Defendant then moved in Supreme Court for a ruling that the amendments applied to this action and for leave to assert counterclaims as permitted by the amended statute. The court concluded that the amendments applied retroactively. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure, requiring proof that the allegedly defamatory statements were made with actual malice; and (2) the strong presumption against retroactive legislation was not overcome with respect to the amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Gottwald v. Sebert" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate division affirming the judgment of Supreme Court denying the County of St. Lawrence's action seeking a declaratory judgment that Local Law No. 2-2021 of the City of Ogdensburg was inconsistent with N.Y. Real. Prop. Tax Law (RPTL) 1150 or otherwise unconstitutional under the home rule article of the New York State Constitution, holding that there was no error.The law at issue in this case repealed a prior local law validly opting out of the application of RPTL article 11. The County commenced this proceeding arguing that the law was not in accord with state law and impaired the rights of the County and the County Treasurer. Supreme Court denied the petition and declared the law to be valid and enforceable. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the law did not violate the statutory and constitutional protections at issue in this case but effectuated a power granted by the legislature to cities wishing to revoke their opt-out from article 11. View "St. Lawrence County v. City of Ogdensburg" on Justia Law