Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals held that tier three police officers in the New York City Police Pension Fund (PPF) who might otherwise be eligible for retirement credit under certain statutory provisions may not use those provisions to apply prior non-police service toward their retirement eligibility.Plaintiff commenced an action seeking a declaration that the City of New York and other related parties (collectively, the City) violated sections of the Retirement and Social Security Law and the New York City Administrative Code by refusing to permit tier three officers to obtain credit toward retirement eligibility for prior non-police service. The appellate division concluded that the City was statutorily required to allow tier three officers to credit non-police service toward their retirement eligibility. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and dismissed the proceeding, holding that the plain language of N.Y. Ret. & Soc. Sec. Law 513(c)(2) limits eligible prior service for those officers to police service. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that this dispute over an exempt class employee's termination was not arbitrable, thus reversing the order of the appellate division and denying a petition to compel arbitration, and that the Town of Monroe was free to terminate the employee without cause.In 2012, the Town appointed Employee to an exempt class civil service position. Three years later, the Town entered a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a Union that defined the bargaining unit to include Employee's position, permitted the Town to "terminate employees for just cause," and supplied procedures culminating in binding arbitration. In 2017, the Town terminated Employee, and the Union filed a grievance. When the Town refused to address the grievance the Union brought this action to compel the Town to arbitrate the dispute. Supreme Court denied the Town's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the underlying dispute was not arbitrable because granting the relief sought would violate a statute, decisional law, and public policy. View "Teamsters Local 445 v. Town of Monroe" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the negligence claims brought in this case involving two separate murders on property owned by the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) should advance to a jury trial.Bridget Crushshon and Tayshana Murphy were killed by intruders on the premises of two different public house complexes, owned and operated by the NYCHA, where the victims lived. In two separate cases, Plaintiffs filed negligence lawsuits against NYCHA, asserting that NYCHA had a duty to provide a locking exterior doors to their buildings. While admitting that it had a duty to provide a locking exterior door, NYCHA moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not a proximate cause of the deaths because the murderers had "targeted" their victims rather than commit crimes of opportunity. The Second Department denied summary judgment in one case, and the First Department granted summary judgment in the other case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Second Department's denial of summary judgment and reversed the First Department's grant of summary judgment to NYCHA in the two cases, holding that the fact that an attack was "targeted" does not sever the causal chain between a landlord's negligence and a plaintiff's injuries as a matter of law. View "Scurry v. New York City Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division concluding that the underlying challenge to Local Law No. 9-2014 was not time barred by either a four-month or a six-year statute of limitations, holding that there was no error.Local Law No. 9-2014 was adopted by the Town Board of the Town of Clarkstown in 2014 and purportedly set an eight-year term limit for all Clarkstown elected officials and required a supermajority vote of the Town Board to repeal. Appellees brought this action seeking a determination that the law was invalid because it was not subjected to a referendum of the Town's voters. Appellants filed a motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations grounds. The appellate division declined to dismiss the actions. The Court of Appeals affirmed in each case, holding that, under the circumstances, the actions were not time barred. View "Hoehmann v. Town of Clarkstown" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a stop and frisk, holding that the circumstances of this case did not warrant a level three stop and frisk under People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976).Defendant, who was stopped and frisked after he existed a parked car and walked down the street, filed a motion to suppress drugs found on his person as the fruits of an illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Defendant was subsequently convicted of two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The appellate division affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and directed that the indictment be dismissed, holding that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and frisk of Defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the minimum standard required to justify a stop and frisk under People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976), was not met in this case. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's criminal convictions, holding that the count of the indictment charging Defendant with aggravated family offense was jurisdictionally defective and must be dismissed but that there was no error as to Defendant's conviction of criminal contempt in the first degree.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of criminal contempt in the first degree, criminal contempt in the second degree, and aggravated family offense. The appellate division modified the judgment by vacating Defendant's conviction of criminal contempt in the second degree and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court modified the appellate division order, holding (1) a jurisdictional defect in the aggravated family offense count required that the aggravated family offense count be dismissed; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his argument that his criminal contempt in the first degree conviction must be vacated on the ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting that conviction. View "People v. Saenger" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases in which both plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries sustained during organized sports practices for high school athletic teams and appealed from orders granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Court of Appeals addressed the primary assumption of risk doctrine and held that material questions of fact remained in one case.The two cases considered by the Supreme Court provided an opportunity to apply the principles of the primary assumption of the risk doctrine in the context of organized practice drills for high school athletic teams. The Court rejected the dissent's suggestion to abandon the doctrine and held (1) in the first case, the primary assumption of the risk doctrine applied, and therefore, summary judgment was properly granted; and (2) in the second case, material issues of fact remained to be resolved by a jury. View "Grady v. Chenango Valley Central School District" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division dismissing Plaintiffs' claims that Taxi and Limousine Commission and New York City breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and engaged in deceptive business practices under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, holding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim.Plaintiffs, entities that purchased government licenses to operate taxis at an auction, brought this action alleging that Defendants (1) breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to enforce certain licensing requirements against smartphone applicate-based competitors such as Uber Technologies, Inc. and Lyft, Inc.; and (2) engaged in deceptive business practices in their promotion of the auction. Supreme Court granted in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed in part and concluded that both claims should be dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs did not adequately plead a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) Plaintiffs failed to plead the type of conduct covered by N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349. View "Singh v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reformulated a question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and concluded that Plaintiff's allegations did not state a cognizable cause of action for breach of the implied contract of good faith and fair dealing.At issue was whether Plaintiff sufficiently pled a cause of action for breach of the implied contract under New York law by alleging that, during a Structured Settlement Protection Act proceeding, the structured settlement obligor and the issuer of an annuity funding the settlement failed to enforce the anti-assignment provisions contained in structured settlement and qualified assignment agreements. The Court of Appeals answered the question, as reformulated, in the negative, holding that Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving an implied promise in this case. View "Cordero v. Transamerica Annuity Service Corp." on Justia Law

In this dispute between two Major League Baseball (MLB) teams and their co-owned regional sports network the Court of Appeals affirmed as modified the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the confirmation of a second arbitration award and directed that a money judgment be vacated, holding that the highly sophisticated parties were bound to the terms of their agreement.In this dispute regarding the fair market value of certain telecast rights Plaintiffs sought to vacate an arbitration award granted by the MLB's Revenue Sharing Definitions Committee (RSDC). Supreme Court vacated the arbitration award based on the RSDC's evident partiality, and the appellate division affirmed. After a second hearing, the RSDC entered a second award. Supreme Court affirmed, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the courts below correctly confirmed the second arbitration award; and (2) the order must be modified because Supreme Court erred by awarding prejudgment interest and rendering a money judgment. View "TCR Sports Broadcasting Holding, LLP v. WN Partner, LLC" on Justia Law