Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of leaving the scene of an accident without reporting, holding that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence without proper notice a recording of a call that law enforcement officials intercepted originating from a county jail.While monitoring a wiretap in an unrelated investigation, police officials intercepted the call at issue, which Defendant joined and during which he made statements suggesting his involvement in a fatal hit-and-run accident. Local police obtained a recording of the call from the jail, and Defendant was charged in connection with the evidence. During trial, the trial court entered the jail recording into evidence without providing Defendant notice within fifteen days of arraignment pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) 700.70. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the wiretap was an "intercepted communication" within the meaning of CPL 700.05; and (2) the People's failure timely to furnish Defendant with a copy of the eavesdropping warrant and underlying application precluded the admission of the jail recording into evidence at trial. View "People v. Myers" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Department Environmental Conservation (DEC) may process renewal and modification applications when those applications seek to mine land that falls within the scope of an undisputed prior nonconforming use, thus modifying the judgment of the courts below and the DEC and remitting for further proceedings.At issue was whether the DEC was barred from processing applications, including applications for renewal and modification permits, for permits to mine in covered counties when "local zoning laws or ordinances prohibit mining uses within the area proposed to be mined" see New York Environmental Conservation Law 23-2703(3). Petitioners here sought to annul a modified permit granted to Respondent, the owner and operator of a sand and gravel mine. The applications at issue implicated some prior nonconforming uses that were undisputed and others that were disputed but not resolved. Supreme Court denied the petition, and the appellate division modified and affirmed. The Court of Appeal affirmed as modified, holding that because prior nonconforming use was not taken into account by either DEC or the courts below, remand to the DEC was required for further proceedings. View "Matter of Town of Southampton v. New York State Dep't of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate division reversing Supreme Court's order granting the petition filed by the City of Yorkers pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 75 to permanently stay arbitration of the underlying labor dispute, holding that grievances like the present one are arbitrable so long as no public policy, statutory, or constitutional provisions prohibit them and they are reasonably related to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA).The underlying dispute between City of Yonkers and its firefighters concerned whether Yonkers must make certain types of payments to firefighters who were permanently disabled for work-related injuries and who qualified for benefits under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 207-a(2). Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO (the Union) filed a grievance alleging that Yonkers violated the CBA and then served a demand for arbitration. Yonkers responded by filing a petition to permanently stay arbitration. Supreme Court granted the petition. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that this grievance was arbitrable. View "City of Yonkers v. Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals concluded that "regular salary or wages" within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 207-a(2) includes monetary compensation to which current firefighters are contractually entitled based on the performance of their regular job duties but does not include monetary compensation based on the performance of additional responsibilities beyond their regular job duties.In this case stemming from a dispute between the City of Yonkers and dozens of their firefighters who were permanency disabled and retired as a result of work-related injuries the parties disputed whether certain compensation outlined in their collective bargaining agreements constituted "regular salary or wages" for the purpose of calculating the retirees' supplement under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 207-a(2). The Court of Appeals held (1) Yonkers's determination that holiday pay and check-in pay should be not included in the supplement was based on an error of law; and (2) substantial evidence supported Yonkers's conclusion that night differential should not be included when calculating the supplement. View "Matter of Borelli v. City of Yonkers" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that, in accordance with N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law. (CPL) 730, when a defendant is not in custody, a court has only the authority to either order a competency examination on an out-patient basis or to direct that the defendant be confined in a hospital pending completion of the examination upon proper medical recommendation that such confinement is necessary.Relator filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Wei Li requesting his release after the trial court ordered a CPL article 730 competency examination and remanding Wei Li to the custody of Respondent until completion of the examination. Relator argued that the remand order was unlawful where Wei Li had not been charged with a bail-eligible offense. Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that CPL article 730 provided criminal court authority to hold Wei Li. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals modified the order by converting the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action and granting judgment declaring judgment in accordance with this opinion, holding that the law does not permit remanding a defendant otherwise entitled to release under the law solely because a CPL article 730 competency examination has been ordered. View "People ex rel. Molinaro v. Warden, Rikers Island" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division affirming the conclusion of County Court that N.Y. Corr. Law 168-a(3)(b) required it to designate Defendant a sexually violent offender because he was convicted in Michigan of a felony that required him to register as a sex offender in that state, holding that County Court did not err.Under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), N.Y. Corr. Law 168 et seq., a person convicted of an offense in another jurisdiction must register as a sex offender if the offense satisfies an "essential elements" test or if the offense falls within SORA's foreign registration requirements. At issue was whether section 168-a(3)(b) requires a person subject to SORA's foreign registration requirements to be designated a sexually violent offender regardless of whether the offense in another jurisdiction is violent in nature. The Court of Appeals answered in the affirmative, holding that County Court properly determined that it was required by law to designate Defendant a sexually violent offender because he was convicted of a felony in another jurisdiction that required him to register as a sex offender. View "People v. Talluto" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate term holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of harassment in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.At issue on appeal was whether Defendant's statements to the victim that her children "were going to get a bullet in their heads" and that he was going to firebomb her home and kill her and her family were serious and unequivocal threats of physical harm. The appellate term concluded that Defendant's speech did not constitute a violation of the second-degree harassment statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Defendant threatened the victim with physical contact of a serious nature, with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm her. View "People v. Lagano" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that, for purposes of New York's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 9-406, an "assignee" includes the holder of a presently exercisable security interest in an assignor's receivables.New Style Contractors, Inc. engaged Checkmate Communications LLC as a subcontractor. Pursuant to a promissory note and security agreement, Checkmate could borrow up to $3 million from Worthy Lending LLC. Checkmate granted Worthy a security interest in its assets, and Worthy filed a UCC-1 financing statement against Checkmate perfecting its secured position regarding Checkmate's assets. Worthy then sent New Style a notice of its security interest and collateral assignment in the New Style accounts. When Checkmate defaulted on the note and filed for bankruptcy. Worthy brought this action against New Style pursuant to UCC 9-607, alleging that Worthy was entitled to recover all amounts New Style owed to Checkmate after New Style's receipt of the notice of assignment. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Worthy did not have an independent cause of action against New Style pursuant to UCC 9-607 because the statute does not authorized a secured creditor as distinct from an assigned, to recover from a nonparty debtor like New Style. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the language of the statute required reversal. View "Worthy Lending LLC v. New Style Contractors, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals declined to expand the Court of Appeals' special duty doctrine to the facts in this case in which the victim's mother and brother, now serving prison terms, sexually assaulted, abused, and murdered her in her home, holding that "government employees took no action that could have induced justifiable reliance."The public administrator of the victim's estate brought these actions against the County of Erie and the Erie County Sheriff alleging, inter alia, that caseworkers from Child Protective Services and Adult Protective Services and Sheriff's deputies were negligent in the performance of their duties, leading the victim's death. Supreme Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed the order denying Defendants' motion and granted summary judgment to Defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) this Court declines to amend the common law special duty rule in this case; and (2) therefore, the orders of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. View "Maldovan v. County of Erie" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division reversing the judgment of Supreme Court dismissing the indictment against Defendant under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 210.35(5), holding that the prosecutor was not obligated to instruct the grand jury on the "choice of evils" defense under N.Y. Penal Law 35.05(2).Defendant was charged with second-degree criminal mischief and other offenses for striking and severely injuring a small dog. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the grand jury proceeding was defective because the prosecutor failed to instruct the jury on exculpatory defenses under CPL 210.35(5). Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the indictment based on the prosecutor's failure to instruct on justification under section 35.05(2). The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the prosecutor did not err in not charging the grand jury on justification under section 35.05(2), the "choice of evils" defense. View "People v. Jimenez" on Justia Law