Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division affirming Defendant's conviction for second-degree rape in satisfaction of the indictment against him, holding that the Appellate Division misinterpreted the test in People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 422, (1975), for deciding whether pretrial delays rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.Defendant's convictions stemmed from the sexual assault of a fourteen-year-old girl. The time between the crime and Defendant's indictment was almost eight years. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the delay in prosecution deprived him of his state and federal constitutional right to due process. County Court denied the motion to dismiss, and Defendant pled guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division misinterpreted the Tranovich framework and that remand was required for a factual and legal review made under the proper framework. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that Plaintiffs' original complaint alleging that Defendant breached the parties' written insurance policy and that Plaintiffs had fully complied with the requirements contained in the policy failed to give Defendant the requisite notice of the "transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved" in support of Plaintiff's reformation claim, as required under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 203(f).Defendant, an insurance company, issued Plaintiffs, two limited liability companies, a multi-million dollar, written insurance policy covering many of Plaintiffs' vacant commercial properties. Plaintiffs later brought this action for breach of contract seeking damages based on Defendant's failure to cover damages incurred after a fire on the premises. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on the reformation claim, and the appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' complaint failed to give notice to Defendant of the transactions or occurrences on which Plaintiffs based their reformation claim. View "34-06 73, LLC v. Seneca Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division and reinstated the original award for workers' compensation benefits in this case to the decedent's minor son, holding that N.Y. Work. Comp. Law (WCL) 15(3)(w) does not provide for any unaccrued portion of a nonschedule award to remain payable following an injured employee's death.After he sustained an injury in a work-related accident Eric Watson was classified as having a nonscheduled permanent partial disability and received a weekly award for 350 weeks. After 311 weeks Watson died due to unrelated causes. Claimant, Watson's son, sought accrued unpaid amounts of Watson's award, including benefits for the weeks remaining before Watson's award was expected to reach the statutory durational cap. A workers' compensation law judge award unpaid amounts for the 311 weeks precedent Watson's death but denied Claimant the award for the remaining weeks. The Workers' compensation Board affirmed. The appellate division modified the award by ruling that Claimant was entitled to an additional posthumous award for the remaining cap weeks. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that WCL 15(3)(w) does not provide for any unaccrued portion of a nonscheduled award to remain payable following an injured employee's death. View "Green v. Dutchess County BOCES" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) does not apply to out-of-state, noncustodial parents seeking custody of their children who are not in custody of New York social services agencies.ICPC is an interstate agreement to follow certain procedures in connection with sending children across state borders "for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption." In 2012, Suffolk County Department of Social Services (DSS) removed Child from the custody of Mother, a New York resident, and placed Child in foster care. In 2013, an application was made under the ICPC to North Carolina, where Father was a resident, for the approval of Father's home as a suitable placement for Child. The North Carolina authority denied the request. In 2017, Father commenced these custody proceedings arguing that it was in Child's best interests to award him sole custody. Family Court dismissed the petitions without a hearing, concluding that the ICPC's requirements did not apply to placement of Child with Father because Child was in the custody of DSS in New York. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ICPC does not apply to out-of-state noncustodial parents seeking custody of their children. View "Matter of D.L. v S.B." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. Serv. 200 et seq., requires a municipality to engage in collective bargaining over the procedures for terminating municipal employees after they have been absent from work for more than one year due to an injury sustained in the line of duty.Plaintiff, a professional firefighter, sustained injuries in the line of duty that were determined to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law. One year later, the City of Long Beach notified Plaintiff that it was evaluating whether to exercise its right to terminate Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff's union (Union) responded by sending a demand to negotiate the City's procedures for terminating its members covered by the protections of N.Y. Civ. Serv. 71. The City refused, resulting in the Union filing an improper practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB determined that the City had an obligation to engage in collective bargaining prior to imposing procedures for terminating employees covered by section 71. Supreme Court dismissed the City's subsequent petition seeking to annul PERB's decision. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Taylor Law requires public employers to bargain over the predetermination procedures used in implementing Civil Service Law 71. View "City of Long Beach v. New York State Public Employees Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed, as modified in accordance with this opinion, the order of the appellate division vacating Defendant's conviction of promoting prostitution in the second degree and otherwise affirming his convictions, holding that Defendant did not make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.Defendant was indicted on several sex trafficking and related counts. Defendant represented himself, with varying levels of assistance from his legal advisors, through pretrial motion practice and during a pretrial suppression hearing. The appellate division vacated Defendant's conviction of second-degree promoting prostitution and otherwise affirmed, thus rejecting Defendant's argument that he was deprived of his right to counsel when he was allowed to proceed pro se at pretrial hearings. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) Defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; and (2) Defendant was entitled to remittal to Supreme Court for an opportunity to make whatever pretrial motions were, or could have been, made during that period. View "People v. Baines" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division reversing the judgment of Supreme Court concluding that Petitioners did not establish that the recently amended Insurance Regulation 187, 11 N.Y.C.R.R. part 224, which provides protections to consumers engaging in life insurance and annuity transactions, was invalid, holding that there was no basis to invalidate the regulation.Petitioners commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding alleging that the amended regulation was unconstitutionally vague because certain terms did not satisfy the test for constitutional vagueness and that the Department of Financial Services (DFS) exceeded its authority in promulgating the amendment. Supreme Court held that the amendment was a proper exercise of the powers granted to DFS. The appellate division reversed, ruling that the amended regulation was unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that DFS appropriately exercised its authority "to create a carefully considered and clear regulation." View "Independent Insurance Agents & Brokers of N.Y., Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Financial Services" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division in this case, holding that an indemnification provision in the partnership agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant lacked express language or indicia of the parties' "unmistakably clear" intent to indemnify each other for attorney's fees in an action between them concerning the contract.After Defendant unsuccessfully brought a partnership dissolution action Plaintiff commenced this action seeking attorney's fees and costs incurred defending the dissolution action, claiming that Defendant waived the benefit of the American Rule, under which a prevailing party in litigation generally may not recover attorney's fees from the losing party, by agreeing to the indemnification provision in the parties' partnership agreement. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Defendant, and appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that nothing in the agreement made "unmistakably clear" that the partners intended to permit recovery for attorney's fees in an action between them on the contract. View "Sage Systems, Inc. v. Liss" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the appellate decision affirming the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts of robbery in the second degree and assault in the second degree, holding that the trial judge erred in replacing a trial juror with an alternate following that discharge from service.Prior to the start of deliberations at trial, the court discharged the alternate jurors. Thereafter, a trial juror was removed for alleged misconduct. The trial court decided to recall and seat one of the discharged alternates, after which Defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding (1) once the court has clearly stated on the record that an alternate juror has no further responsibilities in the case, the alternate juror is discharged; (2) where the alternate jurors have been discharged, the court's sole remedy is to declare a mistrial; and (3) the alternate jurors were discharged in this case, and therefore, the trial judge erred in reseating the alternate juror. View "People v. Murray" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Tern affirming Defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree in satisfaction of the accusatory instrument, holding that the accusatory instrument failed to give Defendant sufficient notice of the charged crime.Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree for possessing an illegal synthetic cannabinoid. On appeal, Defendant argued that the misdemeanor complaint was jurisdictionally defective because it failed to allege that he possessed one of the synthetic cannabinoid substances listed in N.Y. Public Health Law 3306 (g). The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the misdemeanor to which Defendant pleaded guilty failed to allege a sufficient factual basis to conclude that the substance Defendant possessed was illegal; and (2) dismissal of the remaining count was appropriate. View "People v. Hill" on Justia Law