Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case disputing whether Plaintiff, who was in close proximity to her grandchild when he was involved in a fatal accident, may pursue a claim for bystander recovery under a "zone of danger" theory, the Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff's grandchild was "immediately family" for the purpose of applying the zone of danger rule.Plaintiff was with her two-year-old granddaughter in front of a building when they were struck by falling debris from the facade of the building. The grandchild died from the accident. Plaintiff brought suit, asserting negligence and wrongful death. Plaintiff then sought leave to amend the complaint to assert an additional cause of action under the "zone of danger" doctrine. Supreme Court granted the motion to amend, concluding that Plaintiff should be considered an immediate family member and afforded a right to recover for her emotional injuries. The Appellate Division reversed, ruling that leave to amend should have been denied. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a grandchild is the "immediate family" of a grandparent for the purpose of applying the zone of danger rule. View "Greene v. Esplanade Venture Partnership" on Justia Law

In these four appeals turning on the timeliness of a mortgage foreclosure claim and involving the intersection of contracts affecting real property ownership and the application of the statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division order in each case must be reversed.In two cases, the issue was when the maturity of the debt was accelerated, commencing the six-year statute of limitations period. The remaining issues in the other cases turned on whether the noteholder's voluntary discontinuance of a prior foreclosure action revoked acceleration of the debt, thus reinstating the borrower's right under contract to repay the loan in installments. The Court of Appeals held (1) in the first case, the default letter in question did not accelerate the debt; (2) in the second case, two complaints in prior discontinued foreclosure actions that failed to reference the pertinent loan were not sufficient to constitute a valid acceleration; and (3) as to the remaining issues, where the maturity of the debt has been validly accelerated by commencement of a foreclosure action, the noteholder's voluntary withdrawal of that action revokes the election to accelerate. View "Freedom Mortgage Corp. v. Engel" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims that sought to hold Michael Bloomberg vicariously liable for Nicholas Ferris's offending conduct, holding that Bloomberg was not an "employer" within the meaning of the New York City Human Rights Law (City HRL).Plaintiff brought this action against her employer Bloomberg L.P., her supervisor Ferris, and Michael Bloomberg, bringing several claims arising from her alleged discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual abuse. At issue was whether Bloomberg, in addition to Bloomberg L.P., could be held vicariously liable based on his status as owner and officer of the company. Supreme Court denied Bloomberg's motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the causes of action against Bloomberg. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to allege that Bloomberg was her employer for purposes of liability under the City HRL. View "Doe v. Bloomberg, L.P." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the definition of credit card in N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 511(1), as supplemented by N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 511-a, is the controlling definition as designated by N.Y. Penal Law 155.00(7) and, as a result, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction of grand larceny for stealing an intangible credit card account number.Defendant's conviction of grand larceny in the fourth degree was based on Defendant's theft of the victim's credit card account number to purchase goods. During trial, there was no evidence that Defendant possessed the physical card itself. At issue was whether the People needed to prove that Defendant physically possessed the tangible credit card in order to support his conviction of grand larceny based upon credit card theft. The issue turned on the definition of credit card for purposes of N.Y. Penal Law 155.00(7) and whether that definition includes the credit card account number. The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that, under the Penal Law, theft of a tangible card is not a necessary element of fourth-degree grand larceny. View "People v. Badji" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division upholding the denial of Defendant's suppression motion, holding that the search warrant in this case was facially valid and that Defendant's challenge to the execution of the search warrant was unpreserved for appellate review.Police officers searched Defendant's residence pursuant to a search warrant and recovered, among other things, a handgun and ammunition. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the warrant was invalid because it did not meet the constitutional requirements of particularity. The motion court denied Defendant's suppression motion. Defendant then pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the motion court did not abuse its discretion in denying suppression without holding an evidentiary hearing. View "People v. Duval" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals concluded that the Town of Irondequoit and the Town of Brighton were entitled to relief on their claims challenging the determination of Monroe County that it would not credit unpaid property maintenance and demolition charges, holding that the County was required to credit the maintenance and demolition charges.The Towns adopted local town code provisions authorizing the imposition of property maintenance and demolition requirements on real property owners providing for reimbursement of any maintenance and demolition costs incurred by the towns. The County later issued a memorandum stating that it would no longer guarantee the maintenance and demolition charges. The Towns then initiated this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking to annul the County's determination. Supreme Court granted relief to the towns, concluding that the charges were unpaid taxes that the County was required to credit. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division and, as so modified, affirmed, holding that the charges at issue must be credited pursuant N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law 936. View "Town of Irondequoit v. County of Monroe" on Justia Law

In this residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) action the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and reinstated the order of Supreme Court, holding that, in a breach of contract action, the public policy rule prohibiting parties from insulating themselves from damages caused by grossly negligent conduct applies only to exculpatory clauses or provisions that limit liability to a nominal sum.At issue was a contract that contained a sole remedy provision that purported to limit, but not eliminate, the remedies available to Plaintiff in the event of a breach. Plaintiff sought to avoid the provision by alleging that Defendants breached the contract with gross negligence. Supreme Court held that the sole remedy provision was enforceable. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Plaintiff's allegations of gross negligence were sufficient to render the sole remedy provision unenforceable. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) in a breach of contract case, grossly negligent conduct will render unenforceable only exculpatory or nominal damages clauses; and (2) because the sole remedy provision at issue was not an exculpatory or nominal damages clause and was not subject to the gross negligence public policy exception, the allegations of gross negligence did not render the sole remedy provision unenforceable. View "In re Part 60 Put-Back Litigation" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division insofar as appealed from and ordered a new trial on the count of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, holding that the jury should have been instructed regarding the definition of voluntary possession, and the failure to so charge was not harmless.Defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and unlawful possession of marihuana. Based on the trial evidence, Defendant requested that the jury be charged on voluntary possession of the gun. The court denied the requested charge. The jury convicted Defendant of third-degree possession of the gun and unlawful possession of marihuana. The Appellate Division modified and affirmed, summarily rejecting Defendant's challenge to the jury instructions. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction of third-degree possession of a weapon, holding that a reasonable juror could have concluded that Defendant had constructive, knowing, but not voluntary, possession of the gun in question for a brief moment, and therefore, the failure to instruct the jury regarding the definition of voluntary possession was not harmless. View "People v J.L." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction of unlawfully possessing a firearm, holding that the lower courts properly concluded that Defendant was not entitled to a jury charge regarding temporary and lawful possession.On Defendant's appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that there was no reasonable view of the evidence under which Defendant was entitled to a temporary and lawful possession charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because there was no reasonable view of the evidence upon which a jury could find that Defendant's initial possession of the firearm was temporary and lawful, Defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on that defense; and (2) Defendant's challenge to the denial of his motion to set aside the verdict was unavailing. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York (BSA) interpreting the definition of open space within the meaning of the New York City Zoning Resolution to encompass rooftop gardens accessible to a single building's residents as long as the residents of each building on the zoning lot receive at least a proportionate share of open space, holding that the BSA's determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.Plaintiff commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding asserting that BSA's interpretation of open space had no legal basis under the Zoning Resolution. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that the definition of open space unambiguously required that open space be accessible to the residents of every building on a zoning lot. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the BSA's application of the definition of open space to multi-owner zoning lots was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. View "Peyton v. New York City Board of Standards & Appeals" on Justia Law