Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division affirming Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment, holding that a liquidated damages provision in a Surrender Agreement between Columbia University and D'Agostino Supermarkets was an unenforceable penalty in contravention of public policy.D'Agostino and Columbia University entered into a commercial lease for D'Agostino's rental of certain floors of a building owned by Columbia. The parties later entered a Surrender Agreement that terminated the lease in exchange for D'Agostino's surrender of the premises and a staggered payment of $261,752. Columbia later commenced the underlying action to enforce the damages provision in the Surrender Agreement. Supreme Court granted D'Agostino's cross-motion for summary judgment for the requested amount and interest. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the damages sought were grossly disproportionate to the amount due upon full performance of the Surrender Agreement, and therefore, there was no error in rejecting Columbia's liquidated damages provision. View "Trustees of Columbia University in City of New York v. D'Agostino Supermarkets, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division affirming Supreme Court's conclusion that an excess insurer did not have an obligation to pay interest on an underlying personal injury judgment after the primary policy was voided.Plaintiff was injured at a construction site and sued the general contractor, which maintained an excess liability insurance policy with Defendant. Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiff. Plaintiff then commenced this action asserting that Defendant was obligated to pay the entire underlying damages award. Supreme Court ultimate determined that Defendant was obligated to pay $1.3 million in excess damages, prejudgment interest on those damages and interest that accrued from the date partial summary judgment was granted to Plaintiff until the entry of judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant was obligated to pay interest on the underlying personal injury judgment after the primary policy was voided. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the excess policy did not provide overlapping coverage for certain interest payments covered in the primary policy. View "Chen v. Insurance Co. of State of PA" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate Court vacating Defendant's convictions of two counts of attempted murder in the first degree and two counts of attempted murder in the second degree, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions.At issue was whether the People proved that Defendant and his purported coconspirator took any actual step toward accomplishing Defendant's plan to kill his wife and mother-in-law beyond mere conversations and planning. The Appellate Division concluded that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that Defendant engaged in conduct that came "dangerously near commission of the completed crime." The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the intended crimes were dangerously close to completion. View "People v. Lendof-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that federal bankruptcy law did not preempt Plaintiff's state law claims asserted against non-debtor third parties for tortious interference with a contract.Plaintiff loaned $147,250,000 to nonparties "Mezz Borrower" and "Mortgage Borrower" (collectively, Borrowers). Borrowers later defaulted, and Plaintiff sought to conduct a foreclosure sale of Mezz Borrower's 100 percent membership interest in Mortgage Borrower pursuant to the pledge and security agreement. Mezz Borrower and Mortgage Borrower subsequently filed separate voluntary petitions for chapter 11 bankruptcy in federal court. Plaintiff then commenced this action in state court alleging that Defendants had tortiously interfered with the loan agreements between Plaintiff and the nonparty borrowers. Defendants - various affiliated persons and entities - moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action was preempted by the Bankruptcy Code. Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that the action was not preempted because it did not involve the bankruptcy. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Plaintiff's claims were preempted by federal law because damages arose only because of the bankruptcy filings. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that federal bankruptcy law preempted Plaintiff's tortious interference claims. View "Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that, in these two criminal cases, there was no constitutional violation in the practice of temporarily confining level three sex offenders in correctional facilities, after the time they would otherwise be released to parole or postrelease supervision (PRS), while they remain on a waiting list for accommodation at a shelter compliant with N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14).New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified. At issue was whether the Federal Constitution allows DOCCS to place a SARA-restricted sex offender in an RTF or other correctional facility while awaiting SARA-compliant housing. The Court of Appeals held that the practice is constitutional. View "People ex rel. Johnson v. Superintendent, Adirondack Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the condition restricting entry upon school grounds on certain offenders is mandatory only for parolees who have been designated a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) and are serving a sentence for an offense enumerated in N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14).Although Petitioner's conviction did not qualify as an enumerated offense under the statute, the Board of Parole determined that, because of his level three sex offender designation, Petitioner was nevertheless subject to the mandatory condition restricting entry upon school grounds. The Appellate Division granted Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus to the extent of annulling that part of the Board's determination that found Petitioner subject to the mandatory school grounds restriction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding than an offender must be serving a sentence for an enumerated offense and be a level three sex offender in order for the mandatory condition to apply. View "People ex rel. Negron v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified.Under N.Y. Penal Law 70.45(3), the board of parole may impose as a condition of postrelease supervision (PRS) that for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from an underlying term of imprisonment the person be transferred to and participate in the programs of an residential treatment facility (RTF). N.Y. Correct. Law 73(10) authorizes the DOCCS to use any RTF as a residence for persons who are on community supervision, which includes those on PRS. The Court of Appeals held that Correction Law 73(10) authorizes DOCCS to provide temporary housing in an RTF to sex offenders subject to the mandatory condition set forth in the SARA, N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14), after the six-month period specified in Penal Law 70.45(3) has expired but before the offender on PRS has located compliant housing. View "People ex rel. McCurdy v. Warden, Westchester County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion of the Appellate Division concluding that, in appropriate circumstances, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law (DRL) 111(1)(a) permits a court to approve an adoption even absent the consent of an adult adoptee and held that that discretion was not abused in this case.Petitioners commenced this proceeding seeking to adopt Marian, a sixty-six-year-old woman with a profound intellectual disability. Mental Hygiene Legal Services objected to the adoption on the ground that Marian's consent was required under DRL 111(1)(a) and that Marian lacked the capacity to consent. Surrogate's Court did not find that Marian possessed the capacity to consent but concluded that the guardian ad litem had the implied authority to consent on Marian's behalf. The court then approved the adoption petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that DRL 111(1)(a) authorizes a court, in the appropriate exercise of its discretion, to dispense with an adult adoptee's consent to the adoption. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division correctly concluded that the statute provided express statutory authority to dispense with Marian's consent and that the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that her inability to consent should not prevent this adoption. View "In re Marian T." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division affirming County Court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a stop of the vehicle in which Defendant was a front seat passenger, holding that the People failed to meet their burden of coming forward with evidence sufficient to establish that the stop was lawful.A police officer stopped a vehicle when his patrol car's mobile data terminal notified him that something was similar about the registered owner of the vehicle and a person with an outstanding warrant, known as a "similarity hit." The officer arrested Defendant after observing a handgun on the floor of the front passenger seat where Defendant was sitting. Defendant was neither the registered owner of the vehicle nor the person with the warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop. County Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where the People presented no evidence about the content of the similarity hit, the suppression court could not independently evaluate whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. View "People v. Balkman" on Justia Law

In this lawsuit brought by Plaintiffs, the holders of a minority in principal amount of senior secured debt, against the debtor and its guarantors to recover payment of principal and interest after the issuer defaulted, the Court of Appeals held that Plaintiffs' right to sue for payment on the notes survived a strict foreclosure undertaken by the trustee at the direction of a group of majority bondholders over Plaintiffs' objection that purported to cancel the notes.Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Defendants and denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division by reversing the grant of summary judgment to Defendants and granting partial summary to Plaintiffs, holding that Plaintiffs' payment rights were not extinguished by the strict foreclosure, which purportedly cancelled their notes, because the purported cancellation of the notes without the dissenting minority note holders' consent violated the provisions of the indenture agreement. View "CNH Diversified Opportunities Master Account, L.P. v Cleveland Unlimited, Inc." on Justia Law