Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals held that the two-hour rule in N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law 1194(2)(a)(1) authorizing a chemical test to be taken from a motorist based upon deemed consent is not applicable to a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) license revocation hearing held pursuant to N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law 1194(2)(c) after a motorist's refusal to submit to a chemical test.Petitioner was arrested for driving while intoxicated and refused to submit to a chemical test. An administrative law judge revoked Petitioner's driver's license, and the DMV appeals board affirmed. Petitioner then commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding seeking to annul the DMV's determination. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, ruling that Petitioner's refusal to submit to the chemical test was properly used in the administrative license revocation hearing, even thought the refusal occurred more than two hours after the arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the DMV's determination was not irrational or affected by an error of law. View "Endara-Caicedo v. Vehicles" on Justia Law

In response to questions certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Court of Appeals held that inferences of vesting of retiree health insurance rights when construing a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) are inconsistent with New York's established contract interpretation principles.In Kolbe v. Tibbetts, the Court of Appeals left open the question of whether a New York court should infer vesting of retiree health insurance rights when construing a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Supreme Court rejected such inferences as incompatible with ordinary contract principles under federal law, thus repudiating International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agriculture Implement Workers of America v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F2d 1476 (6th Cir 1983). In answering the questions certified to it in this case, the Court of Appeals (1) held that it maintains its traditional contract interpretation principles, including those set forth in Kolbe; but (2) clarified that New York's contract law does not recognize Yard-Man-type inferences. View "Donohue v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that N.Y. Labor Law 198-b, which prohibits wage kickbacks, does not contain an implied private right of action.Plaintiff, who worked as a math teacher at Utica Academy of Science Charter School, brought this action against the school and High Way Education, Inc. after the school failed to renew his contract. Plaintiff alleged that High Way and Utica jointly demanded and collected illegal kickbacks in violation of Labor Law 198-b. Supreme Court dismissed all causes of action against High Way except for the section 198-b claim. The appellate division reversed, dismissing the complaint against High Way in its entirety. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that section 198-b meets the test for determining whether a private right of action can be implied from the statute. View "Konkur v. Utica Academy of Science Charter School" on Justia Law

In these appeals concerning two permutations of the issue of whether non-compliance with the signature acknowledgement requirements of Domestic Relations Law (DRL) 236(B)(3) renders a nuptial agreement irrevocably unenforceable the Court of Appeals that the signature must be acknowledged contemporaneously within a reasonable time of signing.In one case on appeal, the wife signed and acknowledged the nuptial agreement with her husband the month after they married. The husband, however, delayed nearly seven years before acknowledging his signature and did so only shortly before he commenced a divorce action. In the other case, the acknowledgments of the parties were made contemporaneously with the signing of the nuptial agreement, but the certificates of acknowledgment were defective. The Supreme Court held (1) in the first case, the husband's acknowledgement was ineffective, and the nuptial agreement was unenforceable; and (2) in the second case, the defect in the certificate was overcome with extrinsic evidence of the official's personal knowledge or proof of identity of the signer. View "Anderson v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In this action involving a dispute over ownership of the proceeds of the sale of an Edgar Degas painting that was stolen from Margaret Kainer in the 1930s the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of Supreme Court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in this case on forum non conveniens grounds, holding that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion.Plaintiff commenced this action asserting numerous claims against several defendants, including conversion, unjust enrichment, and conspiracy based on the 2009 sale of the painting and seeking damages. Supreme Court granted the motions to dismiss against two defendants. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens. View "Estate of Kainer v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals answered questions certified by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the validity of tort claims brought by a judgment debtor against its judgment creditors, holding that a judgment debtor's exclusive avenue for relief under the circumstances set forth in this case is to bring an appropriate action pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 52.In two cases brought in federal court, the judgment debtor asserted tort claims against its judgment creditors and a New York City marshal, alleging violations of the C.P.L.R. article 52 service requirements committed in the execution of valid judgments issued by New York courts. The Second Circuit certified questions as to the validity of such tort claims, particularly with respect to damages the judgment debtor could show under such circumstances. The Court of Appeals held that the better course is to require that such claims be brought pursuant to article 52. View "Plymouth Venture Partners, II, L.P. v GTR Source, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the second degree, three counts of robbery in the first degree, and two counts of attempted robbery in the first degree, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a new trial based on his absence from a sidebar conference with a prospective juror.In the middle of the voir dire proceeding involving a prospective juror who was ultimately struck when Defendant's codefendant exercised a peremptory strike, Defendant explicitly waived his right under People v. Antommarchi, 80 NY2d 247 (1992), to be present at sidebars. At issue was whether Defendant was entitled to a new trial based on his absence from a pre-waiver sidebar conference with that same prospective juror. The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the claimed error required Defendant's protest in the trial court. View "People v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction on several counts related to the possession of firearms and controlled substances, holding that reversal was required because no Frye hearing was held on the admissibility of statistical evidence generated by the forensic statistical tool (FST) developed by the New York City Office of Chief Medical Examiner, where it was alleged that Defendant was a contributor to a multiple-source DNA profile.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that his motion to suppress should have been granted because the "pedigree exception" to the Miranda requirement did not apply under the facts of his case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a police officer's question to Defendant regarding where he lived fell within the pedigree exception to Miranda, and therefore, Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion for a Frye hearing with respect to the admissibility of the evidence derived from the FST on the multiple-source DNA sample. View "People v. Wortham" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held in these consolidated appeals that liability for the death benefits claims at issue could not be transferred to the Special Fund for Reopened Cases (the Special Fund).At issue in these appeals was whether New York Workers' Compensation Law 25-a(1-a), under which no liability for claims submitted on or after January 1, 2014 may be transferred to the Special Fund, forecloses the transfer of liability for a death benefits claim submitted on or after the cut-off date, regardless of the prior transfer of liability for a worker's disability claim arising out of the same injury. The Court of Appeals held that, based on the plain statutory language and this Court's established precedent, liability for the death benefits claims at issue in these cases could not be transferred to the Special Fund. View "Verneau v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division reversing Supreme Court's order granting summary judgment to Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. and Bear Stearns Securities Corp. (collectively, Bear Stearns) in this action brought by Bear Stearns' successor companies alleging that its insurers (Insurers) had breached insurance contracts, holding that the $140 million disgorgement for which Bear Stearns sought coverage was not a "payment" within the meaning of the relevant policy.When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) censured Bear Stearns for securities law violations, Bear Stearns agreed to a $160 million disgorgement payment and a $90 million payment for civil money penalties. Both payments were to be deposited in a fund to compensate mutual fund investors allegedly harmed by Bear Stearns' improper trading practices. Bear Stearns transferred the payments to the SEC. Plaintiffs then brought this action against Insurers seeking coverage under a "wrongful act" liability for the disgorged funds. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Bear Stearns. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Bear Stearns was not entitled to coverage for the SEC disgorgement payment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Insurers failed to establish that the $140 million disgorgement payment clearly and unambiguously fell within the policy exclusion for "penalties imposed by law." View "J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. v. Vigilant Insurance Co." on Justia Law