Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division reversing Defendant's conviction of manslaughter in the first degree and denied Defendant's motion to suppress DNA evidence from a Defendant's body by buccal swab, holding that there was no violation of Defendant's constitutional rights in this case.After the victim was shot, the People obtained a warrant to obtain a saliva sample for DNA testing from Defendant. Defendant moved to suppress the DNA evidence, asserting that the search warrant application failed to set forth probable cause that he committed the homicide and failed to articulate how the DNA profile related to the homicide investigation. The court denied the suppression motion. Defendant was subsequently convicted. The Appellate Division reversed and granted Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that Supreme Court erred in precluding defense counsel from reviewing the search warrant application and in denying counsel the opportunity to be heard on the issuance of probable cause. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the requirement set forth in Matter of Abe A., 56 NY2d 288 (1982), of notice and an opportunity to be heard in the pre-execution stage of a warrant authorizing the seizure of evidence by bodily intrusion was satisfied in this case. View "People v. McIver" on Justia Law

In this negligence action stemming from injuries Plaintiff allegedly received by a dog in the waiting room of a veterinary clinic, the Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division affirming Supreme Court's summary judgment in favor of Defendant, the veterinary clinic, holding that neither party was entitled to summary judgment.In granting summary judgment for Defendant, Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's liability was contingent upon it having had notice of vicious propensities in the same manner as that of a dog owner. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant could not be held liable without notice of an animal's vicious propensities. The Court of Appeals modified the order below by denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding (1) Defendant did not need the protection afforded by the vicious propensities notice requirement, and the absence of such notice did not warrant dismissal of Plaintiff's claim; (2) under the circumstances, a negligence claim may lie despite Defendant's lack of notice of the dog's vicious propensities; and (3) questions of fact existed precluding summary judgment. View "Hewitt v. Palmer Veterinary Clinic, PC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and reinstated Supreme Court's judgment declaring that Defendants violated the second subdivision (h) of Administrative Code of the City of New York 13-218 by excluding police officers in tier 3 of the state retirement system from the retirement benefits conferred by that subdivision reinstated, holding that the relevant part of section 13-218 rendered those officers eligible for credit for certain periods of unpaid childcare leave.At issue was the policy of the City of New York that tier 3 officers are not eligible for certain benefits available to officers in tier 2 of the New York City Police Pension Fund retirement plan, including the mechanism that allows police officers to obtain credit for certain periods of absence without pay for childcare leave. Supreme Court awarded Plaintiffs judgment, declaring that affected police officers were entitled to the childcare leave benefit. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 13-218 renders officers of the New York City Police Department who are members of the tier 3 retirement system are eligible for credit for periods of unpaid childcare leave and that the grant of such benefits for those officers is consistent with the Retirement and Social Security Law. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division affirming Defendant's conviction of second-degree assault, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the jury a curative instruction and forgoing a Buford inquiry of a sworn juror after her exclamation during trial that she was very offended by the repetitive use of a racial slur by Defendant's counsel while cross-examining the victim.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law in its response to the juror's disruption of the trial. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding (1) the court's curative instruction was a "thorough and sensible approach" that addressed each of the concerns raised by counsel and reached the same result that would have been afforded by a Buford inquiry of the single juror; and (2) therefore, the court's remedy was not an abuse of its discretion. View "People v. Batticks" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals answered questions certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding whether New York recognizes so-called American Pipe tolling of the statute of limitations for absent class members of a putative class action filed in another jurisdiction.In 2012, Plaintiffs filed individual lawsuits alleging injuries based upon the manufacturing of a nematicide by Occidental Chemical Corporation. The cases were consolidated, and the action was transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Occidental moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under New York law. Plaintiffs argued in response that a putative class action originally filed in Texas state court in 1993 had tolled the applicable three-year statute of limitations. The New York District Court Judge denied the motion and certified an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit, which, in turn, certified questions to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals answered (1) New York recognizes American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 US 538 (1974), tolling for absent class members of putative class actions filed in other state and federal courts; and (2) a non-merits dismissal of class certification, as occurred here in 1995, extinguishes tolling. View "Chavez v. Occidental Chemical Corp" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction of criminal contempt, as charged in an amended accusatory instrument, holding that the lower courts erred in permitting amendment of a clearly erroneous fact contained in the information charging Defendant with harassment and contempt in the second degree.Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal contempt and received a ninety-day jail sentence. The Appellate Term affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the factual amendment of a clearly erroneous date was permissible under People v. Easton, 307 NY 336 (1954). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the legislature's replacement of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the modern Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) displaced Easton and precluded prosecutors from curing factual errors or deficiencies in informations and misdemeanor complaints via amendment; (2) the CPL requires a superseding accessory instrument supported by a sworn statement contains the correct factual allegations; and (3) because the trial court lacked the authority to permit the amendment, the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally defective. View "People v. Hardy" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the determination of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct that Petitioner, a Judge of the Family Court, Broome County, committed certain acts of misconduct and should be removed from office, holding that Petitioner's pattern of misconduct warranted removal.The Commission unanimously determined that Petitioner's actions violated sections 100.1, 100.2(A), 100.2(C), 100.3(B)(3), 100.3(C)(1) and 100.4(H)(2) and 100.4(I) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. A majority of the Commission members concluded that removal from office was the appropriate sanction under the facts. On appeal, Petitioner challenged the sanction of removal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) considering Petitioner's misconduct in the aggregate along with his prior disciplinary history, Petitioner exhibited a pattern of injudicious behavior that cannot be viewed as acceptable conduct by one holding judicial office; and (2) therefore, the determined sanction should be accepted. View "In re Miller" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the automobile stop in this case was unlawful and clarified the law of New York as it is presently understood by all four Appellate Division departments, holding that the Appellate Courts are unanimous in employing the elevated probable cause standard set forth in People v. Robinson, 97 NY2d 341 (2001), required for an officer to validly stop a vehicle for a Vehicle and Traffic violation.Defendant was charged with firearms-related and drug-related offenses. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the trooper who stopped his vehicle lacked reasonable suspicion to do so. County Court denied suppression of the physical evidence, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered that Defendant's motion to suppress be granted in its entirety, holding that the trooper in this case lacked probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed a traffic violation and identified no credible facts establishing reasonable cause to believe that Defendant had violated a law. View "People v. Hinshaw" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to National Fuel Gas Supply for its proposed construction of a ninety-nine-mile natural gas pipeline satisfied Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) 206(A) so as to entitle National Fuel to exercise eminent domain over the land in dispute without undertaking additional review of the pipeline's public benefit.National Fuel commenced this EDPL vesting proceeding seeking to acquire, by eminent domain, temporary construction easements and a fifty-foot-wide permanent easement over property owned by Landowners to facilitate construction of the pipeline. Supreme Court granted the EDPL petition, concluding that National Fuel made a prima facie showing of entitlement to the easements based on the FERC certification. The Appellate Division reversed, reasoning that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation's intervening denial of National Fuel's application for a water quality certification meant that National Fuel no longer held a qualifying federal certificate for purposes of the EDPL 206(A) exemption. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the FERC-issued certificate of public convenience and necessity did not condition National Fuel's eminent domain power on receipt of a water qualify certification, the federal certificate remained valid at all relevant times. View "National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Schueckler" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division affirming Defendant's conviction for murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, holding that the trial court did not conduct a "reasonably thorough inquiry" into a sitting juror's unavailability before substituting an alternate juror during Defendant's trial.On the ninth day of Defendant's murder trial, the judge informed the parties that Juror Number 9 was absent. Without stating that it was ordering the substitution, the judge proceeded with Alternate Juror 1 seated in place of Juror Number 9. Alternate Juror 1 served for the remainder of the trial. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, on the record, the court failed to satisfy the requirement that a trial court conduct a "reasonably thorough inquiry" to ensure that its substitution determination is adequately informed. View "People v. Lang" on Justia Law