Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals held that New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified.Under N.Y. Penal Law 70.45(3), the board of parole may impose as a condition of postrelease supervision (PRS) that for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from an underlying term of imprisonment the person be transferred to and participate in the programs of an residential treatment facility (RTF). N.Y. Correct. Law 73(10) authorizes the DOCCS to use any RTF as a residence for persons who are on community supervision, which includes those on PRS. The Court of Appeals held that Correction Law 73(10) authorizes DOCCS to provide temporary housing in an RTF to sex offenders subject to the mandatory condition set forth in the SARA, N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14), after the six-month period specified in Penal Law 70.45(3) has expired but before the offender on PRS has located compliant housing. View "People ex rel. McCurdy v. Warden, Westchester County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion of the Appellate Division concluding that, in appropriate circumstances, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law (DRL) 111(1)(a) permits a court to approve an adoption even absent the consent of an adult adoptee and held that that discretion was not abused in this case.Petitioners commenced this proceeding seeking to adopt Marian, a sixty-six-year-old woman with a profound intellectual disability. Mental Hygiene Legal Services objected to the adoption on the ground that Marian's consent was required under DRL 111(1)(a) and that Marian lacked the capacity to consent. Surrogate's Court did not find that Marian possessed the capacity to consent but concluded that the guardian ad litem had the implied authority to consent on Marian's behalf. The court then approved the adoption petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that DRL 111(1)(a) authorizes a court, in the appropriate exercise of its discretion, to dispense with an adult adoptee's consent to the adoption. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division correctly concluded that the statute provided express statutory authority to dispense with Marian's consent and that the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that her inability to consent should not prevent this adoption. View "In re Marian T." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division affirming County Court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a stop of the vehicle in which Defendant was a front seat passenger, holding that the People failed to meet their burden of coming forward with evidence sufficient to establish that the stop was lawful.A police officer stopped a vehicle when his patrol car's mobile data terminal notified him that something was similar about the registered owner of the vehicle and a person with an outstanding warrant, known as a "similarity hit." The officer arrested Defendant after observing a handgun on the floor of the front passenger seat where Defendant was sitting. Defendant was neither the registered owner of the vehicle nor the person with the warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop. County Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where the People presented no evidence about the content of the similarity hit, the suppression court could not independently evaluate whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. View "People v. Balkman" on Justia Law

In this lawsuit brought by Plaintiffs, the holders of a minority in principal amount of senior secured debt, against the debtor and its guarantors to recover payment of principal and interest after the issuer defaulted, the Court of Appeals held that Plaintiffs' right to sue for payment on the notes survived a strict foreclosure undertaken by the trustee at the direction of a group of majority bondholders over Plaintiffs' objection that purported to cancel the notes.Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Defendants and denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division by reversing the grant of summary judgment to Defendants and granting partial summary to Plaintiffs, holding that Plaintiffs' payment rights were not extinguished by the strict foreclosure, which purportedly cancelled their notes, because the purported cancellation of the notes without the dissenting minority note holders' consent violated the provisions of the indenture agreement. View "CNH Diversified Opportunities Master Account, L.P. v Cleveland Unlimited, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division reversing Defendant's conviction of manslaughter in the first degree and denied Defendant's motion to suppress DNA evidence from a Defendant's body by buccal swab, holding that there was no violation of Defendant's constitutional rights in this case.After the victim was shot, the People obtained a warrant to obtain a saliva sample for DNA testing from Defendant. Defendant moved to suppress the DNA evidence, asserting that the search warrant application failed to set forth probable cause that he committed the homicide and failed to articulate how the DNA profile related to the homicide investigation. The court denied the suppression motion. Defendant was subsequently convicted. The Appellate Division reversed and granted Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that Supreme Court erred in precluding defense counsel from reviewing the search warrant application and in denying counsel the opportunity to be heard on the issuance of probable cause. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the requirement set forth in Matter of Abe A., 56 NY2d 288 (1982), of notice and an opportunity to be heard in the pre-execution stage of a warrant authorizing the seizure of evidence by bodily intrusion was satisfied in this case. View "People v. McIver" on Justia Law

In this negligence action stemming from injuries Plaintiff allegedly received by a dog in the waiting room of a veterinary clinic, the Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division affirming Supreme Court's summary judgment in favor of Defendant, the veterinary clinic, holding that neither party was entitled to summary judgment.In granting summary judgment for Defendant, Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's liability was contingent upon it having had notice of vicious propensities in the same manner as that of a dog owner. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant could not be held liable without notice of an animal's vicious propensities. The Court of Appeals modified the order below by denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding (1) Defendant did not need the protection afforded by the vicious propensities notice requirement, and the absence of such notice did not warrant dismissal of Plaintiff's claim; (2) under the circumstances, a negligence claim may lie despite Defendant's lack of notice of the dog's vicious propensities; and (3) questions of fact existed precluding summary judgment. View "Hewitt v. Palmer Veterinary Clinic, PC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and reinstated Supreme Court's judgment declaring that Defendants violated the second subdivision (h) of Administrative Code of the City of New York 13-218 by excluding police officers in tier 3 of the state retirement system from the retirement benefits conferred by that subdivision reinstated, holding that the relevant part of section 13-218 rendered those officers eligible for credit for certain periods of unpaid childcare leave.At issue was the policy of the City of New York that tier 3 officers are not eligible for certain benefits available to officers in tier 2 of the New York City Police Pension Fund retirement plan, including the mechanism that allows police officers to obtain credit for certain periods of absence without pay for childcare leave. Supreme Court awarded Plaintiffs judgment, declaring that affected police officers were entitled to the childcare leave benefit. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 13-218 renders officers of the New York City Police Department who are members of the tier 3 retirement system are eligible for credit for periods of unpaid childcare leave and that the grant of such benefits for those officers is consistent with the Retirement and Social Security Law. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division affirming Defendant's conviction of second-degree assault, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the jury a curative instruction and forgoing a Buford inquiry of a sworn juror after her exclamation during trial that she was very offended by the repetitive use of a racial slur by Defendant's counsel while cross-examining the victim.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law in its response to the juror's disruption of the trial. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding (1) the court's curative instruction was a "thorough and sensible approach" that addressed each of the concerns raised by counsel and reached the same result that would have been afforded by a Buford inquiry of the single juror; and (2) therefore, the court's remedy was not an abuse of its discretion. View "People v. Batticks" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals answered questions certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding whether New York recognizes so-called American Pipe tolling of the statute of limitations for absent class members of a putative class action filed in another jurisdiction.In 2012, Plaintiffs filed individual lawsuits alleging injuries based upon the manufacturing of a nematicide by Occidental Chemical Corporation. The cases were consolidated, and the action was transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Occidental moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under New York law. Plaintiffs argued in response that a putative class action originally filed in Texas state court in 1993 had tolled the applicable three-year statute of limitations. The New York District Court Judge denied the motion and certified an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit, which, in turn, certified questions to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals answered (1) New York recognizes American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 US 538 (1974), tolling for absent class members of putative class actions filed in other state and federal courts; and (2) a non-merits dismissal of class certification, as occurred here in 1995, extinguishes tolling. View "Chavez v. Occidental Chemical Corp" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction of criminal contempt, as charged in an amended accusatory instrument, holding that the lower courts erred in permitting amendment of a clearly erroneous fact contained in the information charging Defendant with harassment and contempt in the second degree.Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal contempt and received a ninety-day jail sentence. The Appellate Term affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the factual amendment of a clearly erroneous date was permissible under People v. Easton, 307 NY 336 (1954). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the legislature's replacement of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the modern Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) displaced Easton and precluded prosecutors from curing factual errors or deficiencies in informations and misdemeanor complaints via amendment; (2) the CPL requires a superseding accessory instrument supported by a sworn statement contains the correct factual allegations; and (3) because the trial court lacked the authority to permit the amendment, the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally defective. View "People v. Hardy" on Justia Law