Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division affirming the judgment of the Court of Claims granting the State's motion for summary judgment in this assault and battery case involving an inmate who was injured by a correction officer, holding that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the assault constituted action taken within the correction officer's scope of employment.Before the Court of Appeals the claimant argued that summary judgment was not properly granted because the assault was within the scope of the correction officer's employment, and therefore, the State was liable under the doctrine of respondent superior. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there was no basis to conclude that the assault constituted conduct within the scope of employment; and (2) the claimant's remaining contentions were without merit. View "Rivera v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order affirming Supreme Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's action brought under N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law 1504(1) to discharge a mortgage on grounds that the statute of limitations on Defendant's foreclosure claim had expired, holding that Defendant's claims were not time barred.Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 204(a), New York law tolls the statute of limitations where the "commencement of an action has been stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition." At issue was whether the bankruptcy stay of any judicial proceedings against a debtor upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition qualifies as a "statutory prohibition" under section 204(a). Defendant filed two foreclosure actions against Plaintiff, Plaintiff filed two bankruptcy petitions, and automatic bankruptcy stays were imposed. Plaintiff brought this action asserting that the statute of limitations on Defendant's foreclosure claim had expired. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations had not expired because it was tolled while the bankruptcy stay was in effect. Supreme Court dismissed, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the bankruptcy stay is a "statutory prohibition" within the ambit of the New York tolling statute; and (2) Defendant's claims were not time barred when Supreme Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. View "Lubonty v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n" on Justia Law

In these appeals stemming from two residential mortgage-back securities (RMBS) transactions the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division reversing the judgment of Supreme Court and granting Defendants' motions to dismiss the complaints alleging breaches of representations and warranties made in underlying mortgage loans, holding that Plaintiff's causes of action accrued in California, and Plaintiff's actions were untimely pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 202.Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's actions, contending that pursuant to section 202 Plaintiff's causes of action accrued in California and were therefore untimely. Plaintiff conceded that it was a resident of California but argued that the court should apply a multi-factor analysis to determine where the cause of action accrued. Supreme Court denied Defendants' motions to dismiss, noting that the parties had chosen New York substantive law to govern their rights. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) this Court declines to apply the multi-factor test urged by Plaintiff and instead relies on the general rule that when an economic injury has occurred the place of injury is usually where the plaintiff residents; and (2) where Plaintiff is a resident of California, to satisfy section 202 Plaintiff's actions must be timely under California's statute of limitations. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Barclays Bank PLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division confirming the determination of Respondents New York State Comptroller and New York State and Local Employees' Retirement System that Petitioner was not entitled to performance-of-duty disability retirement benefits under the circumstances of this case, holding that Petitioner's injuries were sustained by "any act of any inmate" within the meaning of N.Y. Retire. & Soc. Sec. Law 607-c(a).An inmate accidentally fell on Petitioner, a correction officer, while Petitioner was attempting to remove the inmate from a van. Petitioner applied for benefits under section 607-c(a). Respondents denied the application, concluding that the alleged cause of disability was not the result of an act of any inmate within the meaning of the statute. The Appellate Division agreed with Respondents, concluding that Petitioner's injuries did not arise directly and proximately from any disobedient and affirmative act of the inmate. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Division erred in restricting the word "act" in section 607-c(a) to "volitional or disobedient" acts; (2) the word "act" broadly includes voluntary and involuntary conduct; and (3) Petitioner's injuries were sustained by "any act of any inmate" in this case. View "Walsh v. New York State Comptroller" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division affirming a Supreme Court judgment enjoining a three-day music and camping festival on Landowner's rural property in the Town of Delaware, holding that the challenged provisions of local zoning laws did not unconstitutionally restrict Landowner's First Amendment rights and were not void for vagueness.Landowner planned to sponsor on his sixty-eight-acre property a three-day event during which attendees would camp on the property and view live outdoor music performances. The Town commenced this action seeking an injunction against the event, alleging it was prohibited by the Town's Zoning Law. Supreme Court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined Landowner from holding the festival on his property. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that that relevant Zoning Law provisions were content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions compatible with the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the zoning provisions at issue satisfied the intermediate scrutiny test for content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions and survived Defendant's overbreadth challenge; and (2) Landowner's facial and as-applied void for vagueness challenges likewise failed. View "Town of Delaware v. Leifer" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division granting a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by disapproving an insurance company bail bond package assembled by a bail bond company in conjunction with Defendant's family and friends.Supreme Court disapproved the bond at issue when exercising its review under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 520.30(1), concluding that the pledged collateral was "virtually nonexistent" and provided Defendant "with no incentive to return to court." Relator commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 70 habeas corpus proceeding on Defendant's behalf. The Appellate Division sustained the writ and directed that Defendant be released upon his posting of an insurance company bail bond in the aggregate sum of $500,000, ruling that Supreme Court erred in disapproving the bail. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) section 520.30(1) permits a court to determine whether the collateral securing the insurance company bail bond is so deficient that it fails to ensure the defendant's return to court in contravention of public policy; and (2) Supreme Court correctly interpreted the statute and did not abuse its discretion when it disapproved the bail package on public policy grounds. View "People ex rel. Prieston v. Nassau County Sheriff's Department" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals answered in the negative a question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit asking whether N.Y. Pub. Health Law 230(11)(b) creates a private right of action for bad faith and malicious reporting to the Office of Professional Medical Conduct, holding that there is not indication that the legislature intended to create a private right of action in section 230(11)(b).Plaintiff, a surgeon, treated four injured patients insured by Defendant and submitted claims to Defendant in connection with each patient. Defendant later filed complaints with the Office of Professional Medical Conduct (OPMC) alleging insurance fraud. After OPMC declined to impose discipline against Plaintiff, Plaintiff commenced this action asserting that Defendant's complaints lacked a good-faith basis in violation of section 230(11)(b) and interposed a separate caused of action for defamation. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that section 230(11)(b) does not imply a private right of action. The federal district court granted the motion. On appeal, the Second Circuit certified the above question to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that the statutory text and legislative history of the statute do not imply a legislative intent to create a right of action under section 230(11)(b). View "Haar v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this dispute between members of the Cayuga Nation, a federally-recognized Indian tribe, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division affirming the denial of Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that permitting this action to proceed would require New York state courts to pass upon an internal tribal governance dispute over which they lack subject matter jurisdiction.Defendants, Jacobs Council, claimed that Plaintiffs, Halftown Council, had been removed from their positions on the Nation Council under Cayuga law. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ultimately recognized the Halftown Council as the governing body authorized to contract on behalf of the Nation for certain funding. The Halftown Council later commenced this action. Supreme Court denied the Jacobs Council's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that although New York courts generally lack the ability to resolve an intra-tribal leadership dispute, they did not need do so here because the BIA's recognition determination established Plaintiffs as the Nation's lawful Council. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the BIA's determination did not resolve the disputed issues of tribal law implicated by the merits of this action, and therefore, New York state courts lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Halftown Council's legal claims. View "Cayuga Nation v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In this case involving injuries Plaintiff received from the condition of demised premises the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division affirming Supreme Court's order holding that Defendants, owners of the property, were out-of-possession landlords and were entitled to the protection of the general rule that such landlords will not be liable for injuries caused by dangerous conditions on the leased premises.In Putnam v. Stout, 38 N.Y.2d 607 (1976), the Court of Appeals recognized a limited exception to the rule that an out-of-possession landlord is not liable for injuries resulting from the condition of the demised premises where the landlord covenants in the lease or otherwise to keep the land in repair. At issue in this case was whether the exception recognized in Putnam applied to a regulatory agreement between Defendants and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, as guarantor of the mortgage on Defendants' premises. The Court of Appeals held that the exception to the general rule set forth in Putnam was inapplicable to the regulatory agreement at issue in this case and that the general rule that the landlord was not liable for conditions upon the land after the transfer of possession applied. View "Henry v. Hamilton Equities, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division reversing Supreme Court's order denying Defendants' motion for summary judgment and rejecting their arguments that out-of-possession landowners are not liable for personal injuries based on negligent sidewalk maintenance where, under lease terms, the lessee agreed to maintain the abutting sidewalks, holding that Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment due solely to the owners' out-of-possession status.Plaintiff sued owners of property in New York City for personal injuries arising from Plaintiff's slip and fall on the ice that had accumulated on the sidewalk abutting the property. The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court and granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis that the out-of-possession landowners had no contractual obligation to maintain sidewalks. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) section 7-210 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York makes no exception to the general rule that real property owners have a nondelegable duty to maintain City sidewalks abutting their land in a reasonably safe condition; and (2) therefore, Defendants were subject to the nondelegable duty imposed by section 7-210, exposing them to potential liability for injuries allegedly caused by their failure to properly remove snow and ice from the sidewalks abutting their property. View "Xiang Fu He v. Troon Management, Inc." on Justia Law