Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The State Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (Board) may consider a defendant’s Youthful Offender (YO) adjudication for the limited public safety purpose of accurately assessing the offender’s risk to reoffend.Defendant committed first-degree rape and, thereby, became subject to New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act’s (SORA) sex offender registration requirements. The Board gave defendant a score of 115 points, including twenty-five points for his “criminal history” factors, based solely on his YO adjudication for third-degree criminal possession of stolen property, committed when he was seventeen years old. Defendant objected, arguing that because a YO adjudication is not a conviction, it may not be considered as part of a defendant’s criminal history for the purposes of SORA. The SORA court overruled the objection and designated Defendant a Level III sexually violent sex offender. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Board’s interpretation of its authority under SORA does not conflict with the Criminal Procedure Law’s youthful offender provisions. View "People v. Francis" on Justia Law

At issue was whether two first responders (together, Petitioners) established that they were entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits by demonstrating that they were incapacitated as the natural and proximate result of an accident sustained in service.The Comptroller in these two consolidated cases determined that Petitioners were not injured in an “accident” within the meaning of N.Y. Retire. & Soc. Sec. Law 363. The Court of Appeals held that substantial evidence supported the Comptroller’s determinations that neither petitioner was injured as the result of an “accident” because there were no precipitating accidental events that were not a risk of the work performed. View "Kelly v. DiNapoli" on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, the Court of Appeals held that, for purposes of disclosure of materials from Plaintiff's Facebook account, the threshold inquiry was not whether the materials sought were private but whether they were reasonably calculated to contain relevant information.In this personal injury action, Supreme Court granted Defendant’s motion to compel the production of Plaintiff’s entire “private” Facebook account to the limited extent of directing Plaintiff to produce photographs of herself privately posted on Facebook prior to the accident that she intended to introduce at trial and photographs of herself privately posted on Facebook after the accident. The Appellate Division modified by limiting disclosure to photographs posted on Facebook that Plaintiff intended to introduce at trial, whether pre- or post-accident. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated Supreme Court’s order, holding (1) the Appellate Division erred in employing a heightened threshold for production of social media records that depended on what the account holder had chosen to share on the public portion of the account; and (2) for purposes of disclosure, the threshold inquiry is not whether the materials sought are private but whether they are reasonably calculated to contain relevant information. View "Forman v. Henkin" on Justia Law

Defense counsel’s consent to verdict sheet annotations beyond those automatically permitted by N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 310.20 did not deprive Defendant of meaningful representation.After a trial, the jury retuned a guilty verdict against Defendant on twelve counts. On appeal, County Court held, sua sponte, that the annotations on the verdict sheets were “extraneous, and highly inflammatory information” that “marshaled and bolstered the People’s proof." County Court went on to conclude that defense counsel’s consent to the annotations constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that defense counsel’s consent to the annotations did not deprive Defendant of meaningful representation. View "People v. O'Kane" on Justia Law

Equitable apportionment ensuring that employers’ insurance carriers pay their equitable share of litigation expenses incurred by injured workers who obtain recoveries from a third-party tortfeasor should not turn solely on the label given to a claimant’s award but must take into account the certainty of the award at the time a third-party matter is resolved.In this case a third-party settlement was consummated before a workers’ compensation award was determined. The Workers’ Compensation Board misinterpreted the Court of Appeals’ precedents as requiring that litigation costs apportioned against all schedule loss of use awards be either assigned at the time of the third-party settlement or not at all. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division concluding that the award of workers’ compensation benefits was of a type the Court of Appeals had indicated had an ascertainable present value, and therefore, the claimant was not entitled to a post-settlement apportionment of the litigation expenses contemplated for other types of awards. View "Terranova v. Lehr Construction Co." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of Supreme Court granting Petitioners’ petition asserting that the decision of the New York City Water Board and the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) adopting a resolution approving a rate increase and bill credit and publishing a rate schedule was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.Petitioners commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. article 78 proceeding against the Water Board and DEP challenging the resolution and rate schedule. Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling that the resolution and rate schedule were ultra vires, exceeded the Water Board’s statutory authority, and were unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Respondents’ actions were not utterly arbitrary or unsupported by economic or public policy goals and that Respondents did not act ultra vires or levy a tax. View "Prometheus Realty Corp. v. New York City Water Board" on Justia Law

The Family Court properly found that Respondent willfully violated two temporary orders of protection issued during the pendency of a family offense proceeding and that the court acted within its jurisdiction to enter an order of protection upon those findings.Petitioner filed a family offense petition against Respondent, her husband and the father of her children. Petitioner requested and received a temporary order of protection at her first appearance in Family Court. While the family offense proceeding remained pending, Family Court determined that Respondent had committed two willful violations of two temporary orders. The Family Court thus dismissed the family offense petition but sustained Petitioner’s violation petition and issued a one-year final order or protection precluding Respondent from communicating with Petitioner except as necessary to make arrangements for Respondent’s visitation with the child. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Family Court had jurisdiction to enter the final order of protection; and (2) Respondents’ challenge to Family Court’s finding that he violated the temporary order of protection was without merit. View "Lisa T. v. King E.T." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division that reversed a judgment by Supreme Court, vacated Defendant’s pleas, and dismissed Defendant’s indictment without prejudice.The People filed a motion to compel a DNA test and served the motion on retained defense counsel. The trial court, in Defendant’s absence, granted retained counsel’s motion to be relieved from representing Defendant and granted the People’s DNA discovery motion. After counsel was relieved, Defendant appeared in court. The court proceeding to act in place of counsel throughout an extensive colloquy. Notwithstanding Defendant’s entreaties for an attorney to advise him regarding the motion to compel a DNA test, the court rejected Defendant’s requests for an attorney. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division correctly determined that Defendant was deprived his right to counsel during the pretrial proceedings concerning the DNA test. The court further held, however, that dismissal of the indictment was not “necessary and appropriate” to rectify the injustice to Defendant. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

When identification is an issue in a criminal case and the identifying witness and defendant appear to be of different races, a party is entitled, upon request, to a charge on cross-racial identification.Defendant was charged with robbery in the first degree and other crimes. During trial, defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed on cross-racial identification. The trial court denied the request, and the jury found Defendant guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding (1) in light of the “near consensus among cognitive and social psychologists that people have significantly greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race than in accurately identifying members of their own race,” the need for a charge on the cross-race effect is evidence; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for a cross-racial identification charge. View "People v. Boone" on Justia Law

The statute of limitations for a cause of action permitting parents to recover the extraordinary expenses incurred to care for a disabled infant who, but for a physician’s negligent failure to detect or advise on the risks of impairment, would not have been born runs from the date of birth rather than the date of the alleged negligence.Plaintiffs in both cases gave birth to children through in vitro fertilization treatment using an egg donor. Two of the three children born to the two couples had the Fragile X mutation, a chromosomal abnormality. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed timely to screen the egg donor for the Fragile X mutation and that these negligent acts or omissions resulted in the parents incurring extraordinary expenses to care for and treat a child with a disability. Defendants moved to dismiss both complaints, arguing that the extraordinary expenses claims were time-barred because the limitations period runs from the date of the alleged malpractice, which they identified as the date the embryos were implanted in the mothers. Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Plaintiffs’ causes of action for extraordinary expenses accrued upon the birth of their children, the claims were timely. View "B.F. v Reproductive Medicine Associates of New York, LLP" on Justia Law