Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Laquawn Lewis, was charged with attempted murder, robbery, assault, and obstruction of governmental administration. Leading up to his trial, Lewis expressed dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel and filed various pro se motions. He eventually requested to represent himself, stating his intention to proceed pro se. The court denied his request without conducting the required inquiry into whether his decision was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.At trial, Lewis reiterated his desire to represent himself, but the court again denied his request and proceeded with jury selection. Lewis later pleaded guilty to avoid a potential life sentence based on an incorrect assumption about his status as a persistent felony offender. After realizing the error, defense counsel moved to withdraw the guilty plea, which the court granted. Lewis renewed his request to represent himself, but the court deferred the decision until the trial date and ultimately denied it again. Lewis was convicted of all charges except attempted murder and sentenced to 25 years' incarceration and 5 years' post-release supervision.The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, holding that Lewis's requests to proceed pro se were not unequivocal and that his legal sufficiency argument was unpreserved and without merit. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Lewis leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court violated Lewis's constitutional right to self-representation by denying his unequivocal request to proceed pro se without the requisite inquiry. The court held that Lewis's request was clear and timely, and the trial court's failure to conduct an inquiry warranted a new trial. The court also found that Lewis's legal sufficiency argument was unpreserved. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order and granted Lewis a new trial. View "People v Lewis" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Westchester County Department of Social Services (DSS) initiated neglect proceedings against a mother for leaving her young children unsupervised. The mother consented to a neglect finding, and subsequent permanency hearings were held regarding the placement of two of her children in DSS custody. In 2020, the Family Court trial discharged the children to the mother's custody, but later returned them to DSS after allegations of the mother's non-compliance and further neglect surfaced. In March 2022, the Family Court continued the children's placement with DSS and ordered the mother to participate in various programs and evaluations. The mother appealed this order.During the appeal, another permanency hearing was held, resulting in an October 2022 order that also continued the children's placement with DSS and reiterated the requirements for the mother. The mother appealed this order as well. While these appeals were pending, new permanency hearings and orders were issued, superseding the previous ones. The Appellate Division dismissed the mother's appeals as moot, given that the orders had expired and been replaced.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court held that the appeals were moot because the orders in question had been superseded by subsequent orders, and thus no longer affected the mother's rights. The Court also determined that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in declining to invoke the mootness exception, as the issues raised were not sufficiently substantial or novel. Additionally, the Court declined to adopt a blanket mootness exception for all permanency hearing orders, emphasizing that such a rule would be impractical and could undermine the purpose of timely and effective judicial review in child welfare cases. View "Matter of Joshua J." on Justia Law

Ezrasons, Inc., a New York corporation and beneficial owner of Barclays PLC shares, initiated a derivative action on behalf of Barclays against several current and former Barclays directors and officers, as well as Barclays Capital Inc. (BCI). The complaint alleged breaches of fiduciary duties under English law, causing significant harm to Barclays. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that under English law, only registered members of Barclays could maintain such an action, and Ezrasons was not a registered member.The Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the internal affairs doctrine required the application of English law, which precluded Ezrasons from having standing. The court rejected the argument that New York's Business Corporation Law (BCL) sections 626 (a) and 1319 (a) (2) overrode the internal affairs doctrine. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the internal affairs doctrine applied and that Ezrasons lacked standing under English law.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the internal affairs doctrine, which mandates that the substantive law of the place of incorporation governs disputes related to corporate internal affairs, was not overridden by BCL sections 626 (a) and 1319 (a) (2). The court found no clear legislative intent to displace the doctrine and concluded that Ezrasons lacked standing under English law to maintain the derivative action. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed, with costs. View "Ezrasons, Inc. v Rudd" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a beneficiary of a revocable trust, claimed entitlement to certain real property and income. The trust included an in terrorem clause, which disinherits any beneficiary who contests the trust. Plaintiff argued that she did not trigger this clause by seeking to enforce the trust's provisions as intended by the grantor, rather than challenging the trust itself. The key issue was whether her actions constituted a violation of the in terrorem clause, thereby forfeiting her bequests.The Supreme Court initially denied defendants' motion to dismiss, citing unresolved factual issues. Defendants later moved for partial summary judgment, which the court granted, determining that plaintiff had no ownership interest in Dempsaco LLC. Plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment regarding her entitlement to the real property was denied. Defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's claim to a 50% interest in Dempsaco triggered the in terrorem clause. The Supreme Court agreed, granting defendants' motion and awarding attorney's fees. The Appellate Division modified the order by denying attorney's fees but otherwise affirmed the decision, concluding that plaintiff's actions violated the in terrorem clause.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that plaintiff did not violate the in terrorem clause because her lawsuit sought to enforce the trust's provisions as written and intended by the grantor. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on her claim to the real property, as the trust explicitly directed the trustee to transfer the property to her. However, the court found that triable issues of fact remained regarding the income stream and unjust enrichment claims. The order of the Appellate Division was modified accordingly. View "Carlson v Colangelo" on Justia Law

In 1993, 11-year-old Michael Nellenback was placed in the care of Madison County's Department of Social Services (DSS) and assigned to caseworker Karl Hoch. Over the next three years, Hoch sexually abused Nellenback. Hoch was later convicted of various sex crimes and died in prison in 2001. In 2019, Nellenback filed a lawsuit against Madison County under the Child Victims Act, alleging negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Hoch.The Supreme Court granted Madison County's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The court found that the County lacked actual or constructive knowledge of Hoch's propensities for abuse and that no further investigation or supervision would have uncovered the abuse. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, with two Justices dissenting, arguing that there were triable issues of fact regarding the County's liability for negligent supervision.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that Nellenback failed to raise a triable issue of fact on his negligent supervision claim. The evidence did not show that the County had actual or constructive knowledge of Hoch's propensity for abuse. The Court found that the absence of records documenting Hoch's interactions with Nellenback was not sufficient to establish a triable issue, as the records were routinely destroyed after a certain period. Additionally, the Court noted that the primary role of caseworkers was to transport children, and it was speculative to suggest that increased review of records would have put the County on notice of the abuse. Thus, the Court concluded that Nellenback's claim could not withstand summary judgment. View "Nellenback v Madison County" on Justia Law

Dynamic Logic Inc. (Dynamic) markets products to help clients measure the effectiveness of their advertising campaigns. The product in question, AdIndex, uses a control/exposed methodology to measure the effectiveness of digital advertising. Dynamic surveys individuals exposed to a client's advertisements and a control group, compares the results to broader market data in its MarketNorms database, and generates a report for the client. The data from each AdIndex report is later incorporated into the MarketNorms database for future use.In 2014, the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance audited Dynamic and concluded that AdIndex was a taxable information service under Tax Law § 1105 (c) (1), assessing additional sales tax. Dynamic challenged the assessment before the Division of Tax Appeals, which upheld the tax imposition. The Tax Appeals Tribunal affirmed, finding that AdIndex's primary function was the collection and analysis of information, and that any recommendations were ancillary to the data collection. The Tribunal also determined that Dynamic was not entitled to an exclusion under Tax Law § 1105 (c) (1) because the data collected was furnished to other persons through its incorporation into the MarketNorms database.Dynamic filed a CPLR article 78 petition in the Appellate Division to annul the Tribunal's determination. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination and dismissed the petition, holding that the Tribunal had rationally determined that AdIndex was an information service and that there was substantial evidence supporting its reasoning. The court also held that the Tribunal rationally concluded that the information provided through AdIndex was substantially incorporated into reports furnished to other persons, disqualifying Dynamic from the exclusion.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment, holding that the Tribunal's determination was rational and supported by substantial evidence. The court found that AdIndex fit the definition of a taxable information service and that the data was substantially incorporated into subsequent reports, making Dynamic ineligible for the exclusion under Tax Law § 1105 (c) (1). View "Matter of Dynamic Logic, Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of New York" on Justia Law

Rebecca Flanders, a postal carrier, was bitten by a dog owned by Stephen and Michelle Goodfellow while delivering a package to their residence. Flanders filed a lawsuit seeking damages for her injuries, asserting claims of strict liability and negligence. The dog had previously exhibited aggressive behavior, including growling, barking, and slamming into windows when postal workers approached the house. Despite this, the Goodfellows claimed they were unaware of the dog's vicious propensities.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Goodfellows, dismissing both claims. The court found no triable issue of fact regarding the Goodfellows' knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities, which is necessary for strict liability. The negligence claim was dismissed based on precedent from Bard v Jahnke, which barred negligence liability for harm caused by domestic animals. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, agreeing that Flanders failed to raise a factual dispute requiring a trial.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that there was a triable issue of fact regarding the Goodfellows' constructive knowledge of their dog's aggressive behavior, thus reinstating the strict liability claim. The court also overruled Bard to the extent that it barred negligence liability for harm caused by domestic animals, recognizing that this rule was inconsistent with ordinary tort principles and had proven unworkable. Consequently, the court reinstated Flanders's negligence claim and reversed the Appellate Division's order, denying the Goodfellows' motion for summary judgment. View "Flanders v Goodfellow" on Justia Law

David Katleski, an experienced golfer, was struck by an errant golf ball while participating in a tournament at Cazenovia Golf Club. The accident occurred during a "shotgun start" tournament, where players tee off simultaneously from different holes. Katleski was hit while searching for a ball on the seventh fairway by a ball hit from the third hole. He sued the golf club, alleging negligent design and operation of the course, particularly the placement of tee box A on the third hole.The Supreme Court denied the club's motion for summary judgment, finding a triable issue of fact regarding whether the course's design unreasonably enhanced the risk. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the club, emphasizing Katleski's experience and awareness of the course layout. The court found no evidence that the course design exposed Katleski to risks beyond those inherent in golf. Katleski appealed to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine precluded Katleski's negligence claim. The court found that being struck by a mishit golf ball is an inherent risk of the sport, and there was no evidence that the course design unreasonably enhanced this risk.Mary Galante was injured in a separate incident at Elma Meadows Golf Course when she collided with a car while driving a golf cart in the parking lot. The Appellate Division denied her motion to strike the County's primary assumption of risk defense and granted summary judgment to the County. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply as Galante was not participating in a protected athletic or recreational activity at the time of her injury. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for further consideration. View "Katleski v Cazenovia Golf Club, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested after abandoning a plastic bag containing crack cocaine while being pursued by police. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that the pursuit was unlawful. At the suppression hearing, Officer Kyle Eisenhauer of the Rochester Police Department testified that he and his partner observed the defendant exit a sedan and aggressively approach a woman who had thrown a bottle at the car. The officers instructed the defendant to stop, but he fled, digging into his waistband and leaving his car in the middle of the street. The officers pursued him, and during the chase, the defendant discarded a plastic bag containing a white substance, later identified as crack cocaine.The Supreme Court largely credited Eisenhauer's account, determined that the pursuit was lawful, and denied the defendant's suppression motion. The defendant proceeded to a jury trial and was found guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, concluding that the stop and subsequent pursuit were supported by reasonable suspicion. One Justice dissented, arguing that the reasonable suspicion ceased once the defendant stopped approaching the woman.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that police may pursue a suspect who flees during a lawful level three stop founded on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court rejected the notion that a suspect can legally flee a level three stop if their flight dissipates the initial reasonable suspicion. The court found support in the record for the determination that the police had reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "People v Cleveland" on Justia Law

David Katleski, an experienced golfer, was struck by an errant golf ball while competing in a tournament at Cazenovia Golf Club. The accident occurred during a "shotgun start" tournament, where players tee off simultaneously from different holes. Katleski was hit in the eye by a ball from another player teeing off from a nearby hole. He filed a negligence action against the golf club, claiming the course was negligently designed and operated, particularly pointing to the placement of a tee box that increased the risk of such accidents.The Supreme Court denied the golf club's motion for summary judgment, finding that there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether the course's design unreasonably enhanced the risk of being struck by a golf ball. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision, granting summary judgment to the golf club. The court emphasized Katleski's experience and awareness of the course layout, concluding that the design did not expose him to risks beyond those inherent in the sport of golf. Katleski appealed to the Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine precluded Katleski's negligence claim. The court found that being struck by a mishit golf ball is an inherent risk of the game, and there was no evidence that the course's design unreasonably enhanced this risk.In a related case, Mary Galante was injured in a parking lot at a golf course before she began playing. The Appellate Division had applied the primary assumption of risk doctrine to dismiss her claim. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the doctrine did not apply because Galante was not participating in a protected athletic or recreational activity at the time of her injury. The case was remitted for further proceedings. View "Katleski v Cazenovia Golf Club, Inc." on Justia Law