Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals declined Defendant’s invitation to expand the holding in People v. Syville, 15 NY3d 319 (N.Y. 2010), to situations in which retained trial counsel timely filed a notice of appeals but allegedly failed to advise the defendant of his or her right to poor person relief or to take any action when served with a motion to dismiss the appeal years after the notice of appeal was filed. Syville held that, in certain circumstances, coram nobis may be available for a defendant who demonstrated that he or she timely requested that trial counsel file a notice of appeal, the attorney failed to comply, and the omission could not reasonably have been discovered within the one-year time limit. The Court of Appeals declined Defendant’s invitation to expand Syville and instead held that coram nobis was unavailable where Defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that counsel was ineffective. View "People v. Arjune" on Justia Law

Applying the strict equivalency test to the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals held that Defendant’s Georgia conviction for burglary was equivalent to a violent felony in New York, and therefore, Defendant was properly sentenced as a second violent felony offender based upon that previous conviction.Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. At sentencing, the trial court determined that Defendant must be punished as a second violent felony offender based on his previous Georgia conviction for burglary and sentenced him accordingly. The Appellate Division reversed, ruling that the Georgia conviction was not the equivalent of a New York violent felony. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated Defendant’s sentence as a second violent felony offender, holding that Defendant may be sentenced as a predicate felon based on his Georgia conviction. View "People v. Helms" on Justia Law

Rule 12A, contained in Order 15 of the Cayman Islands Grand Court Rules 1995, is procedural and therefore does not apply where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to litigate his derivative claims in New York.Plaintiff owned ordinary shares in Scottish Re Group, Limited, a Cayman Islands company formerly engaged in the business of reinsurance. Plaintiff asserted both direct and derivative causes of action against Scottish Re and others. The only claims relevant to this appeal were Plaintiff’s derivative claims. Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s derivative causes of action, ruling that, under Cayman Islands law, Plaintiff had not established standing because he did not seek leave of court to commence a derivative action under Rule 12A of the Rules of the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands. The Appellate Division affirmed based on Plaintiff’s noncompliance with Rule 12A, concluding that the rule applied because it was substantive rather than procedural. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s derivative claims should not have been dismissed on the ground that he failed to comply with Rule 12A where Rule 12A is a procedural rule that does not apply in New York courts. View "Davis v. Scottish Re Group Ltd." on Justia Law

A plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) where the wrongdoer’s actions amount to willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or where there is a “conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard.”Plaintiff, a physical therapy aide, sued her former employer and two supervisory employees for sex and pregnancy discrimination under the NYCHRL and Title VII. At trial, the court applied to the NYCHRL the standard for punitive damages found in Title VII. The jury found Defendants liable for pregnancy discrimination and awarded $10,500 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in pain and suffering. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in importing the Title VII standard. The Second Circuit certified to the Court of Appeals a question regarding the standard for finding a defendant liable for punitive damages under the NYCHRL. The Court of Appeals answered as set forth above. View "Chauca v. Abraham" on Justia Law

N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) 380.40 entitles a defendant to be present personally at the time sentence is pronounced for the re-imposition of the defendant’s original prison sentence under N.Y. Penal Law 70.85 unless he or she validly forfeits or waives the right to be present.In 2001, Defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree and attempted murder in the second degree and was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his plea and sentence under People v. Catu, 825 N.E.2d 1081 (N.Y. 2005) because he had not been informed of the term of post-release supervision (PRS) to follow his prison sentence. At a court appearance at which the prosecutor and Defendant’s attorney were present but Defendant himself was absent, Supreme Court denied Defendant’s motion to vacate his plea and re-imposed his original sentence, without a term of PRS, under section 70.85. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because there was no voluntary wavier, Defendant’s absence from the sentencing proceeding was in itself, under precedent, an error because it constituted a violation of his right under CPL 380.40. View "People v. Estremera" on Justia Law

An appellant’s failure to file an affidavit of errors with the criminal court if the underlying proceedings were not recorded by a court reporter in order to appeal a judgment of a local criminal court renders the intermediate appellate court without jurisdiction to hear the case.The jury trial of Defendant, who was charged with criminal contempt in the second degree, was held in a local town court, which is not a court of record, and no court stenographer was present during the proceedings. Defendant was convicted and sentenced. Defendant filed a notice of appeal but did not file an affidavit of errors with the court. County Court upheld Defendant’s conviction but reduced her year-long jail sentence to six months. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Defendant’s appeal was improperly entertained by the intermediate appellate court; but (2) under the circumstances of this case, this case is remitted to the County court to permit that court’s exercise of discretion in connection with Defendant’s motion to file a late affidavit of errors. View "People v. Flores" on Justia Law

Assuming that the legislature’s 2013 amendment to N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law 25-a has a retroactive impact by imposing unfunded costs upon Plaintiffs for policies finalized before the amendment’s effective date, that retroactive impact is constitutionally permissible.Plaintiffs - approximately twenty insurance companies that wrote workers’ compensation insurance policies in New York - commenced this declaratory judgment action in 2013, alleging that the legislature’s amendment to section 25-a operated retroactively to the extent that it imposed unfunded liability upon Plaintiffs and that this retroactive impact was unconstitutional. Supreme Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the amendment operated prospectively. The Appellate Division reversed and entered a judgment declaring section 25-a(1-a) unconstitutional as retroactively applied to policies issued before October 1, 2013. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, even assuming that the amendment has retroactive impact, this impact is constitutional. View "American Economy Insurance Co. v. State" on Justia Law

A due process violation occurs when the sole judge deciding a criminal defendant’s appeal as of right is the same judge who also presided over the defendant’s pretrial motions and bench trial. In this case, due process required the judge’s recusal.Defendant was charged with driving while ability impaired. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him. The judge presiding in city court denied Defendant’s motion. The same judge subsequently found Defendant guilty as charged at a bench trial. During the pendency of Defendant’s appeal, the same judge who had presided over Defendant’s bench trial was elected to county court. That same judge then upheld Defendant’s judgment of conviction and sentence on appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the county court, holding that this matter must be remitted to county court for Defendant’s appeal to be heard by a different judge. View "People v. Novak" on Justia Law

N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law (VTL) 397, which provides that a person - not a police officer but someone acting pursuant to his special duties - who equips or operates a motor vehicle with a radio capable of receiving signals on the frequencies allocated for police use does not require that the prohibited device be physically attached to the motor vehicle.The prosecution filed an accusatory instrument alleging that Defendant operated a pick-up truck bearing the name of a tow truck company while having inside his jacket pocket a police scanner. Criminal Court dismissed the accusatory instrument on the ground that there were no allegations that the scanner was specifically prepared to be used with a vehicle. The Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the information was facially sufficient to establish reasonable cause to believe Defendant violated VTL 397. View "People v. Andujar" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals in this care reaffirmed its longstanding rule that a warrantless arrest of a suspect in the threshold of a residence is permissible under the Fourth Amendment, provided that the suspect has voluntarily answered the door and the police have not crossed the threshold.Defendant was arrested without a warrant inside the doorway of his home. Defendant was later convicted of four counts of third-degree robbery and one count of attempted third-degree robbery. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the police violated Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573 (1980), by entering his home without consent or a warrant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the police never entered Defendant’s home, and therefore, the intrusion prohibited by Payton did not occur; (2) despite the urging of Defendant and two dissenting colleagues, this court refuses to adopt a new rule that warrantless “threshold/doorway arrests” violate Payton when the only reason the arrestee is in the doorway is that he or she was summoned there by police; and (3) there is no compelling justification to overrule prior precedent to recognize a new category of Payton violations based on subjective police intent. View "People v. Garvin" on Justia Law