Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged in both Queens and Richmond Counties with committing numerous sex offenses against four children. Defendant pleaded guilty. When Defendant’s release date was approaching, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders prepared a case summary and risk assessment instrument (RAI) as required by the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The Board did not recommend any points under risk factor seven, entitled “relationship with victim.” At the SORA hearing, the court assessed twenty points under risk factor seven and ultimately assessed Defendant a total of 125 points, rendering him a presumptive risk level three. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Supreme Court did not err in assessing points under risk factor seven. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the lower courts erred in assessing twenty points under risk factor seven. View "People v. Cook" on Justia Law

Defendant committed multiple sexual offenses against four children in both Queens and Richmond Counties. Prosecution was coordinated between the two District Attorneys’ offices on both counties, and Defendant pleaded guilty in both counties. Later, in anticipation of Defendant’s scheduled release, the Richmond County sentencing court conducted a Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) risk assessment hearing and adjudicated Defendant a level III, sexually violent offender. Shortly thereafter, the Queens County sentencing court held a SORA hearing and adjudicated Defendant a level III, sexually violent offender. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Queens County adjudication was not authorized by statute and was barred by res judicata. The Appellate Division reversed the Queens County SORA court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the SORA risk assessment hearing, concluding (1) only one SORA “disposition” may be made per “Current Offense” or group of “Current Offenses”; and (2) the doctrine of res judicata barred the Queens County SORA proceedings. View "People v. Cook" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was working as an employee of DCM Erectors at the 1 World Trade Center construction site when he received a workplace injury. Plaintiff commenced this action against the owner of the premises and the general contractor, alleging violations of N.Y. Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6). Supreme Court denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s section 240(1) claim but granted Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the section 241(6) claim. The Appellate Division modified the order by granting Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the section 240(1) claim and denying Plaintiff summary judgment on the section 241(6) claim. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division by denying Plaintiff’s motion insofar as it sought summary judgment not he issue of liability on his section 240(1) claim, holding that there were triable issues of fact that precluded summary judgment. View "O'Brien v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, Defendant was found guilty of intentional murder and two counts of burglary in the first degree. The trial court, upon resentencing, sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of fifty-four years to life, with the concurrent sentences on the two burglary convictions imposed consecutively to his sentence on the intentional murder conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed. At issue before the Court of appeals was whether consecutive sentences are authorized under N.Y. Penal Law 70.25(2)** for Defendant’s burglary and intentional murder convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the conduct resulting in Defendant’s conviction of intentional murder and the conduct underlying the elements of the burglary convictions was a single act for consecutive sentencing purposes. View "People v. Brahney" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery in the first degree. At issue on appeal was whether the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that Defendant’s conduct amounted to displaying what appeared to be a firearm. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals also affirmed, holding that the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that, under all the circumstances, Defendant’s conduct could reasonably have led the victim to believe that a gun was being used during the robbery, and therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. View "People v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of predatory sexual assault and criminal sexual act in the first degree. Before trial, the trial court gave the People permission to question Defendant about the fact that Defendant had been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent, pursuant to People v. Sandoval, but not the facts underlying the adjudication. Also prior to trial, Defendant signed a waiver attesting that he gave up his right to be present during sidebar discussions with prospective jurors and/or discussions of law. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the Sandoval ruling on the juvenile delinquency adjudication was harmless error and that Defendant validly waived his right to be present at sidebar conferences. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s challenge to the Sandoval ruling was unpreserved; and (2) Defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to be present at a sidebar conference regarding the potential bias of a prospective juror is not reviewable, as Defendant waived his right. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree and unlawfully dealing with a child in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, concluding that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of uncharged crimes. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in permitting the People to introduce testimony from the victim about a prior incident in which Defendant allegedly sexually assaulted her in a similar manner because the evidence was not permissible for the People’s proffered Molineux purposes and the prejudicial nature of that evidence far outweighed any probative value. View "People v. Leonard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Anthony Oddo was assaulted by Sean Velentzas, one of the discharged residents of Defendant Queens Village Committee for Mental Health for Jamaica Community Adolescent Program, Inc., a mental health and substance abuse treatment facility. Plaintiff, the boyfriend of Velentzas’s mother, commenced this negligence action against Defendant, asserting that his injuries were solely the result of Defendant negligently releasing Velentzas. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that it owed no duty to Plaintiff. Supreme Court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant owed no duty of care to Plaintiff or to the public in general because Defendant discharged Velentzas from the program and thus lacked control over him at the time of the incident. View "Oddo v. Queens Village Committee for Mental Health for Jamaica Community Adolescent Program, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a worker at a facility owned by Suffolk County where Plaintiff took adult education classes. The worker, Larry Smith, had been referred for a potential possession with the lessee of the facility through the County’s “welfare to work” program. Plaintiff brought this action against the County, Smith, and others to recover damages for personal injuries. The County moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care and, in any event, was entitled to absolute governmental immunity for discretionary acts. Supreme Court denied the County’s motion. The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment for the County on the ground of governmental immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly granted to the County because the County’s referral of Smith was within the County’s governmental capacity and the County did not assume a special duty to Plaintiff. View "Tara N.P. v. Western Suffolk Board of Cooperative Educational Services" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and other offenses. The jury convicted Defendant of two counts of DWI. Appellate Term reversed and remitted for a new trial on those counts, concluding that Defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights were violated because the police officer who testified at trial regarding Defendant’s breath test did not personally administer the test, although he did directly observe the test. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that no Confrontation Clause occurred under the facts of this case because the officer testified based on his own observations and inclusions, rather than as a surrogate for his partner, who administered the test, and none of the nontestifying officer’s hearsay statements were admitted against Defendant. View "People v. Lin" on Justia Law