Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking a declaration of coverage under a program of builder’s risk insurance furnished by Defendants for weather-related damage to a tower crane. The Appellate Division granted summary judgment declaring that Defendants had no obligation to provide coverage for the subject loss under the policy. At issue in this case was (1) whether the crane was covered in the first instance under the insurance provided for temporary works and, if so, whether the contractor’s tools exclusion defeated that initial grant of coverage; and (2) whether the contractor’s tools exclusion was ineffective because it would render the coverage granted in the first instance for temporary works illusory. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) assuming that the policy contains coverage for the crane in the first instance, the contractor’s tools exclusion would defeat that coverage; and (2) the contractor’s tools exclusion does not render the coverage afforded under the temporary works provision of the policy illusory. View "Lend Lease (US) Construction LMB Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted assault in the third degree, assault in the third degree, and other offenses. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting a phone call between Defendant and his ex-girlfriend as an adoptive admission. The Appellate Division concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the call. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because the People satisfied the threshold evidentiary requirements for admissibility, the trial court properly placed the call before the jury; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s request to redact portions of the call; and (3) that the call was recorded while Defendant was incarcerated does not change the analysis. View "People v. Vining" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of hindering prosecution in the second degree. After Defendant’s codefendant was acquitted of the underlying felony, and prior to Defendant’s sentencing, Defendant moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court neither abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea nor erred in rejecting Defendant’s attempt to relitigate his guilt, as Defendant’s arguments that his plea was constitutionally infirm and that the codefendant’s acquittal of the underlying felony rendered him innocent were without merit. View "People v. Fisher" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of predatory sexual conduct and three counts of criminal sexual act in the first degree. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment followed by twenty years’ post-release supervision on each of the three counts of criminal sexual act and on each corresponding count of predatory sexual assault. The sentence for the criminal sexual acts was to run concurrently to the sentence for the corresponding predatory sexual assault, with the three pairs of sentences to run consecutively to each other. The Appellate Division affirmed the sentences. Defendant appealed, arguing that his aggregate sentence of seventy-five years violates the Eighth Amendment and N.Y. Const. art. I, 5. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to preserve for review his claim that his sentence was cruel and unusual. View "People v. Pena" on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered injuries while traveling on a state highway when a large branch broke off a tree bordering the road, fell through Plaintiff’s Jeep, and struck her on the head. Plaintiff and her spouse, derivatively, brought this action alleging that Defendant, the alleged owner of the property on which the tree was located, was negligent in failing to inspect, trim, and remove the dead or diseased tree. Plaintiff also sued the State, alleging negligence on the part of Department of Transportation employees for failing to properly maintain the trees or warn drivers of hazards along the state highway. Defendant moved for a jury charge directing the apportionment of liability for Plaintiff’s injuries between Defendant and the State. The trial court denied Defendant’s request for a jury instruction regarding apportionment. The Appellate Division modified by reversing the denial of Defendant’s motion for a jury charge on apportionment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the fact-finder may not apportion fault to the State when a plaintiff claims that both the State and a private party are liable for noneconomic losses in a personal injury action. View "Artibee v. Home Place Corp." on Justia Law

The Statewide Central Register maintained by the State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) received information alleging educational neglect by Petitioners. OCFS referred the report to the Westchester County Department of Social Services, Office of Child Protective Services (CPS). CPS decided that the case was eligible to proceed under the Family Assessment Response Track (FAR track) but submitted the case for closure in the month after the report was received, without recommending services. Thereafter, Petitioners wrote to OCFS to request expungement of the FAR records and report. The Director of the OCFS Central Register stated that OCFS could not comply with Petitioners’ request because Petitioners had been placed on the FAR track rather than the standard investigative track. Petitioners then commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding against OCFS and the Director, challenging OCFS’s denial of the opportunity for Petitioners to seek early expungement of the educational neglect report. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statutory procedure allowing for early expungement of reports relating to alleged child abuse does not apply when the parents are not formally investigated but instead are assigned to the FAR track pursuant to N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law 427-a. View "Corrigan v. New York State Office of Children & Family Services" on Justia Law

Jose and Ada Marin obtained an $8 million settlement for injuries Jose suffered when he fell forty feet while working on a building in Manhattan. At issue in this appeal was a fee dispute between Plaintiffs’ attorney-of-record in that action, Sheryl Menkes, and two attorneys she engaged to assist her, Jeffrey Manheimer and David Golomb. Supreme Court held that the fee-sharing agreements unambiguously entitled Manheimer to twenty percent of net attorneys’ fees and Golomb to forty percent of net attorneys’ fees. The Appellate Division affirmed. Menkes appealed. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division, holding that, based on the plain language of the parties’ respective fee-sharing agreements, Manheimer was entitled to twenty percent of net attorneys’ fees and Golomb was entitled to twelve percent of net attorneys’ fees. View "Marin v. Constitution Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy in the sixth degree and two counts of official misconduct. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed Defendant’s convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division in all respects, holding (1) the jury could have rationally concluded that there was legally sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of official misconduct under a theory of malfeasance; (2) the jury could have rationally concluded that the elements of official misconduct by nonfeasance were established; and (3) there was legally sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conspiracy conviction. View "People v. Flanagan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred by precluding defense counsel from questioning prospective jurors during voir dire as to their ability to follow and apply the law regarding the use of involuntary statements at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting defense counsel from questioning prospective jurors with respect to their views on involuntary confessions. View "People v. Miller" on Justia Law

Defendant, a dark-complexioned African-American male, was charged with one count of robbery in the first degree and two counts of robbery in the second decree. During voir dire, the prosecutor used a peremptory strike to exclude a dark-complexioned Indian-American woman. Defendant challenged the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes to exclude dark-colored women. The courts below held that Defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination regarding the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) skin color of a prospective juror is a cognizable classification to challenge a prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes under Batson v. Kentucky; and (2) because defense counsel met her prima facie burden by alleging that the prosecutor was excluding dark-colored prospective female jurors, and the prosecutor did not give a non-discriminatory reason for excluding the dark-complexioned Indian-American woman, the trial court committed reversible error by not seating the juror. View "People v. Bridgeforth" on Justia Law