Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Luz Herrera was injured in an accident while operating a vehicle insured by Hanover Insurance Company, a no-fault insurer. Herrera also had private health insurance through Aetna Health Plan. Herrera received medical treatment for her injuries, and the medical providers submitted some of their bills directly to Aetna, who paid the bills. Aetna subsequently sought reimbursement from Hanover, but Hanover did not respond. Meanwhile, Aetna filed a lien against Herrera for reimbursement. Herrera then resubmitted all of the medical bills to Hanover and assigned her rights against Hanover to Aetna. Aetna then commenced this action against Hanover seeking reimbursement for the medical bills it paid on Herrera’s behalf. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, concluding (1) because Aetna was not a “health care provider” under the no-fault statute, it was not entitled to direct payment of no-fault benefits; (2) Aetna was neither in privity of contract with Hanover nor an intended third-party beneficiary of Hanover’s contract with Herrera; and (3) Aetna could not maintain a subrogation claim against Hanover. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that New York’s Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Reparations Act statutory law and regulatory scheme does not contemplate reimbursement to a health insurer, as opposed to a health care provider. View "Aetna Health Plans v. Hanover Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested after police officers found him in an apartment with three children and loose crack cocaine on a cabinet shelf. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of three counts of unlawfully dealing with a child in the first degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 260.20[1]. Defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the convictions because he was not the parent or guardian of the children and therefore had no relation to the children such that he could control whether the children remained in the apartment. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and vacated the judgment, holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that Defendant permitted the three children to remain in the apartment within the meaning of section 260.20[1]. View "People v. Berry" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree robbery and sentenced to a twenty-year term of imprisonment. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, finding a majority of Defendant’s challenges on appeal unpreserved. Defendant appealed, arguing that errors made by the prosecution before the Grand Jury required dismissal of the indictment and that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to preserve these claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s challenges were not preserved; (2) defense counsel was not ineffective; and (3) Defendant’s remaining contentions were partially unpreserved and otherwise meritless. View "People v. Griggs" on Justia Law

The owner commenced tax certiorari proceedings against the City of Rye, challenging assessments for tax years 2002-2010. for Lot 9 and Lot 10. Lot 10 is within the Rye City School District. Lot 9, which the owner believed to be within that district, actually lies within Rye Neck Union School District. Under RPTL 708, within 10 days of service of the notice and petition on a municipality in a tax certiorari proceeding, a petitioner must mail a copy of those documents to the superintendent of schools of any district within which the assessed property is located. The owner did not comply with that requirements before reaching an agreement with the City. Before that tentative settlement was finalized, the owner recognized its error, notified the Rye District, mailed the petition and notice, and sought the Rye District's consent to settle. The District instead intervened. The court dismissed the petitions with prejudice for failure to comply with RPTL 708. The Appellate Division clarified that dismissal pertained to Lot 9, noting that the action may not be recommenced under CPLR 205(a). The Court of Appeals affirmed. A petitioner who ignores the RPTL 708 mailing requirements and denies a school district the opportunity to economically address a tax certiorari proceeding is not permitted to recommence a proceeding dismissed based upon such noncompliance; to do so would undermine the goals that prompted amendments to RPTL 708. View "Westchester Joint Water Works v Assessor of City of Rye" on Justia Law

Ambac guaranteed payments on residential mortgage-backed securities issued by Countrywide. When those securities failed during the financial crisis, Ambac sued, alleging fraud. Ambac named Bank of America (BoA) as a defendant, based on its merger with Countrywide. Discovery ensued, and in 2012, Ambac challenged BoA's withholding of approximately 400 communications between BoA and Countrywide after the signing of the merger plan in January 2008 but before its closing in July. BoA claimed they were protected by the attorney-client privilege because they pertained to legal issues the companies needed to resolve jointly in anticipation of the closing. Although the parties were represented by separate counsel, the merger agreement directed them to share privileged information and purported to protect the information from outside disclosure. A Referee concluded that the exchange of privileged communications waives the attorney-client privilege and that the communications would be entitled to protection only if BoA could establish an exception, such as the common interest doctrine, which permits limited disclosure of confidential communications to parties who share a common legal (as opposed to business or commercial) interest in pending or reasonably anticipated litigation. The court held that the doctrine applies only if there is "reasonable anticipation of litigation." The Appellate Division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the trial court order holding that privilege did not apply because the communication did not relate to pending or anticipated litigation. View "Ambac Assur. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant was charged with attempted rape and was represented by his first attorney. Defendant retained his second attorney, Long, in 2009. Long represented defendant throughout a significant portion of the pre- and post-indictment proceedings, including plea negotiations and a Huntley hearing. In September 2009, defendant fired Long and retained a third attorney, who represented him for the remainder of the prosecution. Defendant was convicted and subsequently made successive CPL 440.10 motions to vacate the conviction based on newly discovered evidence relating to the credibility of witnesses. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and the denial of both CPL 440 motions. In 2014, defendant moved to vacate his conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10, asserting that attorney Long had simultaneously represented the Albany County District Attorney Soares, that evidence of the conflict was newly discovered, that his conviction was obtained in violation of his right to counsel, that the conviction was based on misrepresentation or fraud by the prosecutor, and that Long had provided ineffective assistance. Four months before defendant retained Long, Long had written a letter in connection with Soares' reelection campaign, asking the Board of Elections asking to examine the machine ballots. In 2011-2012, Long was counsel of record for Soares in a disciplinary proceeding and in Soares' divorce. County Court denied the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division and New York Court of Appeals affirmed, determining that there was no support for the assertion that there was an actual conflict and that defendant failed to show that any potential conflict had operated on the defense. View "People v Wright" on Justia Law

Mother commenced divorce proceedings, seeking full custody of the couple’s two minor children. Father subsequently sought temporary sole legal custody of the children, alleging that he feared for their safety based alleged incidents involving harassment, extramarital affairs, and abuse of alcohol and prescription medication by Mother. The court granted that motion and granted Mother supervised visitation. A subsequent report by a court-appointed forensic evaluator concluded that Father was the more "psychologically stable" parent. During a subsequent appearance, the court set a briefing schedule and stated that it might “be in a position to determine custody sua sponte." The parties submitted briefs regarding Father's requested relocation and the court's ability to grant custody to Father without a hearing. One month later, the court awarded Father sole legal and physical custody, noting that, although the parties planned to continue to make attempts at reinstating supervised visitation, visitation and family therapy had been "suspended" for several months. The court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, noting that the allegations were not controverted and the opinions of the family therapist, the court-appointed forensic evaluator, and the agency supervising visitation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed. The undefined and imprecise "adequate relevant information" standard tolerates an unacceptably-high risk of yielding custody determinations that do not conform to the best interest of a child and does not adequately protect a parent whose fundamental right is at issue. View "S.L. v J.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was born prematurely by emergency cesarean section at New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. (HHC) in June 2005. He was transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit and discharged in stable condition in August 2005. In January 2007, more than 90 days after the claim arose, without first obtaining leave of court as required by General Municipal Law 50-e (5), plaintiff served a notice of claim against HHC alleging negligence and malpractice arising out of failure to properly treat and manage his mother's prenatal care and failure to obtain informed consent with regard to plaintiff's care. The notice claimed that plaintiff sustained brain damage, cognitive defects, developmental, speech and psychomotor delays, fetal and respiratory distress and seizure disorder. Plaintiff filed suit in August 2008, but waited until December 2010, to seek permission to serve late notice of claim. The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal, finding unreasonable an excuse that counsel waited because he needed to receive medical records from HHC. The court held that plaintiff failed to establish "that the medical records put HHC on notice that the alleged malpractice would subsequently give rise to brain damage as a result of birth trauma and hypoxia," The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, the medical records must do more than "suggest" that an injury occurred as a result of malpractice in order for the medical provider to have actual knowledge of essential facts. View "Wally G. v NY City Health & Hosps. Corp." on Justia Law

The Appellate Division rejected the contention that consecutive commitments were not authorized by Family Court Act 454 (3) and concluded that "[g]iven the father's failure to contest the amounts due and his willful refusal to voluntarily pay them despite repeated opportunities afforded to him over more than three years, we find no abuse of discretion in the determination to run the sentences consecutively[.]" At issue is whether Family Court, in revoking two prior suspended orders of commitment, was authorized to order consecutive six-month sentences for each to run consecutively with a third six-month sentence imposed for a current violation. The court concluded that it was within the discretion of the Family Court judge to impose consecutive sentences for each willful violation. Willful violators of Family Court orders should not in effect be given immunity for past violations — conduct which would have justified incarceration at the time — solely because the trial court exercised restraint in fashioning a remedy that provided yet another opportunity to meet support obligations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Matter of Columbia Cnty. Support Collection Unit v. Risley" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for two counts of burglary in the second degree. The court rejected defendant's claim that his trial attorney was ineffective where the record on direct appeal is devoid of any indication that counsel could have presented a colorable argument challenging the legality of the traffic stop. Assuming a colorable challenge to the legality of the frisk incident to defendant's detention could be grounded in this record, counsel may have made a legitimate strategic decision not to move to suppress. The court rejected defendant's contention that counsel failed to provide meaningful representation at sentencing. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments regarding counsel's performance and concluded that they are without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Carver" on Justia Law