Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Defendant Kenneth Cole proposed a going-private merger of Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. that was subject to approval by both a special committee of independent directors and a majority of the minority shareholders. Several shareholders, including Plaintiff, commenced separate class actions alleging breach of fiduciary duty by Cole and the directors. Although the shareholder vote occurred after an amended complaint was filed, 99.8 percent of the minority shareholders voted in favor of the merger. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff sought a judgment declaring that Cole and the directors had breached the fiduciary duties they owed to the minority shareholders, an award of damages to the class, and a judgment enjoining the merger. Supreme Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) in reviewing challenges to going-private mergers, New York courts should apply the business judgment rule as long as certain shareholder-protective conditions are present; (2) if those measures are not present, the entire fairness standard should be applied; and (3) applying that standard to this case, the courts below properly determined that Plaintiff’s allegations did not withstand Defendants’ motions to dismiss. View "In re Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner applied for the partial ten-year exemption for certain improvements made to real property - known as the business investment exemption - in 2008. After the city assessor valued Petitioner’s property, Petitioner challenged the assessed value of the property and the amount of the exemption. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Petitioner on the amount of the exemption and recalculated the exemption for years 2008 through 2014. Supreme Court ordered the Schenectady City School District to issue refunds of any excess taxes it collected during the 2009 through 2014 calendar years due to the prior incorrect calculation of Petitioner’s exemption. The Appellate Division modified by reversing the portion of the order directing the School District to issue refunds for the 2009 through 2011 assessment rolls, concluding that unless Petitioner filed annual challenges to the assessment while the initial 2008 petition was pending, Petitioner failed to preserve its challenge. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there is no requirement that a taxpayer who challenges the amount of the business investment exemption file annual petitions while the initial petition is pending in order to compel compliance with a resulting court order. View "Highbridge Broadway, LLC v. Assessor of the City of Schenectady" on Justia Law

The Glidden Company - now known as Akzo Nobel Paints LLC (ANP) - made, marketed, and sold lead paint. Based on a 1986 purchase agreement, Millennium Holdings LLC, which Appellant insurance companies insured, and its predecessors were required to indemnify ANP and its predecessors from 1986 to 1994. In turn, ANP and its predecessors were required to indemnify Millennium and its predecessors from 1994 onward. Beginning in 1987, a number of lead paint related lawsuits were filed against the predecessors of Millennium and ANP (the lead cases). Appellants satisfied Millennium’s obligations pursuant to monetary settlements reached in the cases. Appellants subsequently commenced this action against ANP seeking to be subrogated to the right of Millennium to indemnification against ANP. Supreme Court determined that the antisubrogation rule prohibited Appellants' right of subrogation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was no reason to apply to antisubrogation rule under the facts of this case, and therefore, the courts below erred in granting summary judgment for ANP on that basis. View "Millennium Holdings LLC v. Glidden Co." on Justia Law

When Defendant was arrested he possessed a folding utility knife. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the People were required to establish that Defendant knew that the knife met the statutory definition of a gravity knife. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the knowledge element of the crime was satisfied by Defendant’s knowledge that he possessed a knife in general. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mens rea prescribed by the Legislature for criminal possession of a gravity knife simply does not require the People to prove that defendants knew that the knife in their possession met the statutory definition of a gravity knife but only requires that defendants be aware of their physical possession of the knife. View "People v. Parrilla" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for the assault and unlawful imprisonment of an eight-year-old boy during which he caused serious physical injury to the child with a dangerous instrument. Defendant was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) and was adjudicated as a risk level three sex offender by the SORA hearing court. Defendant appealed, arguing that the SORA hearing court abused its discretion in adjudicating him a risk level three where the unlawful imprisonment conviction, the qualifying crime for SORA, did not involve a sexual component. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the SORA court to decline to depart from the presumptive risk level three. View "People v. Howard" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether two companies (the Insureds) were entitled to coverage under additional excess policies issued to their predecessor by the Excess Insurers and, if so, how indemnity should be allocated across the triggered policy periods. The Delaware Court of Chancery granted summary judgment for the Insureds with respect to the availability of coverage and the allocation of liability under the excess policies, concluding that New York law applied to the dispute, that the Insureds were each entitled to coverage under the excess policies, and that the proper method of allocation was the all sums approach, as compared with the pro rata allocation method propounded by the Excess Insurers. After a trial, the Delaware Superior Court entered judgment largely in the Insureds’ favor. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that resolution of the parties’ disputes over allocation and exhaustion depended on unsettled questions of New York law. The Court of Appeals answered (1) under New York law, the contract language of the applicable insurance policies controlled the questions certified to the Court; (2) all sums allocation was appropriate based on the language of the policies at issue here; and (3) vertical, rather than horizontal, exhaustion was required before the excess policies attached. View "In re Viking Pump, Inc." on Justia Law

The underlying federal action involved a dispute between General Motors LLC (GM), a franchisor and Chevrolet car manufacturer, and Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc., an automobile dealership with a Chevrolet franchise. Beck sued GM alleging violations of the Dealer Act. The district court ruled against Beck on its claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that resolution depended on unsettled New York law and certified two questions requiring the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of two provisions of New York’s Franchised Motor Vehicle Dealer Act. The Court of Appeals answered as follows: (1) the use of a franchisor sales performance standard that relies on statewide data and some local variances but fails to account for local brand popularity to determine compliance with a franchise agreement is unlawful under the Dealer Act; and (2) a franchisor’s unilateral change of a dealer’s geographic sales area does not constitute a prohibited modification to the franchise. View "Beck Chevrolet Co., Inc. v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was diagnosed with peritoneal mesothelioma years after his exposure to asbestos while replacing asbestos-containing parts on Ford tractors and passenger vehicles. Plaintiff and his wife commenced this action against Ford Motor Company (Ford USA), Ford Motor Company, Ltd., and Henry Ford & Son, Ltd., alleging strict products liability under theories of failure to warn and defective design. Supreme Court denied Ford USA’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that factual issues existed concerning whether Ford USA could be found directly liable for Plaintiff’s injuries. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division erred in concluding that Ford USA could be subject to strict liability in this case. View "Finerty v. Abex Corp." on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and menacing in the second degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him by permitting the People to introduce DNA reports into evidence providing that Defendant’s DNA profile was found on the gun that was the subject of the charged possessory weapon offense without producing a single witness who conducted, witnessed, or supervised the laboratory’s generation of the DNA profile from the gun or Defendant’s exemplar. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that an analyst who witnessed, performed or supervised the generation of Defendant’s DNA profile, or who used his or her independent analysis on the raw data, must be available to testify. View "People v. John" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with assault in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The trial court allowed a recording to be admitted into evidence that the child’s father made on his cellphone in which Defendant told the child that he was going to beat him and that this would hurt more than a previous beating. Defendant appealed, arguing that the recording was inadmissible under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4506 because no party to the conversation consented to the record. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the definition of consent, in the context of “mechanical overhearing of a conversation” pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law 250.00(2), includes vicarious consent, on behalf of a minor child; (2) “vicarious consent” requires a court’s determination that a parent or guardian had a good faith belief that the recording of a conversation to which the child was a party was necessary to serve the best interests of the child and that there was an objectively reasonable basis for this belief; and (3) there was an objectively reasonable basis for the child’s father to believe that recording what he was hearing was necessary to serve his son’s best interests. View "People v. Badalamenti" on Justia Law