Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Appellate Division rejected the contention that consecutive commitments were not authorized by Family Court Act 454 (3) and concluded that "[g]iven the father's failure to contest the amounts due and his willful refusal to voluntarily pay them despite repeated opportunities afforded to him over more than three years, we find no abuse of discretion in the determination to run the sentences consecutively[.]" At issue is whether Family Court, in revoking two prior suspended orders of commitment, was authorized to order consecutive six-month sentences for each to run consecutively with a third six-month sentence imposed for a current violation. The court concluded that it was within the discretion of the Family Court judge to impose consecutive sentences for each willful violation. Willful violators of Family Court orders should not in effect be given immunity for past violations — conduct which would have justified incarceration at the time — solely because the trial court exercised restraint in fashioning a remedy that provided yet another opportunity to meet support obligations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Matter of Columbia Cnty. Support Collection Unit v. Risley" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for two counts of burglary in the second degree. The court rejected defendant's claim that his trial attorney was ineffective where the record on direct appeal is devoid of any indication that counsel could have presented a colorable argument challenging the legality of the traffic stop. Assuming a colorable challenge to the legality of the frisk incident to defendant's detention could be grounded in this record, counsel may have made a legitimate strategic decision not to move to suppress. The court rejected defendant's contention that counsel failed to provide meaningful representation at sentencing. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments regarding counsel's performance and concluded that they are without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Carver" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with gang assault in the first degree. Subsequently at trial, the court polled the jury and accepted the verdict without responding to the notes sent during recess or inquiring whether the jurors still desired a response to those notes. Counsel did not object to this procedure. Defendant was found guilty. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. The court held that where counsel has meaningful notice of the content of a jury note and of the trial court's response, or lack thereof, to that note, the court's alleged violation of the meaningful response requirement does not constitute a mode of proceedings error, and counsel is required to preserve any claim of error for appellate review. The court rejected defendant's remaining contentions. Accordingly, the court reversed and remitted for further consideration. View "People v Mack" on Justia Law

The Attorney General filed suit against defendants, two former officers of AIG, under the Martin Act, Gen. Bus. Law art. 23-A, and Executive Law 63(12). On appeal, defendants challenged the availability of equitable relief. The court held that the Attorney General's claims against defendants withstand summary judgment and, therefore, should proceed to trial. The court concluded that the Attorney General may obtain permanent injunctive relief under the Martin Act and Executive Law 63 (12) upon a showing of a reasonable likelihood of a continuing violation based upon the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, the court rejected defendants' argument that the Attorney General must show irreparable harm in order to obtain a permanent injunction. Furthermore, defendants' reliance upon State of New York v Fine - in which the court held that the Attorney General must demonstrate irreparable harm to obtain a preliminary injunction under the Martin Act - is misplaced. Finally, the court concluded that disgorgement is an available remedy under the Martin Act and the Executive Law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Appellate Division. View "People v Greenberg" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to grand larceny in the third degree. At the plea proceeding, County Court accepted defendant's plea, adjudicated him a second felony offender, and set a sentencing date. At issue is whether a defendant who pleaded guilty to a felony may waive his or her right to be present at sentencing. The court held that such a waiver is permissible in this case. Here, defendant specifically sought to waive this right, did so on the record in the presence of his attorney, was apprised by the court that he had an absolute right to personally appear, and expressly agreed to have his attorney appear at sentencing on his behalf. Moreover, the court assured defendant that it would not sentence him in absentia if circumstances indicated that the plea agreement could not be honored. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v Rossborough" on Justia Law

In Matter of Maron v. Silver, the Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature’s and Governor’s practice of directly and explicitly tying consideration of judicial compensation to unrelated policy initiatives - called linkage - during years 2006 through 2008 violated the separation of powers doctrine. As a result of the Court’s decision, the Legislature passed, and the Governor signed, legislation establishing the Independent Commission on Judicial Compensation, by which the issue of judicial compensation now receives consideration independent of other political matters. In the instant case, Plaintiffs, current and retired judges and justices, sought an award of money damages to remedy the constitutional violation that led to the court’s decision in Matter of Maron. The Appellate Division denied relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that neither Matter of Maron nor any other authority permitted the Court to grant monetary relief to Plaintiffs in this case. View "Larabee v. Governor of State of N.Y." on Justia Law

A condominium board commenced a foreclosure action on a condominium unit to recover unpaid common charges owed by the previous unit owner. Two mortgages were consolidated into a single mortgage lien years before the condominium board filed its common charges lien. Plaintiff, the winning bidder in the foreclosure action, commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring that the second mortgage was subordinate to the subsequently recorded common charges lien and was therefore extinguished by the condominium board’s successful action. Supreme Court declared that the consolidation agreement was the first mortgage of record and that Plaintiff purchased the unit subject to the consolidated mortgage. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the consolidated mortgage qualifies as the first mortgage of record under N.Y. Real Prop. Law 9-B. View "Plotch v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

In 1996, New York State Racing and Wagering Board (the Racing Board) reduced per diem wages for its seasonal employees by twenty-five percent. The Public Employees Federation (PEF) filed an improper practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), alleging that the reduction in wages violated the Racing Board’s duty to negotiate in good faith under N.Y. Civ. Serv. 209-a(1)(d). PERB dismissed the improper practice charge. Petitioner, then president of PEF, subsequently brought this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding, asserting that PERB’s determination was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law. Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that PERB’s determination was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that PERB’s decision dismissing the improper practice charge was not affected by an error of law and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. View "Kent v. Lefkowitz" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and two counts of assault in the first degree. Defendant, who was fifteen years old at the time of the crime, challenged the judgment of conviction on direct appeal, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by withholding information from an expert in child and adolescent psychiatry. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Defendant received meaningful and effective representation; and (2) Defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel’s alleged shortcomings. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted assault in the first degree and attempted arson in the third degree. After a hearing held before a Judicial Hearing Officer (JHO), the JHO concluded that Defendant should be required to pay restitution to the insurer of the owner of the damaged apartment. The County Court fixed restitution in the amount recommended by the JHO. On appeal, the People conceded that the County Court had erred by delegating its authority to conduct the restitution hearing to a JHO. The Appellate Division remitted the case to the County Court for a new hearing. After a second restitution hearing, the County Court increased the restitution award by several hundred dollars. The Appellate Division affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the sentencing court erred by relying upon exhibits and transcripts from the prior hearing conducted by the JHO. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the hearing held upon remittal met the standard set forth in prior cases. View "People v. Connolly" on Justia Law