Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hiroaki (Rocky) Aoki, the founder of the Benihana restaurant chain, formed the Benihana Protective Trust (BPT) in 1998 to hold stock and assets relating to Benihana. In 2002, Rocky married Keiko Aoki. In September 2002, Rocky executed a partial release of his testamentary power of appointment whereby Rocky could appoint only his descendants at the time of his death. In December 2002, Rocky executed a second release further restricting his power to appoint by excluding any descendants who were non-resident aliens. After Rocky’s death, the BPT trustees commenced this proceeding seeking a determination as to the validity of the September and December releases. The Surrogate Court decreed the September and December Releases invalid on the grounds that Rocky was not aware that the Releases were irrevocable and that Rocky’s execution of the Releases was not voluntary. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Keiko failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the Releases were signed as a result of fraud or other wrongful conduct. View "Aoki v. Aoki" on Justia Law

Defendant, Avanguard Medical Group, PLLC was accredited by the State of New York as a facility for the provision of office-based surgery (OBS). Plaintiffs (collectively, GEICO) commenced this action for a declaratory judgment that GEICO was not legally obligated under N.Y. Ins. Law 5102 to reimburse Avanguard for facility fees related to the use of its physical location and related support services. Supreme Court denied GEICO’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed and granted the motion, declaring that GEICO was not required to reimburse Avanguard for OBS facility fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that neither the applicable statutory nor regulatory framework mandate that a no-fault insurance carrier pay a facility fee to an accredited OBS center. View "Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Avanguard Med. Group, PLLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and related charges. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. At the second trial, a witness that had been unavailable at the first trial testified for the prosecution. When asked if he was at the scene of the shooting, the witness invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant appealed, arguing that the witness’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege added “critical weight” to the People’s case, that the witness’s testimony deprived him of a fair trial, and that the trial court erred in allowing the People to impeach the witness with his prior inconsistent statements. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the prosecution did not exploit the witness’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, and therefore, the witness was properly called; (2) the trial court did not err in allowing the People to introduce the witness’s prior statement for the limited purpose of impeaching him; and (3) the trial court did not err in precluding Defendant's identification expert from testifying about the effect of stress on the accuracy of an identification. View "People v. Berry" on Justia Law

After a joint trial, Defendant was found guilty of robbery in the second degree, petit larceny, menacing in the second degree, and possession or use of an imitation pistol or revolver. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting a non-testifying codefendant’s grand jury testimony under Bruton v. United States because the statements were facially incriminating as to Defendant. The Appellate Division agreed with Defendant and reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s admission of the codefendant’s statements, which were incriminating as to Defendant in the constitutional sense, was error, and the error was not harmless. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree gang assault and fourth-degree weapons possession and sentenced to an aggregate term of sixteen years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s redacted statement to law enforcement officers violated Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the redacted statement was facially incriminating, the admission of the statement violated Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, as discussed in Bruton v. United States, and the error was not harmless. View "People v. Cedeno" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and rape in the first degree. On one of Defendant’s N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.10 motions, the Appellate Division vacated the judgment of conviction and remitted the matter for a new trial, concluding that Defendant had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney had operated under a conflict of interest. After a retrial, the jury found Defendant guilty of felony murder and rape in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding Defendant from introducing evidence of third-party culpability during his retrial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in curtailing Defendant’s ability to present a complete defense through the introduction of third-party culpability evidence; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "People v. DiPippo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not commit a mode of proceedings error when it allowed prospective jurors to opt out of serving on the jury due to hardship; (2) the trial court did not err in precluding third-party culpability evidence proferred by the defense; and (3) Defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to object to certain inflammatory statements made by the prosecutor during summation. View "People v. King" on Justia Law

Petitioner maintained a large outdoor advertising sign on the sign of its building that was grandfathered in as a legal, non-conforming use. In 2008, the building and the sign were demolished. Petitioner applied with the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) to erect a new support structure and a new sign. The Manhattan Borough Building Commissioner approved the new sign permit. Thereafter, DOB issued the permit. In 2010, the DOB revoked the permits for both the support structure and the sign, as the zoning resolution did not permit display of advertising signs in the zoning district at issue and the new sign did not qualify as a grandfathered replacement. Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding arguing that it had relied in good faith on the Commissioner’s approval and subsequently-issued permits in expending substantial funds to install the new sign. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) by relying on the erroneously issued permit for the advertising sign, Petitioner did not acquire a vested right to maintain the sign on its property; and (2) the appropriate procedure to resolve the issue of Petitioner’s good-faith reliance on the erroneously issued permit was an application for a zoning variance. View "Perlbinder Holdings, LLC v. Srinivasan" on Justia Law

Petitioner maintained a large outdoor advertising sign on the sign of its building that was grandfathered in as a legal, non-conforming use. In 2008, the building and the sign were demolished. Petitioner applied with the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) to erect a new support structure and a new sign. The Manhattan Borough Building Commissioner approved the new sign permit. Thereafter, DOB issued the permit. In 2010, the DOB revoked the permits for both the support structure and the sign, as the zoning resolution did not permit display of advertising signs in the zoning district at issue and the new sign did not qualify as a grandfathered replacement. Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding arguing that it had relied in good faith on the Commissioner’s approval and subsequently-issued permits in expending substantial funds to install the new sign. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) by relying on the erroneously issued permit for the advertising sign, Petitioner did not acquire a vested right to maintain the sign on its property; and (2) the appropriate procedure to resolve the issue of Petitioner’s good-faith reliance on the erroneously issued permit was an application for a zoning variance. View "Perlbinder Holdings, LLC v. Srinivasan" on Justia Law

Defendant was treated at Hospital for a gunshot wounds. Hospital reported the shooting to the police. By the time Defendant spoke to an officer, Defendant was wearing hospital clothing. The officer subsequently seized the bag containing the clothing that Defendant wore when he came to Hospital. After the officer inspected the garments, authorities came to believe the Defendant had accidentally shot himself with a gun he carried in his waistband. Defendant was charged with, inter alia, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Defendant sought to suppress the clothes based on the “unlawful warrantless seizure of those items.” Supreme Court denied suppression. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the seizure was illegal and that the items seized were improperly admitted into evidence at trial. View "People v. Sanders" on Justia Law