Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and resisting arrest. Robert Fisher, an attorney employed by New York County Defender Services (NYCDS), was assigned to represent defendant. It was later revealed that a different attorney from NYCDS had represented another person, Toi Stephens, who was involved in the incident forming the basis of Defendant’s charges. Based on a potential conflict of interest, the court relieved Fisher as Defendant’s attorney and assigned a new attorney, who represented Defendant at trial. The Appellate Division reversed on the ground that the trial court had abused its discretion in relieving Fisher because Fisher did not represent Stephens, and the relationship between NYCDS and Stephens did not constitute a conflict. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by relieving Defendant’s assigned counsel and appointing conflict-free counsel to represent him. View "People v. Watson" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant was convicted of two counts of the class B violent felony of robbery in the first degree. The People recommended that the court treat Defendant as a second violent felony offender based on a 1994 conviction of assault in the first degree. Defendant was originally sentenced to probation with respect to the 1994 conviction, but after violating that probation, Defendant was resentenced in 1995 to a prison term with respect to that crime. At issue in this case was whether the date of the original sentence, rather than the date of the resentence, determined whether the prior conviction came within the ten-year look-back period in the second violent felony offender statute for the purpose of imposing sentence on the 2010 conviction. Supreme Court concluded that the date of the resentence was the controlling date for the calculation of the look-back period and sentenced Defendant as a second violent offender. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the original sentence controls for the purposes of determining eligibility under the look-back period in N.Y. Penal Law 70.04; and (2) Defendant in this case should not have been resentenced as a second violent felony offender. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated driving while intoxicated and driving while intoxicated. At issue on appeal was whether an unavailable witness’s statement to a defense investigator that she, and not Defendant, was the driver at the time of the accident and that she fled the scene should have been admitted by the trial court as an exception to the hearsay rule because it was a declaration against interest. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that the declarant’s expressions satisfied the requirement that the declaration was aware at the time of making her statement that the statement was contrary to her penal interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statement should have been admitted as a declaration against interest, and the error was not harmless. View "People v. Soto" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the People improperly used his silence, in the immediate aftermath of his arrest, against him in violation of his constitutional rights and that he was denied a fair trial due to defense counsel’s ineffectiveness. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the People’s use of Defendant’s silence constituted a violation of his state constitutional rights, but the error was harmless; and (2) Defendant failed to establish that his attorney failed to provide meaningful representation that compromised his right to a fair trial. View "People v. Pavone" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of attempted robbery in the third degree and two counts of assault in the third degree. Defendant moved to suppress all identification testimony, contending that the People’s failure to preserve a computer-generated array of photographs shown to an identifying witness entitled to him to a presumption that the array was unduly suggestive. Supreme Court denied the motion. The jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the People’s failure to preserve the array gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that the photo array was unduly suggestive, but the People overcame that presumption through testimony at the suppression hearing. View "People v. Holley" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, the court found Defendant guilty of attempted assault in the third degree and related offenses. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly denied her request for a Wade hearing to determine the suggestiveness of a prosecutor’s pre-trial display to the complainant of Defendant’s arrest photograph on the ground that the display was trial preparation and not an identification procedure. The trial court denied Defendant’s request for a Wade hearing, concluding that the pre-trial photograph display was not permissible trial preparation. The Appellate Term affirmed, concluding that the pre-trial photograph display was permissible trial preparation, and the display did not taint the complainant’s in-court identification. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court improperly denied Defendant’s request for a Wade hearing, but the error was harmless, as there was record support for the trial court’s alternative finding of an independent source for the complainant’s in-court identification of Defendant. View "People v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree. Defendant did not appeal. Defendant was later placed in removal proceedings. Citing Padilla v. Kentucky, Defendant moved to vacate his conviction, arguing that his counsel failed inform him that his guilty plea carried a risk of deportation. Supreme Court denied the motion, concluding that Padilla should not be applied retroactively to judgments such as Defendant’s that became final before Padilla was decided. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Chaidez v. United States. At issue before the Appellate Division was whether Defendant’s 2009 judgment of conviction and sentence became final before or after Padilla was decided on March 31, 2010. Defendant argued that the judgment did not become final until one year and thirty days after he was sentenced, or the last day that he could have sought an extension from the Appellate Division to file a late notice of appeal. The Appellate Division concluded that the judgment did not become final until after Padilla was decided, and therefore, Defendant could raise a Padilla claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where a defendant does not take a timely direct appeal from the judgment and does not move for leave to file a late notice of appeal, the judgment becomes final thirty days after sentencing. View "People v. Varenga" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree. The plea included treating Defendant as a second felony offender. The second felony information was based on a prior conviction in Washington D.C.for attempt to commit robbery. Supreme Court adjudicated Defendant a second felony offender and sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Defendant subsequently filed a motion pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.20 to set aside his sentence, which Supreme Court denied. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reducing the prison term from twenty-five years to fifteen years but disagreed with Defendant that his predicate felony was not equivalent to a New York felony. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant’s prior conviction for attempt to commit robbery was not equivalent to any New York felony and, therefore, did not provide a proper basis for Defendant’s second felony offender adjudication. Remitted for further proceedings. View "People v. Jurgins" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of burglary in the second degree but was acquitted of charges involving the use or threatened use of a dangerous instrument. The Appellate Division reversed. Before the second trial on the second-degree burglary charge began, defense counsel moved to preclude the prosecution from presenting evidence at trial evidence that Defendant threatened the victim of the burglary with a razor blade, arguing that the jury in the first trial necessarily decided that Defendant did not use a razor blade by acquitting him of first-degree burglary. The trial court denied the motion. During trial, the People sought to introduce a statement made by Defendant’s counsel at arraignment that was damaging to Defendant. The trial court allowed the statement and denied counsel’s request to withdraw. The jury convicted Defendant of burglary in the second degree. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding (1) even if the jury necessarily decided that Defendant did not use or threaten to use the razor blade, the Appellate Division correctly determined that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply; but (2) pursuant to the advocate-witness rule, the trial court should have granted defense counsel’s request to withdraw or declared a mistrial. View "People v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned three commercial agreements entered into among family members regarding family-owned entities. New York residents executed each agreement, and each agreement contained a provision stating that disputes will be settled by arbitration pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). This action was commenced in New York County Supreme Court alleging fraud and malpractice against the family’s accountants. The court dismissed the complaint but gave Plaintiffs twenty days to replead certain causes of action with specificity. Plaintiffs subsequently added two family members as respondents and filed a demand for arbitration and a statement of claim with the AAA. Supreme Court granted Defendants’ motion to permanently stay certain claims asserted in the arbitration demand as time-barred and granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a stay pending arbitration to the extent of directing the parties to arbitrate the remaining non-time-barred claims, concluding that the AAA was inapplicable. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the AAA applied to the agreements because each concerned transactions that affected commerce and that Plaintiffs did not waive the right to arbitration. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiffs waived the right to arbitration because of their blatant forum-shopping, and the issue of timeliness should be determined by the court. View "Cusimano v. Schnurr" on Justia Law