Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Child lived with his paternal Grandparents beginning when he was less than ten days old and continuing until he was almost ten years old. In 2006, Child’s Mother was granted primary physical custody, but Child continued to reside with Grandparents. In 2012, after Father sought custody from Mother, Mother refused to return Child to Grandparents following a visit. Grandparents commenced this proceeding seeking primary physical custody of Child. Family Court granted joint custody to Grandparents and Father, with primary physical custody to Grandparents and visitation to each parent. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed Grandparents’ petition, concluding that Grandparents lacked standing to seek custody. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Grandparents established their standing to seek custody of Child by demonstrating extraordinary circumstances, namely an extended disruption of Mother’s custody. Remitted. View "Suarez v. Williams" on Justia Law

The two defendants in these cases accepted pleas to criminal offenses. Defendants later petitioned for writs of error coram nobis, each alleging that counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to advise Defendants of their right to appeal. Defendants also alleged had they known about their right to appeal, they would have requested one. In each case, the Appellate Division denied the defendant’s writ of error coram nobis. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under the circumstances of these two cases, Defendants failed to meet their burden on their coram nobis applications, as the records as a whole revealed that Defendants knew about their right to appeal. View "People v. Rosario" on Justia Law

While being treated at South Nassau Communities Hospital by medical professionals employed by Island Medical Physicians, P.C. (collectively, Defendants), Lorraine Walsh was treated with medication that impaired her ability to safely operate an automobile. Afterwards, Walsh drove herself from the Hospital and was involved in an accident that injured Edwin Davis. Davis and his wife (together, Plaintiffs) brought this action against Defendants. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendants did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs to warn Walsh that the medication Defendants gave to Walsh either impaired or could have impaired her ability to safely operate a motor vehicle following her departure from the Hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified by denying Defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint, holding that where a medical provider has administered to a patient medication that impairs or could impair the patient’s ability operate an automobile safely, the medical provider has a duty to third parties to warn the patient of that danger. View "Davis v. S. Nassau Communities Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (collectively, “Pegasus”) sued one defendant (“VarigLog”) for breach of contract and conversion and sought to hold other defendants (“MP defendants”) liable for VarigLog’s conduct on an alter ego theory. Pegasus served a notice to produce documents seeking electronically stores information (ESI) concerning Pegasus’s claims and VarigLog’s relationship with the MP defendants. VarigLog’s production was unsatisfactory to Pegasus. Supreme Court appointed a discovery referee to assist Pegasus and VarigLog in resolving the dispute. During the conferences it was established that computer crashes resulted in the loss of much of the ESI, and that data recovery efforts had proven unsuccessful. Pegasus moved for the imposition of spoliation sanctions against VarigLog and the MP defendants. Supreme Court granted the motion, concluding that the evidence was negligently destroyed. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division erred in determining that Pegasus had not attempted to make a showing that the destroyed documents were relevant to its claim. Remanded to the trial court for a determination as to whether the evidence was relevant to the claims asserted against Defendants and for the imposition of an appropriate sanction should the trial court decide that a sanction is warranted. View "Pegasus Aviation I, Inc. v Varig Logistica S.A." on Justia Law

In IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar Invs., S.A., the Court of Appeals held that, where parties include a New York choice-of-law clause in a contract, such a provision demonstrates the parties’ intent that courts not conduct a conflict-of-laws analysis. In the instant case, Plaintiff was a New York not-for-profit corporation that administered a retirement plan and a death benefit plan. Decedent was enrolled in both plans. Decedent named Appellants as beneficiaries. Both plans stated that they shall be governed by and construed in accordance with New York law. After Decedent died, a Colorado court admitted his will to probate. Plaintiff was unsure to whom the plan benefits should be paid after Decedent’s death and commenced a federal interpleader action against Decedent’s Estate, the personal representative (PR) of the Estate, and Appellants. A federal district court directed Plaintiff to pay the disputed funds to the PR, concluding that Colorado’s revocation law terminated any claims to the plans by Appellants. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals answered by extending the holding in IRB to contracts that do not fall under Gen. Oblig. Law 5-1401 and clarifying that this rule obviates the application and both common-law and conflict-of-laws principles and statutory choice-of-law directives, unless the parties expressly indicate otherwise. View "Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Snow" on Justia Law

The primary issue in these three consolidated appeals was whether Defendants entered knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty pleas when the trial courts failed to mention the constitutional rights Defendants were waiving, including the right to a trial by jury, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront one’s accusers. The Court of Appeals concluded that two of the three defendants intelligently and understandingly waived their constitutional rights, holding (1) a court’s failure to recite the Boykin rights does not automatically invalidate an otherwise voluntary and intelligent plea, and where the record affirmatively shows that the defendant intentionally relinquished those rights, the plea will be upheld; (2) the records in two of the three cases contained such a showing, and therefore, Defendants’ pleas were valid; and (3) the third defendant’s plea must be vacated because the record failed to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver. View "People v. Conceicao" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1989, Petitioner received public assistance from New York City Department of Social Services. Petitioner gave birth to a son, Michael, the next year. Michael was added to Petitioner’s public assistance case, and Petitioner assigned her right to child support for Michael. In January 2007, the Social Security Administration (SSA) determined that Michael was eligible to receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI), retroactive to September 2005. Because Michael’s eligibility for SSI made him ineligible for public assistance, the City removed him from Petitioner’s case in January 2007 but continued to collect child support arrears that had accrued prior to January 2007. In 2011, Petitioner requested a review from the City to determine whether she was owed any excess child support payments. The City determined that it owed no payments because it had not collected sufficient child support arrears to exceed the public assistance provided to Petitioner’s household. The State confirmed the City’s determination. Petitioner then commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding challenging Respondents’ determinations as arbitrary, capricious and erroneous as a matter of law. Supreme Court denied the petition, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds that the City had not yet collected child support arrears that exceeded the unreimbursed benefits Petitioner’s family received. View "Hawkins v. Berlin" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. Later that year, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts each of robbery in the first degree and of endangering the welfare of a child. In 2009, Defendant was released to parole supervision, but his parole was revoked both in 2010 and in 2011. Defendant pleaded guilty to a parole violation and was sentenced to an eighteen-month parole hold. In 2012, Defendant moved to be resentenced on his 2004 conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance. Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to Supreme Court, holding that the courts below erred in deciding Defendant’s resentencing motion without giving him an opportunity to be heard. View "People v. Golo" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees. Defendant’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. Defendant later filed a pro se motion to vacate his judgment of conviction under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law ("CPL") 440.10, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the People failed to disclose evidence that would have supported a third-party culpability defense. Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granted Defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion and ordered a new trial, holding that there was a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different if the information supporting the third-party culpability defense had been disclosed, and therefore, Defendant was denied his right to a fair trial. View "People v. Negron" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second-degree robbery. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court committed legal error by failing to issue an adverse inference instruction based on the police’s failure to generate an electronic recording of his interrogation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion or commit legal error by declining to issue an adverse inference instruction against the People at trial based solely on the police’s failure to electronically record the custodial interrogation of a defendant; and (2) the Appellate Division properly determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law or commit legal error by declining to deliver the adverse inference instruction requested by Defendant. View "People v. Durant" on Justia Law