Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner maintained a large outdoor advertising sign on the sign of its building that was grandfathered in as a legal, non-conforming use. In 2008, the building and the sign were demolished. Petitioner applied with the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) to erect a new support structure and a new sign. The Manhattan Borough Building Commissioner approved the new sign permit. Thereafter, DOB issued the permit. In 2010, the DOB revoked the permits for both the support structure and the sign, as the zoning resolution did not permit display of advertising signs in the zoning district at issue and the new sign did not qualify as a grandfathered replacement. Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding arguing that it had relied in good faith on the Commissioner’s approval and subsequently-issued permits in expending substantial funds to install the new sign. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) by relying on the erroneously issued permit for the advertising sign, Petitioner did not acquire a vested right to maintain the sign on its property; and (2) the appropriate procedure to resolve the issue of Petitioner’s good-faith reliance on the erroneously issued permit was an application for a zoning variance. View "Perlbinder Holdings, LLC v. Srinivasan" on Justia Law

Defendant was treated at Hospital for a gunshot wounds. Hospital reported the shooting to the police. By the time Defendant spoke to an officer, Defendant was wearing hospital clothing. The officer subsequently seized the bag containing the clothing that Defendant wore when he came to Hospital. After the officer inspected the garments, authorities came to believe the Defendant had accidentally shot himself with a gun he carried in his waistband. Defendant was charged with, inter alia, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Defendant sought to suppress the clothes based on the “unlawful warrantless seizure of those items.” Supreme Court denied suppression. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the seizure was illegal and that the items seized were improperly admitted into evidence at trial. View "People v. Sanders" on Justia Law

In 2003, Plaintiff was charged with two counts of murder in the second degree. In 2007, Supreme Court dismissed the charges. Plaintiff subsequently commenced two civil rights actions by filing complaints against the City of New York, the New York City Police Department (NYPD), and several police officers involved in the investigation of the murder. After discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaints in both actions. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to (1) the individual defendants on Plaintiff’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims under New York common law and 42 U.S.C. 1983, and (2) the City and NYPD on Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) the lower courts improperly granted summary judgment to the individual defendants on Plaintiff’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims; and (2) although Plaintiff maintained triable state law claims against the City and NYPD, the courts below properly granted summary judgment to those governmental entities on Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Torres v. Jones" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the parties’ disputes pertaining to certain workers’ compensation insurance payment agreements should be submitted to arbitration. To resolve this issue, the Court of Appeals was required to make a threshold determination of the whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act precludes application of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in relation to Cal. Ins. Code 11658. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division, holding (1) because application of the FAA does not invalidate, impair, or supersede section 11658, the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not implicated, and the FAA applies to the parties’ payment agreements in this case; and (2) because the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated the question of arbitrability and enforceability of the arbitration clauses to the arbitrators, the FAA mandates that the arbitration provisions be enforced as written. View "Monarch Consulting, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Penn." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. Supreme Court imposed two concurrent six-month terms of imprisonment and a $300 mandatory surcharge pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law 60.35. Defendant asked the sentencing court to defer the surcharge, but the court refused to consider the request on the grounds that it did not have the authority to do so. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant could seek relief from the surcharge only by way of a motion to resentence pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 420.10(5). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a person subject to a mandatory surcharge may seek to defer payment by way of a motion to resentence; and (2) persons sentenced to confinement of sixty days or less may present information in support of a request to defer on the appearance date set forth on a summons issued pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law 60.35(8). View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fourth degrees. In handing down its verdict, Supreme Court indicated that the presumption set forth in N.Y. Penal Law 220.25(2), commonly known as the drug factory presumption, applied in this case. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the drug factory presumption applied and that Defendant received effective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, the drug factory presumption was properly considered by the court; and (2) defense counsel’s decision that Defendant would not testify before the grand jury did not, per se, amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. View "People v. Hogan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting rebuttal testimony intended to provide evidence of Defendant’s sole witness’s bias or motive to fabricate, that the trial court erred in several of its other evidentiary rulings, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Appellate Division affirmed as modified. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Appellate Division did not exceed its authority under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 470.15(1) or violate previous holdings of the Court of Appeals by basing its decision that the People’s rebuttal witness testimony was admissible on a ground different from that of the trial court; (2) Defendant’s remaining claims of trial court error were without merit; and (3) no errors in counsel’s representation established the level of ineffectiveness warranting reversal of Defendant’s conviction. View "People v. Nicholson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, a Chinese immigrant, was found guilty of murder, burglary and attempted robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) his confession to law enforcement officers was an involuntary product of untoward psychological pressure and fatigue, and (2) due to his limited English language proficiency, he did not understand the import of the Miranda warnings given to him, and therefore, he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the totality of the circumstances did not establish that Defendant’s will was so overborne as to make his confession involuntary; and (2) there was record support for the lower courts’ determinations that Defendant understood the import of his Miranda rights. View "People v. Jin Cheng Lin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by (1) failing to oppose the admission and use of prior consistent statements of the child victim, which bolstered her credibility, and (2) failing to consult or present testimony from a qualified independent medical expert to support his argument that no sexual abuse occurred. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the record clearly indicated that Defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective in this case. View "People v. Gross" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that he fell and was injured while walking on a New York City public sidewalk. Plaintiff brought this negligence action against West River Associates, LLC and Sandy and Rhina Mercado. Plaintiff specifically alleged that West River violated section 7-210 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, which establishes a duty on the part of the owner of real property abutting a sidewalk to maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. West River moved for summary judgment, asserting that the area of the sidewalk upon which Plaintiff tripped was located entirely in front of the Mercado property, therefore, the defect did not abut the West River premises. Supreme Court granted West River’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that because West River did not own the property that abutted the sidewalk where Plaintiff tripped it fell, it was not responsible for maintaining the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that factual questions existed as to whether West River breached its duty to maintain its sidewalk and, if so, whether that breach was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. View "Sangaray v. West River Assocs., LLC" on Justia Law