Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2002, Plaintiffs commenced a proposed class action civil rights suit against the County of Rensselaer. The County invoked Selective Insurance Company’s duty to provide a defense under the policies that the company sold to the County. Selective agreed to defend the County in the action, subject to the insurance policy limits and the deductible. Selective’s counsel and the County agreed to settle the actions for $1,000 per plaintiff, determined to be slightly more than 800 individuals in total, with attorney fees also being recoverable. Selective abided by the terms of the settlement. The County, however, refused to pay Selective more than a single deductible payment. Selective then commenced this action for money damages, arguing that each class member was subject to a separate deductible. Supreme Court concluded that a separate deductible payment applied to each class member and that all legal fees should be allocated to one policy. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the class action suit did not constitute one occurrence under the relevant policies’ definition of “occurrence” and that the attorney’s fees generated in defending that suit were properly allocated to the named plaintiff. View "Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. County of Rensselaer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was born in 1992 with severe mental and physical difficulties. In 2008, Plaintiff commenced this personal injury action against BMW of North America, LLC and related BMW entities (collectively, Defendants), alleging that his disabilities were caused by in utero exposure to unleaded gasoline vapor caused by a defective fuel hose in his mother’s BMW. Defendants moved to preclude Plaintiff’s causation experts from testifying at trial, arguing that their opinion reached novel conclusions and did not use generally accepted principles and methodologies. Supreme Court granted Defendants’ motion to the extent that it precluded the testimony of two of Plaintiff’s causation experts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the courts below properly precluded the two expert witnesses from testifying at trial as to causation because the experts did not rely on generally accepted methodologies in concluding that Plaintiff was exposed to a sufficient concentration of gasoline vapor to cause his injuries. View "Sean R. v. BMW of N. Am., LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and resisting arrest. Robert Fisher, an attorney employed by New York County Defender Services (NYCDS), was assigned to represent defendant. It was later revealed that a different attorney from NYCDS had represented another person, Toi Stephens, who was involved in the incident forming the basis of Defendant’s charges. Based on a potential conflict of interest, the court relieved Fisher as Defendant’s attorney and assigned a new attorney, who represented Defendant at trial. The Appellate Division reversed on the ground that the trial court had abused its discretion in relieving Fisher because Fisher did not represent Stephens, and the relationship between NYCDS and Stephens did not constitute a conflict. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by relieving Defendant’s assigned counsel and appointing conflict-free counsel to represent him. View "People v. Watson" on Justia Law

In 2010, Defendant was convicted of two counts of the class B violent felony of robbery in the first degree. The People recommended that the court treat Defendant as a second violent felony offender based on a 1994 conviction of assault in the first degree. Defendant was originally sentenced to probation with respect to the 1994 conviction, but after violating that probation, Defendant was resentenced in 1995 to a prison term with respect to that crime. At issue in this case was whether the date of the original sentence, rather than the date of the resentence, determined whether the prior conviction came within the ten-year look-back period in the second violent felony offender statute for the purpose of imposing sentence on the 2010 conviction. Supreme Court concluded that the date of the resentence was the controlling date for the calculation of the look-back period and sentenced Defendant as a second violent offender. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the original sentence controls for the purposes of determining eligibility under the look-back period in N.Y. Penal Law 70.04; and (2) Defendant in this case should not have been resentenced as a second violent felony offender. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated driving while intoxicated and driving while intoxicated. At issue on appeal was whether an unavailable witness’s statement to a defense investigator that she, and not Defendant, was the driver at the time of the accident and that she fled the scene should have been admitted by the trial court as an exception to the hearsay rule because it was a declaration against interest. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that the declarant’s expressions satisfied the requirement that the declaration was aware at the time of making her statement that the statement was contrary to her penal interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statement should have been admitted as a declaration against interest, and the error was not harmless. View "People v. Soto" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the People improperly used his silence, in the immediate aftermath of his arrest, against him in violation of his constitutional rights and that he was denied a fair trial due to defense counsel’s ineffectiveness. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the People’s use of Defendant’s silence constituted a violation of his state constitutional rights, but the error was harmless; and (2) Defendant failed to establish that his attorney failed to provide meaningful representation that compromised his right to a fair trial. View "People v. Pavone" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of attempted robbery in the third degree and two counts of assault in the third degree. Defendant moved to suppress all identification testimony, contending that the People’s failure to preserve a computer-generated array of photographs shown to an identifying witness entitled to him to a presumption that the array was unduly suggestive. Supreme Court denied the motion. The jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the People’s failure to preserve the array gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that the photo array was unduly suggestive, but the People overcame that presumption through testimony at the suppression hearing. View "People v. Holley" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, the court found Defendant guilty of attempted assault in the third degree and related offenses. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly denied her request for a Wade hearing to determine the suggestiveness of a prosecutor’s pre-trial display to the complainant of Defendant’s arrest photograph on the ground that the display was trial preparation and not an identification procedure. The trial court denied Defendant’s request for a Wade hearing, concluding that the pre-trial photograph display was not permissible trial preparation. The Appellate Term affirmed, concluding that the pre-trial photograph display was permissible trial preparation, and the display did not taint the complainant’s in-court identification. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court improperly denied Defendant’s request for a Wade hearing, but the error was harmless, as there was record support for the trial court’s alternative finding of an independent source for the complainant’s in-court identification of Defendant. View "People v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree. Defendant did not appeal. Defendant was later placed in removal proceedings. Citing Padilla v. Kentucky, Defendant moved to vacate his conviction, arguing that his counsel failed inform him that his guilty plea carried a risk of deportation. Supreme Court denied the motion, concluding that Padilla should not be applied retroactively to judgments such as Defendant’s that became final before Padilla was decided. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Chaidez v. United States. At issue before the Appellate Division was whether Defendant’s 2009 judgment of conviction and sentence became final before or after Padilla was decided on March 31, 2010. Defendant argued that the judgment did not become final until one year and thirty days after he was sentenced, or the last day that he could have sought an extension from the Appellate Division to file a late notice of appeal. The Appellate Division concluded that the judgment did not become final until after Padilla was decided, and therefore, Defendant could raise a Padilla claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where a defendant does not take a timely direct appeal from the judgment and does not move for leave to file a late notice of appeal, the judgment becomes final thirty days after sentencing. View "People v. Varenga" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree. The plea included treating Defendant as a second felony offender. The second felony information was based on a prior conviction in Washington D.C.for attempt to commit robbery. Supreme Court adjudicated Defendant a second felony offender and sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Defendant subsequently filed a motion pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.20 to set aside his sentence, which Supreme Court denied. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reducing the prison term from twenty-five years to fifteen years but disagreed with Defendant that his predicate felony was not equivalent to a New York felony. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant’s prior conviction for attempt to commit robbery was not equivalent to any New York felony and, therefore, did not provide a proper basis for Defendant’s second felony offender adjudication. Remitted for further proceedings. View "People v. Jurgins" on Justia Law