Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree, rape in the second degree, and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant appealed, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to seek the dismissal of time-barred charges against him and by failing to object to certain statements by the prosecutor during her summation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) given the presence of a plausible and reasonable strategy that could explain counsel’s action, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek dismissal of the time-barred charges; and (2) Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to certain statements made during the prosecutor’s summation. View "People v. Ambers" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for burglary in the second degree and petit larceny. The burglary charge was timely interposed but the petit larceny charge was not, as the applicable statutory period ran approximately one and one-half years before the filing of the accusatory instrument. Defendant’s counsel never obtained the time-barred count’s dismissal, and Defendant was convicted of both indicted offenses. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his for-cause challenge to a prospective juror and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment by vacating Defendant’s conviction on the charge of petit larceny and dismissing that charge in the indictment, holding that the failure of Defendant’s counsel to have the time-barred petit larceny count dismissed constituted ineffective assistance. View "People v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant was arraigned on three accusatory instruments, each charging him with two counts of forcible touching, sexual abuse in the third degree, and harassment in the second degree. Upon motion, Criminal Court consolidated the three accusatory instruments. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to one count of forcible touching. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction and dismissed the accusatory instrument based on factual insufficiency grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Appellate Term and reinstated Defendant’s conviction, holding that the accusatory instrument set forth sufficient factual allegations to establish the elements of the offense. View "People v. Hatton" on Justia Law

On March 30, 2006, Defendant was indicted for various charges arising from a burglary that occurred in January 2005. Defendant was arrested on April 4, 2006 for a different burglary that occurred that day. On April 7, 2006, the People filed a felony complaint against Defendant for a burglary that occurred on February 23, 2006. Defendant was charged with two counts of burglary in the second degree for both the April 4 and February 23 incidents. After a trial on the consolidated indictments, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree relative to both the 2005 and February 23, 2006 burglaries. The sentencing court adjudicated Defendant a second violent felony offender based on a 1985 conviction for robbery in the second degree and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division by remitting the case for resentencing, holding (1) the courts below properly denied Defendant’s motions to dismiss the grand jury indictment for the February 23 burglary; but (2) Defendant should not have been sentenced as a second violent felony offender for the 2005 burglary because his 1985 conviction occurred more than ten years earlier, and the intervening periods of incarceration did not close the gap. View "People v. Small" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with several crimes for committing acts against a six-year-old girl. Before trial, the People made a plea offer of ten years’ probation for a single crime. After hearing the trial court’s warning that he would not receive leniency should he be found guilty the charges, Defendant rejected the State’s plea offer and proceeded to trial. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of rape in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, sexual misconduct, and endangering the welfare of a child. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate term of imprisonment of ten to twenty years. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a presumption of vindictive sentencing did not apply to the circumstances presented in this case. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

In exchange for a fee, Defendant used a stolen New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) key to allow two undercover police officers to enter the subway system through an emergency exist gate. Defendant was subsequently charged, by misdemeanor information, with petit larceny. Defendant pleaded guilty to petit larceny under the information and also pleaded guilty to theft of services under a second information. Defendant appealed, arguing that the information charging him with petit larceny was jurisdictionally defective because the NYCTA was not the “owner” of any property taken within the meaning of the larceny statutes. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the information adequately alleged all the elements of a larceny in setting forth Defendant’s unauthorized use of the illegally-obtained key to allow individuals to enter through the exit gate in exchange for money, thereby depriving the NYCTA, as the owner, of its property. View "People v. Matthew P." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a second child sexual assault felony offender to a determinate term of fifteen years with five years of post-release supervision. The Appellate Division affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that his right to a fair trial was violated because of alleged critical mistakes by his trial counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to establish that defense counsel made the type of missteps that establish a performance so lacking in competence and strategic purpose that it failed to meet the constitutional minimum standard of professionalism recognized by the Court. View "People v. Wragg" on Justia Law

Petitioners, including individual residents of the Village of Painted Post, commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding against the Village and others (collectively, Respondents), asserting that the Village failed to comply with the strict procedural mandates of the State Environmental Quality Review Act by entering into a bulk water sale agreement with a subsidiary of Shell Oil Co. providing for the sale of 314 million gallons of water from the village water system and by approving a lease agreement with a railroad for the construction of a water transloading facility. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that Petitioners lacked standing and failed to state a cause of action. Supreme Court denied Respondents’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing after finding that one of the individual petitions had standing. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the petition on the ground that the individual petitioner lacked standing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division, in concluding that the individual petitioner at issue lacked standing, applied an overly restrictive analysis of the requirement to show harm “different from that of the public at large.” View "Sierra Club v. Village of Painted Post" on Justia Law

In 1993, Petitioner began receiving public assistance from the City of New York. At that time, the City required that Petitioner work thirty-five hours per week in the Work Experience Program (WEP). In 2000, Petitioner left the WEP, and his benefits were terminated. In 2007, Petitioner won $10,000 in the New York State lottery. The New York State Division of Lottery and the New York State Office of Temporary Disability Assistance (OTDA) invoked N.Y. Soc Serv. Law 131-r, which authorizes the State to appropriate half of any lottery prize to reimburse itself to public assistance benefits paid to the prizewinner during the previous ten years. Petitioner filed this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding alleging that were OTDA permitted to recoup a portion of the benefits paid to him through section 131-r, then he would be paid less than minimum wage in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Supreme Court ultimately granted Petitioner’s petition against OTDA and its Commissioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner was entitled to minimum wage for his hours worked as a participant in the WEP program, and the State could not retroactively deprive him of a minimum wage by recouping the funds through his lottery prize. View "Carver v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of intentional murder in the second degree and attempted intentional murder in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s challenge to the admissibility of testimony concerning Defendant’s 2005 assault of a restaurant worker was unpreserved or waived at trial; (2) the trial court properly allowed the prosecutor to inquire about a 2002 incident in which Defendant reacted with violence to a verbal insult to his mother; and (3) reference to a 2010 incident in which Defendant broke an inmate telephone and threatened a corrections officer should have been excluded, but the error was harmless. View "People v. Israel" on Justia Law