Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nomura Asset Capital Corporation and Asset Securitization Corporation (Nomura) established a commercial mortgage-backed securities business and engaged the law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP (Cadwalader) to confirm that Nomura’s securitized commercial mortgage loans qualified as real estate mortgage investment conduit (REMIC) trusts. When one REMIC securitization, known as the D5 securitization, involved Nomura in federal litigation, Nomura commenced the underlying legal malpractice action against Cadwalader, alleging that Cadwalader failed to provide appropriate legal advice and perform necessary due diligence concerning the REMIC eligibility of the D5 securitization. Cadwalader moved for summary judgment, which Supreme Court denied. The Appellate Division modified the order by dismissing the advice claim and otherwise affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division order, granted summary judgment to dismiss the legal malpractice in its entirety and otherwise affirmed, holding that Cadwalader established, as a matter of law, that summary judgment and dismissal of the legal malpractice cause of action were merited in this case. View "Nomura Asset Capital Corp. v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Attorney General (AG) filed a complaint resulting in a civil enforcement action by the AG, alleging that Sprint knowingly violated the New York Tax Law, engaged in fraudulent or illegal acts, and submitted false documents to the State pursuant to the New York False Claims Act (FCA). Sprint moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Supreme Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the New York Tax Law imposes sales tax on interstate voice service sold by a mobile provider along with other services for a fixed monthly charge; (2) the statute is unambiguous; (3) the statute is not preempted by federal law; (4) the AG’s complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action under the FCA; and (5) the damages recoverable under the FCA are not barred by the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. View "People v. Sprint Nextel Corp." on Justia Law

James Pyne, who died during these proceedings, was the founder and sole stockholder of Remet Corporation. Pyne sold Remet’s stock and facilities, along with real property he had been leasing to Remet, to Burmah Castro Holding, Inc. The sales agreement contained an indemnification provision obligating Pyne to indemnify, defendant, and holder the buyer harmless for certain environmental losses. Remet later received a letter from the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) notifying Remet that it was a potentially responsible party for environmental contamination at the Erie Canal Site adjacent to Remet’s real property. Remet filed notices of claim against Pyne’s estate seeking indemnification for environmental liabilities under the sales agreement. Remet then brought this action against the Estate asserting claims for contractual and common-law indemnification. Supreme Court granted Remet summary judgment on liability. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that DEC’s letter did not require Remet to take action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the letter was sufficiently coercive and adversarial as to require action in connection with any environmental law pursuant to the sales agreement; and (2) Remet was entitled to contractual indemnification for past and future environmental losses arising out of DEC’s investigation and remediation of the Erie Canal Site. View "Remet Corp. v. Estate of Pyne" on Justia Law

The common thread among these three appeals was that an individual tripped on a defect in a sidewalk or stairway and was injured but was prevented from going to trial on the ground that the defect was characterized as too trivial to be actionable. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division in two of the three cases, holding (1) a defendant seeking dismissal of a complaint on the basis that the alleged defect is trivial must make a prima facie showing that the defect is physically insignificant and that the characteristics of the defect or the surrounding circumstances do not increase the risks it poses; (2) in the first case, the Appellate Division properly ruled that the defect was not actionable; (3) in the second case, the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the defect was nonactionable, as a material triable issue of fact existed regarding whether the defect was trivial; and (4) in the third case, the Appellate Division erred in holding that the alleged defect was trivial, as the defendant failed to meet its initial burden of making a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as matter of law, and therefore, the burden did not shift to the plaintiff to establish the existence of a material triable issue of fact. View "Hutchinson v. Sheridan Hill House Corp." on Justia Law

During the course of the parties’ matrimonial proceeding, Supreme Court issued an order (the “January 2010 order”) requiring Defendant to deposit in escrow the proceeds of the sale of properties which were the subject of a prior equitably distribution determination in favor of Plaintiff, Defendant’s former spouse. Plaintiff filed a motion to hold Defendant in civil and criminal contempt for Defendant’s failure to comply with the order. After a hearing, Supreme Court found Defendant in contempt of court for failing to comply with the January 2010 order. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence adduced at the hearing established a sufficient basis for the civil contempt judgment, and therefore, the Appellate Division properly affirmed Supreme Court. View "El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of sodomy. In contemplation of Defendant’s release from incarceration, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders prepared a case summary and a risk assessment instrument. At the ensuing court appearance, Supreme Court assessed Defendant eighty-five points and adjudicated him a level two sexually violent offender, finding sufficient evidence, consisting in part of the grand jury minutes, to support the imposition of points for course of sexual misconduct. The grand jury minutes were not disclosed to the defense in reaching Defendant’s Sex Offender Registration Act risk level determination. The Appellate Division affirmed, ruling that there was no due process violation in Supreme Court’s reliance on the grand jury minutes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant’s due process rights were violated when the hearing court relied on the grand jury minutes, but given the overwhelming evidence that was disclosed to Defendant in support of the same risk factor, the error was harmless. View "People v. Baxin" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Defendant waived prosecution by information. Defendant appealed, arguing that the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally defective. The Appellate Term affirmed, concluding that the accusatory instrument was facially sufficient. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the language used in the accusatory instrument gave Defendant sufficient notice of the crime charged to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy. View "People v. Sans" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with three counts of witness tampering and bribery for cultivating a relationship with and giving money to three girls, witnesses to the murder of Dennis Brown. Defendant’s half-brother, Wesley Sykes, was charged with the murder. As the trial of Sykes was about to begin, Bobby Gibson, an eyewitness to the shooting, was shot and killed outside the apartment of one of the three girls. An unrelated individual later confessed to the murder of Gibson. During Defendant’s trial, the trial court ruled that evidence of Gibson’s murder was necessary for the jury to consider the reliability and truthfulness of the three girls. The jury acquitted Defendant of all three tampering counts but convicted him of the bribery counts. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was deprived of a fair trial because the trial court allowed evidence of the Gibson murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court’s decision to admit the evidence of Gibson’s murder was not an abuse of discretion. View "People v. Harris" on Justia Law

On July 22, Petitioner commenced this proceeding seeking to invalidate a designating petition filed on July 8, 2015 by the Niagara County Board of Elections naming Respondent as a Democratic Party candidate for the office of Niagara County Legislator and to enjoin the Board from placing Respondent’s name on the ballot. In serving Respondent, Petitioner nailed the papers to the door of Respondent’s residence on July 22 and mailed the papers to that residence by express mail on July 23. July 23 was the last day of the statutory period authorized by the Election Law. Respondent answered, arguing that the action was not timely commenced. Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the Board to strike Respondent’s name from the ballot. The Appellate Division affirmed. Respondent appealed, arguing that mailing on the last day of the statutory period was jurisdictionally defective since delivery inevitably would occur outside of the statutory period. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the instrument of notice had been properly delivered prior to the deadline, and this proceeding was properly commenced in a timely manner. View "Angletti v. Morreale" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held in Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Amato that N.Y. Ins. Law 3420(f), which provides that all motor vehicle insurance policies must contain uninsured motorist coverage, has no application to police vehicles. Here, Respondent, a police officer, was injured when the driver of an underinsured vehicle struck the police car in which Respondent was a passenger and Michael Knauss was the driver. Knauss maintained an automobile liability insurance policy issued by State Farm that included a supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorist (SUM) endorsement. Respondent made a demand upon State Farm for underinsured motorist arbitration under the SUM endorsement of Knauss’s policy. State Farm refused payment, asserting that a police vehicle was not a covered “motor vehicle” within the meaning of the SUM endorsement. Supreme Court concluded that Knauss’s policy did not cover Respondent. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Amato was inapplicable to SUM coverage mandated by section 3420(f)(2) and defining “motor vehicle” for purposes of statutorily required SUM coverage as inclusive of police vehicles. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a police vehicle is not a “motor vehicle” covered by a SUM endorsement under section 3420(f)(2)(a); and (2) Amato remains binding precedent in this matter of statutory interpretation. View "Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law