Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is a health insurance company that offers a choice of federal government-regulated alternatives to Medicare known as Medicare Advantage plans. These plans allow Medicare-eligible individuals to purchase health insurance from private insurance companies. Those companies are reimbursed by the government for health care services provided to the plans’ members. Before the Supreme Judicial Court was Plaintiff’s demand for indemnification to cover losses resulting from health care claims for unprovided services paid through Plaintiff’s computer system. At issue was the coverage available to Plaintiff pursuant to Rider #3 of a financial institution bond issued by Defendant. The bond insured Plaintiff against various losses, and the Rider amended the bond to provide indemnification specifically for computer systems fraud. When Plaintiff suffered more than $18 million in losses for payment for fraudulent claims for services never actually performed under its Medicare Advantage plans, Plaintiff sought payment from Defendant for its post-deductible losses. Defendant denied coverage, and Plaintiff sued. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Rider applies to losses resulting directly from fraudulent access, not to losses from the content submitted by authorized users. View "Universal Am. Corp. v Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA" on Justia Law

The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC), which regulates taxis and other cars for hire in New York City, engaged in a lengthy process to create the “Taxi of Tomorrow.” The process culminated in rules that established a particular make and model of vehicle as the City’s official taxicab. Petitioners sought to invalidate the rules and obtain a related declaration, arguing that the TLC lacked authority to enact the rules and violated the separation of powers doctrine in doing so. Supreme Court concluded that the rules were invalid because the TLC exceeded its authority under the City Charter and violated the separation of powers by intruding in the City Council’s domain. The Appellate Division reversed and declared that the rules were valid. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the TLC did not exceed its authority or violate the separation of powers doctrine by enacting the rules. View "Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. N.Y. City Taxi & Limousine Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 1990, Appellant was convicted of three counts of rape in the second degree. Prior to his release in 2004, Appellant was adjudicated a risk level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Appellant subsequently violated parole. In 2010, while under civil confinement, Appellant filed a petition for a downward modification of his risk level. After a hearing, County Court denied Appellant’s modification request, concluding that Appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to a downward modification. The Appellate Division affirmed. Appellant appealed, arguing that he was deprived of due process when County Court failed to grant an adjournment so as to give him access to copies of all the records that the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders reviewed in making an updated recommendation that Appellant’s risk level classification should not be reduced. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant was not prejudiced by the court’s denial of an adjournment to obtain the documents. View "People v. Lashway" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-insurance intermediaries were Brown & Brown, Inc., a Florida corporation, and its New York subsidiary, Brown & Brown of New York, Inc. (BBNY). When Theresa Johnson began working for BBNY she signed an employment agreement that contained a Florida choice-of-law provision and a non-solicitation provision precluding Johnson from soliciting, accepting, or servicing any customer of Plaintiffs. One month after Johnson was terminated, she began working for a competitor of BBNY. Plaintiffs commenced this action against Johnson and her new employer (collectively, Defendants) alleging that Johnson breached the employment agreement by soliciting Plaintiffs’ customers. The Appellate Division dismissed the portion of the breach of contract cause of action based on the non-solicitation provision, concluding that the provision was overbroad and unenforceable and that the choice-of-law provision was unenforceable as against public policy. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the agreement’s choice-of-law provision was unenforceable in relation to the non-solicitation provision; and (2) questions of fact existed as to whether Plaintiffs engaged in overreaching or used coercion to obtain the non-solicitation restrictive covenant, and therefore, dismissal was inappropriate. View "Brown & Brown, Inc. v Johnson" on Justia Law

The two defendants in this case were eighteen years old when they pleaded guilty to armed felonies. Both defendants were “youths” within the meaning of N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 720.10(1), had never been convicted of a crime, and would be eligible to be granted youthful offender status but for the fact that their convictions to be replaced by youthful offender adjudications were armed felonies. At issue on appeal was whether the court in the case of each defendant was required to determine on the record if he was an eligible youth due to the existence of one or more factors set forth in section 720.10(3). The Court of Appeals reversed in each case, holding that, when a defendant who would otherwise be an eligible youth has been convicted of an armed felony, the court is required to make a determination on the record as to whether one or more of the section 720.10(3) factors exists and the defendant is therefore an eligible youth, even if the defendant does not request it or has agreed to forgo youthful offender treatment as part of a plea bargain. View "People v. Middlebrooks" on Justia Law

Two certificateholders in ACE Securities Corp., Home Equity Loan Trust sued DB Structured Products (DBSP) for failure to repurchase loans that purportedly did not conform to the representations and warranties of DBSP, which sponsored the transaction. The Trust later sought to substitute itself as plaintiff in place of the certificateholders. DBSP moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely, arguing that the Trust’s claims accrued as of March 28, 2006, more than six years before the Trust filed its complaint. DBSP further contended that the certificateholders did not validly commence this action and lacked standing to sue. Supreme Court denied DBSP’s motion to dismiss and held the Trust’s action to be timely.The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Trust’s cause of action against DBSP for breach of representations and warranties accrued at the point of contract execution on March 28, 2006; and (2) even assuming that the certificateholders possessed standing to sue, the two certificateholders did not validly commence this action because they failed to comply with the contractual condition precedent to suit. View "ACE Sec. Corp. v DB Structured Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant executed an adjustable rate note to First National Bank of Arizona, wherein she agreed to repay a loan. To secure payment, Defendants executed a mortgage with the the bank. The loan was subsequently made part of a residential mortgage-back securitization trust, and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas became the owner of the note. Aurora Loan Servicing, LLC later assumed servicer obligations, and thereafter, the mortgage was assigned to Aurora. When Defendants defaulted under the note, Aurora commenced this foreclosure action. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that Aurora did not have standing to bring this foreclosure action. Supreme Court denied the motion and then granted Aurora’s motion for summary judgment of foreclosure and sale. The Appellate Division affirmed the first order, concluding that Aurora had standing. The court reversed the judgment of foreclosure and sale for reasons not relevant to this appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that Aurora had standing to commence this mortgage foreclosure action, holding that because the note was transferred to Aurora before the commencement of the foreclosure action, Aurora was vested with standing to foreclose. View "Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Jesse Stipley (the decedent), a seventeen-year-old high school student, was killed in an automobile accident. During an authorized autopsy, the medical examiner removed, among other organs, the decedent’s brain, fixed it in formalin, and placed it in the autopsy room for further examination by a neuropathologist. The decedent’s body was subsequently retrieved from the mortuary, and a funeral was held. Approximately three months later, the decedent’s family discovered that the decedent’s brain had been retained by the medical examiner. Plaintiffs, the decedent’s family, commenced this action against the City of New York alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from the mishandling and withholding of their son’s brain. Supreme Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict as to liability. After a trial, Plaintiffs were awarded $1 million in damages. That amount was subsequently reduced. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a medical examiner is not legally required to notify next of kin that organs, tissues or other specimens have been removed from the body during a lawful autopsy and retained by the medical examiner after such an autopsy. View "Shipley v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant and Oman Gutierrez were charged with the first degree murder of Edward Contreras. It was alleged that Defendant murdered Contreras at Gutierrez’s request. New York City Police Detective Rolando Rivera testified for the prosecution as an expert respecting uncoded portions of recorded conversations of phone calls made by Gutierrez while in prison. Defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed, arguing that Rivera should not have been permitted to testify as an expert regarding the conversations because he invaded the fact-finding province of the jury and impermissibly bolstered the testimony of certain prosecution witnesses. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that although considerable portions of Rivera’s testimony were admitted in error, the error was harmless. View "People v. Inoa" on Justia Law

Eastchester Rehabilitation & Health Care Center cared for Edna Shannon for four years. During the fourth year, Family Service Society of Yonkers (FSS Yonkers) was appointed as guardian of Shannon’s person and property. Eastchester later made a claim with FSS Yonkers seeking compensation for services it rendered to Shannon that were not covered by Medicaid. Thereafter, Westchester County Department of Social Services (DSS) advised FSS Yonkers that Shannon was indebted to DSS for medical assistance paid on her behalf. After Shannon died, FSS Yonkers commenced this proceeding to settle its final account and seeking a determination as to how it should disburse Shannon’s remaining property. Supreme Court held that the balance of Shannon’s remaining property should be paid to DSS. The Appellate Division reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) N.Y. Ment. Hyg. Law 81.44 does not permit a guardian to retain property of an incapacitated person after the incapacitated person has died for the purpose of paying a claim against the incapacitated person that arose before that person’s death; and (2) inasmuch as Eastchester’s claim for medical services rendered to Shannon was unrelated to the administration of her guardianship, section 81.44 does not allow FSS Yonkers to withhold from Shannon’s estate funds to pay Shannon’s debt to Eastchester. View "In re Shannon" on Justia Law