Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Alem Cardenas received treatment for injuries he received during an automobile accident at the office of Plaintiff-medical provider. Cardenas’s automobile liability insurance policy with Defendant-insurer contained a New York State no-fault endorsement. Cardenas assigned his right to receive no-fault benefits to Plaintiff. Plaintiff later commenced this action seeking to recover no-fault insurance benefits, asserting that it timely submitted bills and claims for payment but that Defendant had not made any payments or denied the requests. Defendant asserted as an affirmative defense that payment for Plaintiff’s claims was not overdue because Plaintiff failed to submit “proper proof of the fact and amount of the loss” as required by the Insurance Law. The Appellate Division granted summary judgment for Plaintiff with respect to all the claims that were not timely denied by Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division properly determined that Plaintiff met its prima facie summary judgment burden. View "Viviane Etienne Med. Care v. Country-Wide Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 1986, when Plaintiff was three years old, he underwent surgery to correct a congenital heart malformation. In 2008, Plaintiff underwent exploratory surgery, which revealed that a portion of an atrial catheter had been left in his heart during surgery in 1986. In 2009, Plaintiff commenced this action alleging that, while treating him, Defendants negligently left the foreign body in his heart, which caused him to suffer serious and permanent injuries. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the action should have been filed ten years after they allegedly failed to remove the entire catheter and that the foreign object exception for medical malpractice actions did not apply. Although Plaintiff sued within one year of discovering the tubing, Defendants contended that the catheter was a fixation device, not a foreign object. Supreme Court granted Defendants’ motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the fragment at issue in this case qualified as a foreign object for purposes of the discovery rule of N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-a. View "Walton v. Strong Mem’l Hosp." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree and gang assault in the first degree. After a plea colloquy, the court accepted the plea, and Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the County Court erred in denying in part his motion to suppress statements he made to police. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant’s valid waiver of the right to appeal barred his challenge to the court court’s suppression ruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal, and therefore, he was precluded from challenging the County Court’s adverse suppression ruling. View "People v. Sanders" on Justia Law

In 2009, Defendant pleaded guilty in a Westchester County court to criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree. In 2010, a Suffolk County Grand Jury charged Defendant with criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. Defendant moved to dismiss the Suffolk County charges on statutory double jeopardy grounds, arguing that his second prosecution was based on the same criminal transaction as the previous prosecution. The court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the crimes for which Defendant was prosecuted in Suffolk County were not based upon the same criminal transaction as the crime for which he was prosecuted in Westchester County. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the successive prosecutions here involved two different criminal transactions. View "People v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant was a CEO and director of now bankrupt Agra Services of Canada, Inc (Agra Canada) and an officer and director of Agra USA. Agra Canada entered into a purchase agreement with Cooperative Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. (Rabobank) under which Rabobank purchased and financed certain receivables of Agra Canada. Thereafter, Defendant and Eduardo Guzman Solis, Agra Canada’s president and a manager of both Agra businesses, signed personal guarantees in favor of Rabobank. After Guzman Solis died, an investigation revealed fraudulent receivables based on nonexistent transactions submitted by Guzman Solis. Rabobank sued Agra Canada, Agra USA, and the estate of Guzman Solis seeking to recover the millions of dollars owed to Rabobank under the purchase agreement and guarantees. Defendant appeared represented by counsel but failed to retain counsel for Agra USA. The district court entered default judgment against Agra USA. Rabobank then filed this action in state court alleging that Defendant was liable under the guaranty. The Appellate Division granted Rabobank summary judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the default judgment against him was obtained by Rabobank’s collusion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s collusion claim constituted a defense barred by the language in the guaranty; and (2) Defendant’s claim of collusion was contradicted by the record. View "Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank, B.A. v. Navarro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Bank was the owner and holder of note secured by a mortgage on commercial property in Brooklyn. When Defendant, the mortgagor and obligor on the note, defaulted, Bank commenced a mortgage foreclosure action against Defendant. The property was sold at auction to Bank. Bank subsequently retained an appraiser to determine the fair market value of the property. Bank then moved for a deficiency judgment against Defendant in an amount representing the outstanding amount Bank was owed less the alleged fair market value. Supreme Court denied Bank’s motion for a deficiency judgment, holding that Bank failed to meet its burden of establishing the fair market value of the premises because the affidavit from the appraiser was conclusory and lacked specific information about how he reached his fair market value determination. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division, holding that Supreme Court correctly found that the appraiser’s affidavit was insufficient to meet Bank’s burden, but that the court should have permitted Bank to submit additional proof establishing fair market value rather than denying the deficiency judgment motion outright. View "Flushing Savings Bank, FSB v. Bitar" on Justia Law

When decedent Robyn R. Lewis died in 2010, a will was admitted to probate that was executed by Decedent in Texas in 1996. Objections to probate were filed by various members of Decedent’s family. The Surrogate dismissed the objections to the 1996 will and admitted it to probate. The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s decision and decree. The Court of Appeals modified the orders of the Appellate Division by remitting to Surrogate’s Court for further proceedings, holding that crucial issues remained sufficient to raise the presumption that Decedent revoked her 1996 will. View "In re Lewis" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted robbery in the second degree. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that he had the specific intent to steal. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that there was legally sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction on the robbery counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that while the evidence may establish attempted criminal behavior, it did not support a valid inference that Defendant intended to steal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances provided legally sufficient evidence to support the inference that Defendant intended to steal. View "People v. Lamont" on Justia Law

In June 2008, Plaintiff brought an action in a federal district court alleging violations of her federal and state constitutional rights and asserting common law negligence claims. The district dismissed several of Plaintiff’s claims. On September 30, 2011, the court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining federal claims. Plaintiff appealed. Because Plaintiff failed to file her brief and appendix by an extended deadline, the Second Circuit dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal by mandate issued on August 28, 2012, effective July 10, 2012. On June 25, 2012, Plaintiff commenced the instant action in Supreme Court. Defendants moved to dismiss the state action as untimely, contending that the six-month tolling period provided by N.Y. C.P.L.R. 205(a) had already expired. Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff’s federal action terminated on September 30, 2011, thus rejecting Plaintiff’s contention that her federal action terminated with the Second Circuit’s dismissal of her appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, where an appeal is taken as of right, the prior action terminates for purposes of section 205(a) when the nondiscretionary appeal is “exhausted,” either by a determination on the merits or by dismissal of the appeal. View "Malay v. City of Syracuse" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance. While on parole for the instant offense, Defendant moved for resentencing pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 440.46. The People opposed the motion, arguing that Defendant was ineligible for resentencing under that provision because he was not currently incarcerated. Supreme Court granted Defendant’s motion for resentencing, concluding that Defendant was eligible for relief under the 2011 amendments to section 440.46 because the revised statute did “not distinguish between defendants who are incarcerated and those who are on parole but are not incarcerated.” The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the amendments to section 440.46 expanded the class of defendants eligible for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act to include those who are on parole at the time resentencing is sought. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law