Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Respondent pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree. Respondent was previously convicted in three separate cases to sexual abuse in the first degree, rape in the first degree, and sodomy in the second degree. As Respondent’s release date approached, the Attorney General commenced this N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 10 proceeding seeking a determination that Respondent was a detained sex offender requiring civil management. After a dispositional hearing, Supreme Court issued an order finding that Respondent was a dangerous sex offender and ordering his confinement. Defendant appealed, arguing that Supreme Court improperly permitted an expert witness to testify via electronic video conferencing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Supreme Court erred by permitting the expert witness to testify via electronic appearance on rebuttal without a showing of exceptional circumstances; but (2) the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence presented by the State. View "State v. Robert F." on Justia Law

The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) terminated the Section 8 benefits of Petitioners. Petitioners commenced separate N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceedings against NYCHA seeking to annul NYCHA’s determinations as arbitrary and capricious and to reinstate their benefits. NYCHA move to dismiss the proceedings as time barred, arguing that Petitioners did not commence these proceedings within four months of their receipt of their respective “T-3 letters.” Supreme Court denied NYCHA’s motions and granted Petitioners’ petitions, concluding that the statute of limitations did not begin to run because NYCHA failed to show that it mailed all three notices - a warning letter, T-1 letter and T-3 letter - required under a federal consent judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) pursuant to the consent judgment, the statute begins to run upon the tenant’s receipt of the T-3 letter, regardless of whether NYCHA has proven that it mailed other notices required by the consent judgment to be sent before the T-3 letter; and (2) the Appellate Division found in each case that NYCHA established proper mailing of the T-3 letters, and Petitioners did not commence these proceedings within four months of their receipt of the T-3 letters. View "Banos v. Rhea" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied to the New York City Department of Education (DOE) for certification as a school bus driver. The DOE denied Petitioner’s application due to Petitioner’s long record of criminal behavior, a gap in his employment history, and his age at the time of his last conviction. Consequently, the bus company employing Petitioner terminated Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding against the DOE contending that the DOE’s denial of his application for certification was arbitrary and capricious. Supreme Court granted the petition to the extent of annulling DOE’s determination and ordering the DOE to approve Petitioner’s application. The Appellate Division reversed, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the DOE’s denial of Petitioner’s application for certification was not arbitrary and capricious. View "Dempsey v. New York City Dep’t of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Bank of America and related entities seeking to set aside and cancel, as null and void, the Bank’s mortgage interest in real property conveyed on the authority of an allegedly forged deed. The Bank moved to dismiss the complaint under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(5) as untimely under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(8). Supreme Court dismissed the complaint in its entirety as time-barred. The Appellate Division affirmed as to the Bank, concluding that Plaintiff’s forgery-based claim against the Bank was subject to the six-year statute of limitations for fraud claims set forth in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(8). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations in section 213(8) did not foreclose Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant because, under prior case law, a forged deed is void ab initio, and as such, any encumbrance upon real property based on a forged deed is null and void. View "Faison v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and robbery in the second degree. The sentencing court directed that the assault sentence run consecutively to the attempted murder sentence and that the remaining sentences run concurrently. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by directing that the sentences for Defendant’s assault and attempted murder convictions be served concurrently. The Appellate Division then remanded the matter for resentencing for consideration of whether one of Defendant’s robbery sentences should be modified to run consecutively in light of the correction. Defendant argued that N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 430.10 prohibited the court from realigning his sentences and that N.Y. Penal Law 70.25(2) required the imposition of concurrent sentences for each count. The sentencing court rejected Defendant’s arguments and modified Defendant’s sentences by running his sentence for first-degree assault consecutively to his sentence for first-degree robbery. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing court’s realignment of Defendant’s sentences did not violate N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 430.10; and (2) the imposition of consecutive sentences on Defendant's assault and robbery convictions was lawful because the robbery and assault were committed by separate and distinct acts. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), on behalf of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), retained P.A.L. Environmental Safety Corp. (PAL) to perform asbestos removal from electrical cables underneath city streets. PAL contracted with IMS Safety Inc. (IMS) to serve as site safety consultant. Plaintiff, an asbestos handler employed by PAL, sustained work-related injuries after falling through an uncovered manhole. Plaintiff commenced this action against IMS, the City of New York, NYCTA, and MTA alleging violations of the Labor Law and common law negligence. Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint against all defendants, concluding that Plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries because he disregarded his supervisor’s instructions. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding (1) IMS was not a statutory agent subject to liability; and (2) Plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division, holding (1) the Appellate Division erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries; and (2) Plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether IMS, as a potential statutory agent, had the authority to supervise that portion of the work that brought about Plaintiff’s injury. Remitted to Supreme Court. View "Barreto v. Metro. Transit Auth." on Justia Law

The 2010 General Permit requires municipal storm sewer systems to develop and implement a Stormwater Management Program in compliance with specifications developed by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) to limit the introduction of pollutants into stormwater. After the 2010 General Permit took effect, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) and other environmental advocacy groups (collectively, NRDC) brought this hybrid N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding/declaratory judgment action against DEC challenging certain aspects of the 2010 General Permit. The Appellate Division rejected NRDC’s federal and state law challenges to the 2010 General Permit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that NRDC’s challenges to the lawfulness of the 2010 General Permit were without merit. View "Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation" on Justia Law

While seeking treatment from a psychiatrist, Defendant admitted to sexually abusing an eleven-year-old relative. Defendant was later arrested and charged with predatory sexual assault against a child. During Defendant’s criminal trial, over Defendant’s objection, the trial court permitted the psychiatrist to testify that Defendant had made the admission on the grounds that the psychiatrist had disclosed the reported abuse to the Administration for Children’s Services. Defendant was convicted as charged. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Supreme Court erred in permitting the psychiatrist to testify concerning Defendant’s admissions and that the error was not harmless. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the testimony by Defendant’s psychiatrist that Defendant admitted to the abuse ran afoul of the physician-patient privilege, and the error was not harmless. View "People v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of murder and eventually released on lifetime parole supervision. Petitioner was subsequently charged with misdemeanor assault. Petitioner was found to be unfit to stand trial and was committed to the custody of the Office of Mental Health. While committed, Petitioner was charged with assault and harassment stemming from his attack on a fellow patient. The charges were eventually dismissed. Meanwhile, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision commenced parole revocation proceedings against Petitioner on the incident based on the patient attack. An administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended parole revocation. The Division of Parole adopted the ALJ’s recommendation, and Petitioner was incarcerated. While incarcerated, Petitioner commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 contending that due process prohibits the Division from proceeding with a revocation hearing against a person who has been deemed mentally unfit to proceed to trial. Supreme Court denied the petition, determining that an assertion of incompetency does not bar parole revocation proceedings. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when a parolee lacks mental competency to stand trial, it is a violation of his or her due process rights to conduct a parole revocation hearing. View "Lopez v. Evans" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer stopped Defendant’s vehicle based on the officer’s mistaken belief that Defendant violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Defendant was subsequently charged with failing to stop at a stop sign and driving while intoxicated. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked probable cause for the initial stop. The county court suppressed the evidence, concluding that the traffic stop was improper. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that that traffic stop was justified based on the officer’s reasonable belief that Defendant failed to stop at a valid stop sign. View "People v. Guthrie" on Justia Law