Justia New York Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession in the first degree. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other claims, that his right to counsel was violated when the trial court replaced a sick juror with an alternate juror and failed to object to the replacement of the juror. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendant failed to preserve his right to counsel claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s right to counsel claim was not preserved for appellate review; and (2) Defendant’s remaining claims lacked merit. View "People v. Garay" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. The People sought to have Defendant adjudicated a persistent felony offender pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law 70.10. After two days of hearings, County Court issued an order finding that Defendant was a persistent felony offender and concluding that a recidivist sentence was warranted. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 70.10 was rational as applied to Defendant in this case. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

In the underlying federal action commenced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against David Smith and his investment services firm, the SEC obtained a temporary restraining order freezing Smith’s assets and those of his wife, including the couple’s irrevocable trust (Trust). The Trust, represented by Jill Dunn, intervened in the matter. Due to Dunn’s actions in that action, the United States Magistrate Judge sanctioned Dunn with a public admonishment. Thereafter, the Committee on Professional Standards for the Third Department filed a petition alleging that Dunn had engaged in fraudulent conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The text of the Magistrate’s sanctions opinion was essentially the basis of the complaint. The Appellate Division concluded that collateral estoppel applied to the Magistrate’s sanctions order and found Dunn guilty of the charged misconduct. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, Dunn did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of her alleged misconduct, and therefore, collateral estoppel did not apply in her disciplinary proceeding to bar her from challenging the findings of the Magistrate. View "In re Dunn" on Justia Law

Phillip Khalil was employed with Front, Inc. for approximately seven years. Khalil later informed Front that he intended to resign to take a position with Eckersley O’Callaghan Structural Design (EOC), one of Front’s competitors. Front, however, terminated Khalil’s employment upon discovering that he worked on several side projects for Front’s competitors, including EOC, in violation of the terms of his employment contract. Front retained Meister Seelig & Fein LLP (MSF), whose attorney sent a letter to Khalil making certain demands. The attorey then sent a letter to EOC making demands nearly identical to those made in the letter to Khalil. Khalil and EOC failed to comply with Front’s demands. Front subsequently commenced an action against Khalil and EOC alleging, inter alia, civil conspiracy and misappropriation of trade secrets. Khalil commenced a third-party action against MSF and its attorney (collectively, MSF), asserting a cause of action for libel per se based upon statements made by MSF in its letter to Khalil. Supreme Court determined that the letter to Khalil was absolutely privileged and dismissed the third-party action against MSF. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the letters were written in the preliminary stages of an anticipated action, they were properly subject to a qualified privilege. View "Front, Inc. v. Khalil" on Justia Law

Petitioners, the owners of a single-family residence located in Nassau County, filed a small claims assessment review (SCAR) petition under Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) 730. The County requested disqualification of the petition for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the property was not owner-occupied by Petitioners during the tax year in question. The SCAR hearing officer agreed and disqualified the petition. At issue on appeal was whether the property should come within the statute’s coverage where, during the relevant tax year, the property was occupied rent-free by Petitioners’ close relative. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when a property is occupied during the relevant tax period by an owner’s relative but not by the owner, the property is not “owner-occupied” within the meaning of RPTL 730(1)(b)(i). View "Manouel v. Bd. of Assessors" on Justia Law

Julie Conason and Geoffrey Bryant (together, “Tenants”) were the rent-stabilized tenants of an apartment in a residential building owned by Megan Holding, LLC (“Megan”). Megan was Tenants’ landlord. Almost five and a half years after she occupied the apartment under a vacancy lease, Conason asserted an overcharge claim against Megan. Civil Court dismissed the overcharge claim without prejudice, reasoning that Tenants failed to prove the amount of the overcharge. Tenants subsequently commenced this action against Megan seeking a money judgment for rent overcharge. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Tenants and directed an assessment of damages. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213-a’s four-year statute of limitations did not bar the claim because there was significant evidence of fraud on the record. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that, because of the unrefuted proof of fraud in the record, section 213-a merely limited Tenants’ recovery to those overcharges occurring during the four-year period immediately preceding Conason’s rent challenge. View "Conason v. Megan Holding, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2005, Barclays Bank PLC, a major global bank based in the United Kingdom, and BDC Finance LLC, a Connecticut-based hedge fund, entered into a series of transactions that were memorialized in several forms, including a Master Agreement. In 2008, Barclays sent BDC a letter terminating the Agreement due to BDC’s alleged default. BDC filed this action for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. Barclays counterclaimed alleging corresponding causes of action. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Appellate Division granted BDC’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Barclays breached the agreements and was not entitled to summary judgment on its counterclaims. The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the Appellate Division, holding that material issues of fact existed as to whether Barclays defaulted under the parties’ contract and, thus, neither party was entitled to summary judgment. View "BDC Finance LLC v. Barclays Bank PLC" on Justia Law

After a subsurface water main abutting Plaintiffs’ property ruptured, causing water to flood into and damage their home’s basement, Plaintiffs made a claim under their homeowners’ insurance policy issued by Defendant, Allstate Indemnity Company. Allstate disclaimed coverage based on a provision in the policy excluding coverage for loss caused by water on or below the surface of the ground, including water that seeps through any part of the residence premises. Plaintiffs commenced this action alleging that Allstate had improperly disclaimed coverage because their claim fell within the exception to the water loss exclusion. Supreme Court declared that Plaintiffs’ loss was covered under the policy and that Allstate was required to pay the claim. The Appellate Division modified the order by vacating the declaration and otherwise affirmed, concluding that the policy was ambiguous and should be construed in favor of Plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the policy’s unambiguous language excluded from coverage the water damage to Plaintiffs’ home, and the exception did not nullify the water loss exclusion or render it ambiguous. View "Platek v. Town of Hamberg" on Justia Law

Following Tenant filed a successful rent overcharge complaint, Landlord commenced a holdover proceeding against Respondent seeking to evict Tenant and regain possession of the premises. In support of its claims, Landlord alleged that Tenant breached the lease. Tenant asserted a defense of retaliatory eviction and counterclaimed for attorneys’ fees and damages under N.Y. Real Prop. Law 234, which imposes a covenant in favor of a tenant’s right to attorneys’ fees. Civil Court dismissed the proceeding, finding that Tenant had not breached the lease and that the proceeding was commenced in retaliation for Tenant’s successful rent overcharge claim. The court denied fees under section 234. The Appellate Division modified on the law by granting Tenant’s claim for attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 234 and otherwise affirmed. The Appellate Division subsequently granted Landlord’s leave to appeal, certifying the question of whether section 234 applies to a lease that authorizes the landlord to cancel the lease upon a tenant’s default, repossess the premises and then collect attorneys’ fees incurred in retaking possession. The Court of Appeals answered that section 234 applied to the lease in this case and that Tenant was entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party in this summary holdover proceeding. View "Graham Court Owner's Corp. v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Several firefighter plaintiffs sued the City of Buffalo, alleging that the City engaged in reverse, disparate treatment racial discrimination as to civil service lists for Buffalo firefighters. The City moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211 due to Plaintiffs’ undisputed failure to file a N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 50-i notice of claim. Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that dismissal was not warranted based on Plaintiffs’ failure to file a notice of claim and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently issued its decision in Ricci v. DeStefano. This case was returned to Supreme Court, which granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the City had failed to meet the strong basis in evidence standard set forth in Ricci. The Court of Appeals remitted this case for further proceedings, holding (1) a notice of claim need not be filed for a Human Rights Law claim against a municipality; and (2) Plaintiffs should not have been granted summary judgment on the issue of liability. View "Margerum v. City of Buffalo" on Justia Law